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ABSTRACT 
Over the last thirty or so years, feminist scholars have been highly critical of the ways 
that gender roles have been understood, particularly in religious institutions, including 
Roman Catholicism. Although some changes have been made (e.g., women are able to 
take on roles that were prohibited in the recent past), serious problems still remain. 
Gender roles are seen as “given” by God and/or as a part of our human nature. The many 
problems relating to gender roles affect not only women, but also men, yet very little 
attention has been paid to their negative implications for men. This dissertation proposes 
to develop a more adequate understanding of masculinity from a Roman Catholic 
perspective. In order to develop this, I will draw on historical perspectives, feminist 
scholarship, scholarship by men on gender, and recent scholarship in the natural and 
social sciences. In addition, I will show how this idea of masculinity relates to a culture 
outside the West: Korea. It is possible, I will argue, to develop an understanding of 
masculinity that moves beyond gender complementarity (i.e. “separate but equal” attitude 
towards gender), that allows for the flourishing of both sexes, and that promotes a just 
and loving way of living as a man. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the recent past, scholarly treatments concerning gender highlighted problems—
from unfair treatment of individuals to the unjust structures of institutions of the 
society—for women. While many people around the world have benefited from these 
wonderful and pioneering works, what has largely been missing from them, especially 
from the theological community, and more specifically from works by Roman Catholic 
theologians, are works by and about men. That is, there has been no extensive study 
about what kind of effects these old constructions of gender might also have for and on 
men. I intend to show in this dissertation that the policies and ideologies that have been 
and still are harmful for women are also simultaneously harmful for men. There has not 
been a project dedicated to finding out just how harmful the complementary norms for 
gender roles are for men, or to developing a more just outlook on masculinity by and in 
the context of Roman Catholic men. There certainly has been some work on masculinity 
in the Protestant context and some discussion of masculinity in the Roman Catholic 
context. Nevertheless, none of them deal directly with the Roman Catholic vision of 
masculinity per se. 
 The significance of this project will go beyond the context of Roman Catholic 
ethics in the western world. It is meant to stimulate global discussions. As such, I will 
make my observations, analysis, criticisms, and reconstructions as a Korean Roman 
Catholic man with examples coming from history, social and natural sciences, 
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scholarship by men and women, and from the Korean tradition as well as the Korean 
Roman Catholic heritage, since similar problems exist in Korea. This is not to claim that 
such an approach will automatically qualify my dissertation as a work that is globally true. 
However, I will be able to make the case that traditional Roman Catholic accounts of 
masculinity are problematic for both men in the West and in one other, non-western 
country, namely Korea—enabling later works to add to this project. 
 In the end, my hope is that the final product of this dissertation will be helpful for 
anyone, but especially men, who struggles with the religious and societal conceptions of 
male roles. It is meant to help anyone struggling with traditional notion of gender and 
hence the contribution will be universal—or “catholic,” in the true meaning of the word. 
Historical Consideration 
 
 To do so, I must first make at least a very brief mention about the earlier stages of 
the problem.1 Thinkers of Greek and Roman antiquity, such as Aristotle, operated with 
dualistic ideologies, which associated women with the characteristics of body, cold, wet, 
and impurity while men were associated with the higher characteristics of soul, hot, dry, 
and pure. However, their views were diverse and even in the earliest forms of Christianity 
we do not find a monolithic view of gender. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind 
that Christian views did not come into existence out of a vacuum. Certainly, the Jesus 
movement had its own color and uniqueness but, however unique and however different, 
it was nevertheless profoundly influenced by dualism in Greek thought, Stoicism and 
Gnosticism, and Jewish thought and customs. Based on the available biology of the time, 
                                                 
1
 I intend to write this part as a quick summary.  While an extensive look into the historical development 
may be very important, my focus will be to critique complementary model for gender roles and to develop 
a more adequate understanding of masculinity.  As such, I will keep this section only as a brief historical 
overview. 
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males and females were not simply different, but often males (and their seed) were seem 
to be better, or even perfect, and females were imperfect, failed males, or “mistakes” of 
biology. One possible theological consequence of these understandings of biology was 
the creation of the view that males were better equipped for salvation and that women 
had to become de facto males in order to enter the Kingdom.2 
Even without a direct linkage to Greek dualism, one finds the superior status of 
men over women in traditional interpretations of some references to the image of God of 
the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible). The ruling metaphor in describing such a status is 
that of bridegroom and bride. As noted in the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World (2004) 
by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (henceforth CDF), the well-known Old 
Testament image stresses that “God makes himself known as the bridegroom who loves 
Israel, his bride.”3 Such imagery lives on in the New Testament and in our current Roman 
Catholic teachings. While the image of bridegroom/bride encompasses positive images 
such as the intimacy of marriage, the physical desires and delights of marriage, and God’s 
tender love, care, closeness, and delight for God’s people, what has traditionally been 
subtly stressed are other aspects of this metaphor. That is, what has been quietly handed 
down is its linkage of only men with God and Jesus. 
Many scholars find this linkage problematic for a variety of reasons. Such a 
method understands the divine essence fundamentally and essentially as male, inevitably 
                                                 
2Rosemary Ruether, Religion and Sexism (New York: Simon and Schuster 1974), chapter 5; Peter Brown 
The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988) 
 
3
 CDF, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the 
Church and in the World (2004), paragraph #9 
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placing maleness closer to the divine than femaleness. Furthermore, this method suggests 
that the bride “responds” to the bridegroom’s invitation, putting women in a receptive, 
not initiatory, role as later exemplified by Mary who listens and receives.4 
Influenced by their Sitz im Leben, the canon of the New Testament (the “Second 
Testament”)—along with the writings of early and medieval Christian thinkers—upheld 
the gender status quo of the ancient times (i.e. Haustafeln, paterfamilias, and lower status 
for and blameworthiness of women for sin). Furthermore, with a few very important but 
aberrant exceptions, such views of women, and consequently of men, held sway in 
Roman Catholic documents for centuries up to the modern times. I believe that the first 
significant glimpse of modification came with Pope John Paul II (JPII hereafter) in 1981. 
In Familiaris consortio, the language of submission and inferiority disappeared. Unlike 
many5 of the preceding official documents, it did not include the same kind of emphasis 
on subjection and obedience. In fact, JPII opened up many more possibilities for women 
not seen up to that point. Following St. Ambrose, he maintained that a man is “not her 
master but her husband” and a woman is “not your slave but your wife.” The instruction 
to the man is to “reciprocate her attentiveness to you and be grateful to her for her love.” 
JPII urged men to pay “due respect for the different vocation of men and women,” and 
                                                 
4
 Susan A. Ross, “Can God be a bride?” America 191.13 (Nov. 1, 2004): 12-15.  Also see her “The 
Bridegroom and the Bride: The theological anthropology of John Paul II and its relation to the Bible and 
Homosexuality,” in Patricia Beattie Jung ed. with Joseph A. Coray, Sexual Diversity and Catholicism: 
toward the Development of Moral Theology (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001); “The Bride of 
Christ and the Body Politic: Body and Gender in Pre-Vatican II Marriage Theology,” Journal of Religion 
71/3 (July 1991), 345-61; Extravagant Affections: a Feminist Sacramental Theology (New York: 
Continuum, 1998), 97-136 
 
5
 Many but certainly not all.  JPII was not the first to rid of the language of submission and inferiority.  For 
example, the Second Vatican Council made great strides by making many affirmations for women and their 
roles in Gaudium et spes Part2. Chap. 1 
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said that the church must promote as far as possible their equality of rights and dignity.6 
Further still, he did not limit women’s role to the domestic sphere and gave some 
acknowledgment for the possibilities of women working, at least in some contexts, 
outside their homes. In relation to the view previously held in the Church, this certainly is 
a much needed step in the right direction. 
Having said all that and certainly not taking anything away from the brave 
movements that JPII made especially in the context of the documents from less than a 
century before him, there are yet more possibilities for improvement. While JPII certainly 
made progress in giving women some possibilities for advancement in society and in 
their families, progress is allowed only insofar as it is contained in certain complementary 
expectations. That is, JPII cautioned that women should not lose their “femininity” and 
that they should put their family and maternal obligation over any other obligations 
(and/or perhaps over their dreams).7 While I do not have much problem with JPII’s 
insistence on a “family first” attitude,8 it becomes problematic when the obligation is 
only stressed for women. One can only imagine how much better an encyclical it would 
have been if he also urged men to make sure to put paternal and family obligations over 
any other obligations.9 With this missing from the document, one can only come up with 
                                                 
6
 Familiaris consortio, (On the family), No. 23-25. 
 
7
 Ibid. 23.  “On the other hand the true advancement of women requires that clear recognition be given to 
the value of their maternal and family role, by comparison with all other public roles and all other 
professions.” 
 
8
 I do find it problematic that such an attitude presumes and expects only “married life.”  Ones who choose 
to or are called to live a single life or ones who live in homosexual relationships are not considered.  While 
I find this fact problematic as such, it becomes a greater problem when we are talking about a considerable 
amount of people. 
 
9
 It is of great importance to note here that JPII did acknowledge that “the absence of a father causes 
psychological and moral imbalance and notable difficulties in family relationships.” Ibid 25.  While he 
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a definition of masculinity for Catholic men that puts work obligation over family and 
material support for the family before its emotional and interpersonal support as well as 
what else men might be called by God to do. 
One should not mistakenly assume that I am dismissing such attitudes completely. 
There are noble efforts made by many parents who put their own interests second and 
family interests first. However, it becomes a problem when this concept is pushed so far 
as to the point where women are limited to (sometimes less socially valued) domestic 
roles or men are de facto reduced to a breadwinner and/or a disciplinarian of the family. 
It is my contestation in this project that such documents have brought Roman Catholic 
men and women to the point not only of injustice but also unhealthy relationships for all 
the members of the family. 
This brief survey of history demonstrates the fact that the dualistic ideology of the 
ancient times and its biology, along with the biblical influences and theological writings 
over the years, are the original sources of the problem and they have profoundly 
contributed to essentialism and to the modern Roman Catholic notion of gender 
complementarity. Further investigation shows that the presumption of gender 
complementarity often results in harmful, unjust relationships. Moreover, such an 
approach yields few resources for a model of Christian masculinity; men are continually 
seen as the norm and have a little chance at self-criticism and improvements. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
called for fathers to be more involved, he never went as far as to say that such family obligation should take 
precedence over all the other obligations; he did make that claim for mothers.  It is also noteworthy again 
that this model only considers femininity and masculinity in a married family life. 
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Theological Scholarship 
Women Writers (Roman Catholic) 
 Thus far, many helpful Catholic thinkers, most of them women, contributed in 
bringing forth such problems into the realm of discussion. Starting with the December 
1975 issue of Theological Studies, many voices followed including, and certainly not 
exclusively, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, Christine Gudorf, Anne E. 
Patrick, Rosemary R. Ruether, Jean Porter, Susan A. Ross, Christina Traina, Patricia 
Beattie Jung, Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, and Julie Hanlon Rubio, to name a few. I emphasize 
again that there are many more important writers beyond this list, but since femininity is 
not my main focus for this project per se, this list of authors will suffice for the moment. 
The only point to be made at this juncture is that I stand on the shoulders of these seminal 
thinkers without whom I would not have been informed enough for my conviction for the 
project at hand. 
Men Writers 
 While these thinkers helped me to understand that the road to justice is still under 
construction, there have not been many Catholic men who have spoken out for and about 
men. Even in the writings that find the current official Catholic paradigm of 
“complementarity” to be problematic, the criticism is only in terms of how it has been 
harmful for women or what men owe women as a result (with James B. Nelson, Christine 
E. Gudorf, and perhaps Daniel Maguire as notable exceptions). Certainly, men may owe 
much since much has been given to them. But what many thinkers have missed thus far 
has been the fact that in order to “pay back” what is owed, in order to enhance the life of 
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women or any other, one must make sure that one is in the condition to do so. The 
modern (popular) trend, albeit not completely unfounded, is to blame men for much of 
the ills—related to gender—of the world.10 However, according to Connell Cowan and 
Melvyn Kinder,11 this is neither therapeutic nor effective, at least not for heterosexual 
women who may be seeking a suitable life-partner. 
Some male writers from other Christian traditions have written on the subject. We 
may be able to build on their findings and arguments and develop a model appropriate for 
Catholic men. Of the works available, the best work has been done by James B. Nelson. 
He calls for embracing masculinity. What is remarkable about that is the fact that he does 
not simply embrace one or another aspect typically assigned to “maleness.” His approach 
calls for the embracing of all facets of masculinity. What makes such a methodology and 
anthropology so remarkable is that we do not have to dismiss the traditional notions of 
maleness completely. We can embrace these notions along with other aspects of 
masculinity that have been hidden behind gender stereotypes. 
Nelson is not alone in his quest. Daniel Maguire is a Catholic male writer who has 
written extensively on the injustice that many groups have suffered because of strict 
gender role assignments. Clearly, there is no doubt that it is important that he claimed so 
as a Catholic man. Furthermore, he has not only rightly identified the consequences from 
the mistreatment of women, but also recognized the negative implications that came with 
macho-masculinity—a problem that extends not only to the social but also to the 
                                                 
10
 Ex-CBS reporter Bernard Goldberg, for example, criticizes the media and the kinds of “male bashing” 
comments that the media get away with in popular news shows in the New York Times Bestseller, Bias: A 
CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distorts the News (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). 
 
11
 Connell Cowan and Melvyn Kinder, “Men Who Make Women Want to Scream” printed in Kieran Scott 
and Michael Warren ed., Perspectives on Marriage: A Reader 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 305-312. 
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theological sphere. Nevertheless, most of his work hinges on rightly analyzing the cause 
or identifying the oppressors but with no mention of bettering situations for men. One 
may argue that in fact by finding what is just for the oppressed is finding the solution for 
men in the long run. That may be true but it is my argument throughout this project that it 
cannot be done by harming or unjustly treating men. That is, a far better solution will 
develop with a model that not only includes justice for women but also considers the 
overall well-being of men. The first step in the right direction, then, is identifying to what 
extent traditional gender role assigning has been harmful for men, a process that Maguire 
has already started. It is only then that we can move to constructing a model for Catholic 
masculinity and its appropriate gender role paradigm. 
Christine E. Gudorf 
A Catholic feminist theologian, Christine Gudorf has already initiated, and was 
indeed the impetus for, this project. While investigating the effects of the traditional 
Judeo-Christian model of family, she also examined the effects of such a model on men. 
Women were not the only victims of the effects stemming from the fact that men had 
traditionally conformed to the headship/breadwinner role within the family. Men had also 
suffered from such a system—perhaps in a different form and degree—but suffered 
nonetheless. Not only did men carry the burden of responsibility of providing material 
support for the family, but also many of them had to forego their dreams, or at least the 
kind of a job they wanted, as a consequence of the assignment of certain kinds of work to 
men. Often a job is understood as involving sacrifice for their family and many do not 
feel the freedom to choose work through which they can be satisfied. Furthermore, there 
exists a further effect on men in that the society, often via the media, that tells them to be 
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emotionally detached and isolated, and to relate to others primarily in terms of power, 
provision, and pay check. Hence, men too are victims of carrying the burden of sole 
responsibility for material support, of missing out on many important human experiences 
within the family, and being allowed to find identity only in power and responsibility 
without due consideration for their emotions which in turn have possible grave effects of 
violence in them and against their own families. 
Scientific Scholarship 
While this project is not socio-biological or psychological in nature, the findings 
of these disciplines must be mentioned since ignoring the data may have detrimental 
results for this project. (One can imagine, for example, how grave consequences can 
result from developing a model for gender roles based on outdated Aristotelian biology 
by ignoring what we now know about men and women.) In recent years, as the dimorphic 
sexual model has been challenged more than ever before, socio-biological findings are 
beginning to acknowledge that a traditional model for gender may be harmful even for 
men. The reason is twofold. Many men simply do not find the traditional model for men 
something with which they can identify. Also, a great number of them do not have a 
model from which they can work because certain models—like the Catholic model—do 
not spell out explicitly what masculinity means. When masculinity is not acknowledged 
in name, one cannot really deal with it. When men find themselves in such a state, they 
feel anxious about their masculine identity which leads to being less prepared for being 
strong and capable men and/or fathers. Not being able to show a loving and gentle side to 
their sons or daughters, men often end up handing down just one instruction, namely to 
be aggressive. The sons, like their fathers, often develop depression and anxiety because 
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they see themselves as failures when they do not meet the demand of that masculine 
image.12 Such a vicious cycle can lead to a number of social problems. 
The somewhat dated works of Joe Dubbert, Don Welch, Clyde W. Franklin, and 
Joseph Pleck, along with Michael Lamb, Margaret Mead, Carol Gilligan, Nancy 
Chodorow, Lillian Rubin, Marie Augusta Neal, Myriam Miedzian, and the more recent 
works of Anne Fausto-Sterling, Michael S. Kimmel and Joan Roughgarden as well as 
some works from The Journal of Men’s Studies foster discussions about whether men are 
naturally hardwired in certain ways or not—or at least not to the extent that we have 
hitherto thought. That is, more data are available now that beg discussion on just how 
much receptive and active qualities—along with other characteristics assigned to each 
gender—are all part of who we are as sexual beings. If it turns out that we have been 
wrong about what is “natural” for being a man simply because we decided to focus on 
one aspect of men, then, we need to modify—with some help from socio-theological 
works of Christine Gudorf and Karen Lebacqz—any prescriptions that resulted from it 
accordingly. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Because of repressed emotions to fit the masculine norm or of not living up to the masculine expectations, 
many men deal with the depression with alcohol and/or violence.  See Korean Woman Institute ed., New 
Lecture in Feminist Studies [Sae Yŏsŏnghakkangŭi] (DongNyuk: Seoul, Korea, 1999), [The National 
Library of Korea ISBN: 89-7297-405-603300] especially 121-312.  Also, when the economic crisis hit 
Korea (known as the “IMF crisis” because the Korean government sought an IMF bailout), in 1997, many 
lost their jobs.  Many men could not face up to the fact that they could not meet the demand of the 
masculine image—of being the breadwinner, and economically able/responsible—and many chose to live 
in the streets (or even commit suicide), rather than going back to his family and live as “powerless men.” 
See Masanori Sasaki et al, Men Studies and Men Movement about Feminism (in Korean), (WonMiSa: 
Seoul, Korea, 2007), especially 293-298.  
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Global Consideration- Korea 
An important point must also be made in conjunction with these findings. That is, 
such gender role assignments are not only harmful for men of the West, and Catholic men 
in particular, but this fact may also be true globally. To demonstrate, I will look to 
Korean men and Korean Catholics in particular, as a test case. I could have chosen many 
other examples from many other traditions/countries but as a Korean-born man, I have 
many direct and personal experiences—including the two years spent in the Korean 
military—that enabled me to formulate strong convictions and to draw upon resources in 
Korean for the subject-matter at hand. 
By drawing upon the similarities among the foundations for traditional Korean 
Neo-Confucian notions of masculinity, for compulsory military service for Korean men 
only, and the traditional Roman Catholic model for men, one is able to see that such 
definitions of masculinity and gender roles do much harm to Korean society and 
subsequently to the flourishing of the Korean Roman Catholic Church. It is unclear what 
or who exactly is culpable. Some may put the accountability on the Neo-Confucian mores 
as such or perhaps on men who because they also might profit from this model perpetuate 
and prolong this harmful notion of masculinity. However, it will be my continual 
argument in this project that a simple indictment of pre-Christian tradition or of men is 
not only unfair but impractical. A far more effective and fair indictment must target all 
those power institutions—governmental and ecclesial—that propagate and bless such 
notions of masculinity. There are alarming similarities between the conception of 
masculinity within the Korean military and the Korean Catholic culture. Therefore, both 
the Korean state and the Roman Catholic Church should be held responsible for the 
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continuation of such destructive gender requirements. The victims of such requirements 
are women and men; there is a dire need for a new paradigm for masculinity that does not 
impinge upon their male dignity. That model of masculinity, then, must be something 
beyond a gradation or complementarity and that fosters the flourishing of both sexes. 
Reconstruction 
The reconstruction of masculinity for Catholics must, then, involve discovering a 
model that works not only for the U.S. and Korea but also has wider implications for 
finding ideas that are adequate for the time/place and the tradition. Since the project is 
focused on Catholic conceptions of masculinity, it must be—without jettisoning the great 
tradition altogether—a model that is truly universal to be truly Catholic. Hence, taking 
cues from Dawn M. Nothwehr,13 one is able to discover different ideas of gender that are 
much more mutual, rather than hierarchal or complementary, within the Catholic tradition 
itself and indeed from none other than Jesus of Nazareth. The current Roman Catholic 
complementary model highlights only certain aspects of God. They are the active/primary 
(also associated only with men) characteristics and the model ignores the passive, 
vulnerable, soft, and gentle characteristics. However, Jesus of Nazareth not only 
embodied both of these components but also personified qualities beyond these, including 
mutual components. Hence, a Christian notion of God, in order to be comprehensive, 
must include both male and female characteristics. Thus, one must come up with a 
solution not within the complementary model but in a refined notion of masculinity and 
femininity. 
                                                 
13
 Dawn M. Nothwehr, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Ethics (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 1998) 
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While post-modernity was successful in deconstructionism (albeit not for models 
of masculinity), a reconstruction must follow because deconstructionism tried to do away 
with sexed models altogether.14 However, doing away with all models leaves behind an 
incoherent multiplicity, almost to point of relativism or nihilism. Thus for this section, I 
will be critical of a polar opposite dimorphic (either-or) view of men and women, yet 
hold on to the two-sex model, so long as we admit the abundance of difference and 
diversity within the two categories (both-and).15 When such a task is done, I will see 
which of the two models can survive Christian category of love and justice. 
Review of Literature 
Working primarily from a book by Margaret A. Farley at the initial stage, I will 
do a brief overview of the shaping and legitimating of certain gender ideologies and 
anthropologies from the Greek, Jewish, and early Christian tradition. In her Just Love: A 
Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics, Farley refers to various seminal articles to take 
us from ancient to modern thinkers and outlines how we came to a dualistic 
understanding of gender. For sections on Greco-Roman, Jewish, and early 
Christian/biblical influences, I will also rely on works such as Thomas Laqueur’s Making 
Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, John T. Noonan’s Contraception, 
Rosemary Radford Reuther’s Religion and Sexism and Sexism and the God-Talk, Peter 
Brown’s The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
                                                 
14
 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. (New York: Routledge, 1990).  
According to Butler, not only is gender socially constructed but also sex.  This is a strong but very 
complicated point which I cannot take up for this dissertation.  Suffice it to acknowledge at this point that 
such a reasonable argument exists. 
 
15
 I am very aware of those who do not fit even the most fluid of the two-sex model, i.e. intersexuals.  
Perhaps a whole separate category of third sex should be made to accommodate the diversity.  However, to 
pay an adequate amount of attention for the criticism and the reconstruction of the two-sex model, I must 
and will limit my undertaking to dimorphic examples. 
15 
 
 
Christianity, David Biale’s Eros and the Jews: From Biblical Israel to Contemporary 
America, Judith Plaskow’s Standing Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist perspective, 
David Novak’s Jewish Social Ethics, and Susan A. Ross’ Extravagant Affections: a 
Feminist Sacramental Theology, “Can God be a bride?”; “The Bridegroom and the Bride: 
The theological anthropology of John Paul II and its relation to the Bible and 
Homosexuality”; “The Bride of Christ and the Body Politic: Body and Gender in Pre-
Vatican II Marriage Theology,” a compilation by Kristen Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and 
Valarie H. Ziegler called Eve and Adam: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Readings on 
Genesis and Gender. In addition, Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex: Body and Gender from 
the Greeks to Freud, Dale B. Martin’s “Galatians 3:28: “No Male and Female,”” 
Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s “Discipleship and Patriarchy: Early Christian Ethos and 
Christian Ethics in a Feminist Theological Perspective,” and Wayne A. Meek’s The First 
Urban Christians: the Social World of the Apostle Paul. 
Farley continues to be helpful in the discussion about the prolongation of certain 
gender ideologies in medieval Catholic thinkers. Along with her work, An Anthology of 
Sacred texts by and about Women edited by Serinity Young, Subordination and 
Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas by Kari 
Elizabeth Børrensen, and “Whose Sexuality? Whose Tradition? Women, Experience, and 
Roman Catholic Sexual Ethics,” by Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, will also elucidate 
medieval attitudes toward gender, albeit only for women. Parsing through these texts 
leads to the emergence of the attitudes toward men at that time. 
  The ideology of gender dualism lives on in 20th century papal teachings. Readings 
in Moral Theology No. 9: Feminist Ethics and the Catholic Moral Tradition edited by 
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Charles E. Curran, Margaret A. Farley and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. gives a 
wonderful overview of the conversation stemming from papal teachings in the 20th 
century. An especially helpful overview and critique is Christine E. Gudorf’s 
“Encountering the Other: the Modern Papacy on Women.” Further discussion of 
magisterial documents can be found in Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Family: a Christian Social 
Perspective. It carefully runs through the developments up to the time of JP II on the 
Church’s expectation on fathers and mothers. A slight, but monumentally important, shift 
in language—namely jettisoning the words subjection, inferior, and obedience—becomes 
very clear after such a survey of the Church’s position over a century. 
 Despite different wording, changes, modifications, and improvements from the 
old Roman Catholic positions on the issue, they clearly did not satisfy many scholars of 
moral theology. Many scholars claimed the following: complementary models is never 
equal; dualism or physicalism in seeing the gendered persons is harmful; liberalism that 
fails to see the importance of “body” and “differences” is unjust; and essentialists’ 
understanding of the body is inadequate—i.e. essentially or naturally different between 
the sexes therefore in need of different role assignment including agapic self-sacrifice for 
women—is inadequate and dangerous. Many scholars found these problems including, 
but not exclusively, Gudorf and Cahill in their aforementioned articles and Cahill in Sex, 
Gender, and Christian Ethics, Rosemary Ruether in Christianity and the Making of the 
Modern Family, Barbara Hilkert Andolsen in “Agape in Feminist Ethics,” Anne E. 
Patrick in “Women and Religion,” Patricia Beattie Jung in Heterosexism, and Susan A. 
Ross in Extravagant Affections: a Feminist Sacramental Theology. 
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As far as the project is concerned, the logical next step, then, is to articulate how 
unsatisfactory and harmful it also is for men and to explain what the problem is. In one of 
the most important works for this project, James B. Nelson, in “Embracing Masculinity,” 
claims that men need to develop and appropriate what has been neglected and that men 
need to be more fully men, not less so. That is, he does not think that men are defined 
solely by strong and rough characteristics but also by a tender and soft side. Hence, his 
definition of manliness may not be considered too “manly” by social standards. In fact, 
this way of thinking pushes us beyond the dominating image of the divine to the soft 
vulnerable humanity of the divine in the person of Jesus as well. I find Nelson’s method 
to be a helpful step in the right direction. Adding on to this helpful insight from a 
Protestant theologian, the Catholic scholar Daniel C. Maguire sees a grave danger in a 
clear-cut understanding of gender binary as essential or natural. In “the Feminization of 
God and Ethics,” he maintains that the experience of what he calls the “macho-masculine 
culture,” seriously hinders not only men’s ability to show and practice sensitivity, but 
also blinds men from truer ethical inquiry and study of God because it either misses or 
dismisses anything that is not “macho.” 
Using scientific data, one must see how it can inform us about the stance that we 
ought to have about men and women. For this largely social scientific section, I will draw 
from Joseph Pleck’s The Myth of Masculinity, Clyde W. Franklin II’s Men and Society, 
Kenneth Clatterbaugh’s Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity: Men, Women and 
Politics in Modern Society, Michael S. Kimmel’s The Gendered Society, Anne Fausto-
Sterling’s “The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough,” and Sexing the 
Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, Joan Roughgarden’s 
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Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People, David 
James’ “The Integration of Masculine Spirituality,” and other articles from The Journal 
of Men’s Studies. Christine Gudorf’s “The Erosion of Sexual Dimorphism: Challenges to 
Religion and Religious Ethics” will especially be helpful for her insights and for the 
method of combining the sciences and theology together. 
Korean history and reality will serve as a test case—to see whether dimorphic 
gender norms and expectations are also harmful outside of the western context—because 
of my experience of the Korean society, including that of Korean military. Owing to my 
experience in Korea, I am more informed and have stronger data on Korea than any other 
non-western country to make an adequate comparison. As I found out, Korean history is 
not immune from the inculcation and continuation of a static and harmful gender 
dichotomy. In order to understand that tradition more clearly, one must recognize the 
neo-Confucian tradition from which the modern notions comes, the war-ridden history of 
the people, and the prolongation of those values by military regimes and militaristic 
ideals. A great place to start is with two books: Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean 
Nationalism edited by Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi and Militarized Modernity 
and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea by Seungsook Moon. These works outline the 
origin of gender ideology of the Korean people and what is galvanizing and propagating 
that ideology. As indicated in an unfortunately poorly written set of articles with some 
helpful data, Social Change in Korea vol 2, edited by Kim Kyong-Dong and the Korea 
Herald, there is some progress that is being made but the problems still loom large. 
Women are still held back and unequal opportunities and salaries are still a very clear 
reality. However, according to many other articles, men also suffer greatly because of the 
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current dichotomous gender ideology. Of the many works available, two exemplary 
books in Korean are Man and Korean Society [Namsŏngkwa Hankuksahoe] by the Center 
for the Korean Women Society and The New Lecture on Feminism [Sae 
Yŏsŏnghakkangŭi] by Center for Korean Women Research, especially Chapter 5 entitled 
“Men and the Male Culture.” 
Korean Roman Catholic attitudes toward women and men, as also current Roman 
Catholic attitudes in general, are congruent with the problematic dimorphic model for 
gender. A dissertation by Jong-rye Gratia Song, S.P.C. entitled Listening with the Heart 
to the Echo of Silenced Voices suggests that the traditional social roles and customs hold 
back Korean Catholic women immensely. She presents how, despite this limitation, many 
women deny and rebel against this injustice, sometimes to the point of sacrificing their 
lives during governmental persecutions! Indicative of where the values are placed in 
Korean culture and among Korean Roman Catholics, such stories are neither on the 
forefront of the history of Korea nor Korean Roman Catholic history. Following the lines 
of reasoning and data thus far, and after revealing the disturbing similarities drawn 
between the Korean military culture and the gender related attitudes by the (Korean) 
Roman Catholic Church, one can easily see the negative effects on Korean Roman 
Catholic men. 
In Dawn M. Nothwehr’s, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Ethics, one can 
began to formulate a model of masculinity that is more loving, more mutual, and more 
Catholic. Even with the culturally shaped problems that Roman Catholic thinking has 
faced, there are enough materials within the tradition that will guide one in crystallizing a 
definition of masculinity for Catholic families. In fact, the biggest aid comes from Jesus 
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of Nazareth. In “The Power to Create: Sacraments and Men’s Need to Birth,” Gudorf 
draws a picture of how the life and works of Jesus would fare against the modern 
definition of masculinity. When it is found that Jesus would have had a problem 
measuring up to these standards, I can only conclude that either the model has a problem 
or Jesus does. Unless one is prepared to say that Jesus is the problem, it is wise to 
generate a model with which Jesus would be happier. Gudorf suggests that men must be 
more than peripherally involved in basic nurturing activities of human life. Her model of 
masculinity would not work if the model advocates an essentialist conception of gender. 
To curb ourselves from tendencies of such a danger, principles of medical ethics can shed 
some light alongside mutuality, outlined in Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’ 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics. The categories used in medical ethics work effectively 
as formal criteria in developing a new model for masculinity. For a more encompassing 
definition, one may also turn to additional norms outlined in Margaret A. Farley’s Just 
Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics since she uses and goes beyond the 
norms for medical ethics for her treatment of sexual ethics. 
Contribution of Dissertation 
 This dissertation will make original contributions to the study of Roman Catholic 
ethics and theology in several ways. First, there has not been, to my knowledge, a 
dissertation dedicated to the investigation of what masculinity means by a Roman 
Catholic man. I am aware of and will make reference to some material that is already 
available on the topic of masculinity in the Protestant context. I will make allusions to 
references about masculinity in the Roman Catholic context. However, none of these 
materials are works for masculinity in the Roman Catholic context as such. Hence, my 
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work will be the first of the kind and will be an original contribution to academia and 
society. 
 Moreover, I will make observations, analysis, and constructions as a Korean 
Roman Catholic man. This is a significant contribution, for it puts the work in the 
broader/more global context outside the English speaking world — an approach that is 
increasingly important in the field of ethics. I will not be able to make the case that my 
suggestions and theories are true always and everywhere. However, I will be able to 
make the case that it is true in at least one other non-western country. By doing so it will 
enable others, or myself, to add on to it later. Hence, making an effort to analyze 
masculinity in the Korean context and connecting it to the Korean/Roman Catholic 
context will be a very original contribution of this dissertation. 
Research Methods 
 The basic method to be employed in this dissertation will be twofold: criticism 
and reconstruction. Firstly, I will briefly analyze some of the sources from which our 
ideal of masculinity and gender roles came. I will show that the ancient thought tended to 
polarize the notion of gender and that gave way to the later notion of dualism and 
essentialism. Also, by examining revealed tradition, I plan to show how the Old 
Testament imagery and the New Testament ideals contributed to the current Roman 
Catholic thinking on gender. Furthermore, I will show how all of these ideals galvanized 
current Roman Catholic attitudes toward gender. Since the Roman Catholic paradigm of 
complementarity did not create itself, I will be able to show how the gender polarity and 
scriptural imagery gave birth, at least in part, to a complementary model for gender. This 
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assessment is a necessary step before doing what I set out to do for this first section, 
which is to show the dire need for developing a model for Christian/Catholic masculinity. 
With the help from mostly feminist scholars, I will then address the problems of 
some uncritical acceptance of what we have inherited and make some criticisms. 
However, I will keep in mind that we have inherited some positive liturgical, spiritual, 
and ritual traditions and thus this project will critique the division that deals with gender 
and the unspoken and consequent definition of masculinity. This is a big task since it will 
involve criticizing “spousal imagery” and I will inevitably deal with much larger issues 
concerning ideas of God, Christ, and Church. Moreover, secular scholarship and cross-
cultural presentation will validate further my position that it has and will be harmful for 
many relationships if we were to continue using the current Roman Catholic model for 
gender. The rationale behind these criticisms is to show the need for the next part of the 
dissertation, namely (re)construction. 
 If indeed the model that Catholics have for masculinity and its related gender role 
is problematic, then there is a need for reconstruction of that model. The next part, then, 
will make an attempt to construct as refined a definition as possible of Roman Catholic 
masculinity so that it can be employed in determining what a Catholic man’s role should 
be. I will address one possible critical question of such a definition, namely, “How is it 
Catholic?” That is, I will argue that the definition can be applied as a normative definition 
of masculinity for Christians as a whole, not just for Roman Catholic men. What makes 
my definition “Catholic” will be its positive attitude towards the nature of human beings 
and the sacramental vision. 
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 In the end, I will comment about why and how this refined definition of 
masculinity offers a more adequate understanding than the current official teachings of 
the Roman Catholic Church on gender and masculinity and what needs to be done to 
reconcile these differences. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One: Historical Consideration 
This chapter will be an introduction to the subject-matter of the dissertation. As 
such, I will only write a brief overview of the historical development of dualistic 
ideology of gender, since my initial focus is to assess the Catholic understanding, or lack 
thereof, of masculinity. Keeping this historical development short, I will be able to 
accomplish my ultimate task for this project: explicitly naming and reconstructing what 
has only been implicitly suggested; namely Catholic masculinity. 
By way of a prologue, then, the chapter will assess the sources of traditional 
notions of gender understanding. While a full examination into ancient times is probably 
necessary, for the purpose of this project, it will suffice to recognize the most crucial 
moments appropriate for the issue at hand. Hence, I will initially study the time when the 
milieu of dualistic thinking was at its infancy, namely the Greco-Roman period, along 
with when such a way of thinking was at large, namely the Judeo-Christian period. 
Dissemination is just as important as the instigation of a trend. Hence, it is 
necessary to study both how Roman Catholics were influenced by the past—i.e. Greco-
Roman, dualistic, and biblical influences—and how they influenced the future, by 
studying the early Roman Catholic Church fathers and/or medieval thinkers. Also, 
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studying the encyclicals and other church sponsored and/or related documents, one will 
see how this ancient ideology remained to this day. 
Chapter Two: Feminist Criticisms 
 Among a number of criticisms made of traditional notions of gender and gender 
roles, there are some common threads. These commonalities are not exclusive but 
interrelated themes which include dualism, physicalism/essentialism/naturalism, 
liberalism, and complementarity. This chapter will define and expand on these terms to 
diagnose some possible problems in what we have inherited thus far. Most of the analysis 
will come from ideas suggested by feminist scholars, not as a preference but because they 
have taken the lead. That is, most of the criticism of the Church’s position on the issue of 
gender has come from those who have suffered the most, and will suffer most directly, 
namely women. However, this chapter will find such a fact in itself problematic. If in fact 
they were correct, that is, if indeed the issue at hand is injustice, it should be of concern 
not only for a certain group of people—albeit very justifiably and appropriately so—but 
for anyone who cares about justice and fairness. Hence, this chapter will make a claim 
that if feminist criticism is correct, then even without taking into consideration the 
injustice it may cause men also, the gender ideology as Catholics have it today should be 
a big problem for men too. 
Chapter Three: Theological Criticisms by men… and Beyond 
 If current official Roman Catholic attitudes and positions on gender issues are 
already problematic, the problem becomes even more serious if they have unjust 
components for men (and consequently for women and children as well). This chapter, 
then, will outline what some theologians, Catholic and non-Catholic Christian, and 
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mostly male, have written concerning the negative effects that the current gender 
ideologies have on men. This chapter will also explain how these negative effects expand 
the theological meanings and values. The theological end result of such insistence on the 
nature of men and women, then, is the concentration and focus on one, or part, of the 
aspects of Jesus of Nazareth, namely the traditional “maleness” of Jesus. While admitting 
that we are never able to see completely and perfectly the comprehensive fullness of God 
in the form of Jesus, failing to see as best as possible both aspects of the humanity of 
Jesus, is devastating for a faithful person. 
Chapter Four: Scientific Criticisms 
 Since I cannot do justice to all sciences and theories, I will concentrate and rely 
mostly on social sciences, with some natural scientific references; and work with a two-
sex model in spite of the existence of many other models. If scientific data conversely 
support the traditional views of gender, then one must acknowledge their validity.16 This 
chapter will demonstrate that in fact the data not only do not support the old models but 
confirm that gender is much more diverse than Aristotle and all thinkers who were 
influenced by him thought to this very day. The end result from the previous chapter to 
this is that part of the current Roman Catholic model for masculinity is harmful 
theologically, psychologically, scientifically, academically, and socially. For the purpose 
of this project, theological damage from the old model of masculinity will be the focus, 
yet other harmful aspects from the old model 1) will show the significance of the problem 
and 2) that there are data better than that of Aristotelian biology available for modern 
                                                 
16
 Although even in such a case, one must evaluate and continue to question what is the just and loving 
model for Christians.  For example, just because data show that murder has always been a reality and is part 
of human nature, it still does not make it right, just, or loving.  In such an instance, we must be able to go 
beyond the history of “scientific data.” 
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Catholics from which a new definition of masculinity and its appropriate gender role can 
arise. That definition will be discussed in chapter six. 
Chapter Five: Global Consideration 
 I will not be able to do a complete global analysis of the problems discussed 
previously. However, it is necessary to investigate at the very least one other 
culture/country to see whether such a problem is true in a non-Western, non-English 
speaking country to begin to suggest that the problem may in fact be global and that the 
solution accordingly may have to be universal. Hence, for no other reason than the fact 
that I am more familiar, comfortable, and in tune with the Korean culture, I will ask 
whether Western findings hold true in Korea, and in Korean Roman Catholic men 
specifically in this chapter. I will argue that not only does it hold true in Korean cases, 
but also suggest that part of the problem may be due to the militaristic nature of Korea 
and of Roman Catholicism in general. My experience as a Korean Roman Catholic man 
and as a soldier having completed compulsory service in the Korean military will come 
into play in this chapter. While I understand that experience is not absolute and has the 
danger of subjectivism/relativism because of the diversity of experiences of people, I 
believe that there will be enough commonality of experience among Korean soldiers and 
objective facts about it so that experience certainly can and must have a place in this 
dissertation. 
Chapter Six: Constructing a More Just Model for Masculinities 
 This chapter will take into consideration all the criticisms outlined above and 
make an initial attempt to come up with a new masculinity model for Roman Catholics. 
Of course, there is not a perfect model and no one will be able to live out a just model 
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perfectly. However, a model is just that: a model, to which one could strive and towards 
which one should always work. Hence, this chapter will propose a model for masculinity, 
a model that will never be able to justify an unchecked unjustifiable power, direct or 
indirect, of one gender over the other on the basis of “nature” or complementarity (even 
though the complementary model does not claim that it is putting one power over 
another). It will discuss the norms to which an adequate definition of masculinity must 
adhere. The components of the model will include the respect for autonomy, prohibition 
of maleficence, valuing beneficence, mutuality, fruitfulness and social justice. This list of 
norms will not be exhaustive in nature. Rather, it is an initiative, with the goal of 
eventually reaching a comprehensive definition for Roman Catholic masculinity. 
Conclusion and Epilogue 
I will show in the dissertation that being male or female consists of much 
diversity. One can accommodate such diversity by claiming that there is no gender or sex 
at all. Or, one can do so by claiming that while two sex model works, it must be 
accompanied by the fact that there is much diversity within each category. I choose the 
latter to simultaneously solve the problems of polar opposite attitude of dimorphisms and 
of the relative nihilism of post-modern thoughts. 
I will make a collateral claim, then, that within the framework of “two sexes”—
using the methods employed in the “secondary principles” of St. Thomas—the spectrum 
of the two is much more vast and diverse within these two than what Roman Catholic 
documents assume. There is not a static woman or a monolithic man. There are all kinds 
of men. There are all sorts of women. Within the framework of men and women that 
there is such diversity that in the end, one cannot help but to feel somewhat agreeable 
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with the post-modern thinkers. The only difference is that one claims against categories 
and the other claims diversity within the two categories. 
Moreover, body is two-directional: 1) that is constitutive of personhood which is 
“given” and 2) that is produced by social discourse. All, men and women alike, are born 
with certain givens but everything else cannot be based on these givens. While taking 
into account certain biological givens about men and women, a huge chunk is not only 
socially constructed but also biologically quite diverse. If one of the two parts—diversity 
of the biologically based and socially constructed—is missing in the discussion of body, 
gender, family, or marriage, then it can never be considered legitimate. 
Therefore, to see the fullness of a human being is to see him or her as diverse, 
dynamic, and dignified. A corollary to it is to see God and all of creation in all aspects of 
being, not just culturally defined facets. Hence, for the model of masculinity to be used 
by Roman Catholics, one must recognize the diversity of human nature. I will therefore 
conclude by proposing some general roles for today’s men—which, by the way, may 
vary from period to period in human history—but not according to the generalized notion 
and expectation of men but to one’s ability, capability, and for which one is naturally 
gifted. In the end, a gender role assignment may be helpful but only if it does no harm to 
oneself and the other. What I will suggest in this chapter may point to the more just and 
more loving paths. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
Origin of Dualism 
 
 A necessary precursor to discourse about Catholic masculinity is a discussion 
about gender as such. The prevailing view of gender in the West is a result, in part, of a 
dualistic anthropology developed in ancient Greece and Rome. It is fitting, then, that I 
start this project by searching for clues about where the current Roman Catholic model of 
gender has its origin. However, let me first be clear about what I mean by the “current 
Roman Catholic model of gender.” It is, as Elizabeth A. Johnson rightly describes, a 
dualistic model for gender is: 
…[a] model that casts women and men as polar opposites, each bearing 
unique characteristics from which the other sex is excluded. In this view 
male and female are related by the notion of complementarity, which 
rigidly predetermines the qualities each should cultivate and the roles 
each can play. Apart from naiveté about its own social conditioning, its 
reliance on stereotypes, and the denial of the wholeness of human 
experience that it mandates, this position functions as a smokescreen for 
the subordination of women since by its definition women are always 
relegated to the private, passive realm.1 
 
This complementary notion of gender has its roots in ancient thinkers and their milieu. 
While the tendencies of dualism predated them, dualism started to solidify itself in Greek 
and Roman traditions. Generally speaking, dualistic thinking was common and 
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 Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: 
Crossroad, 1992), 154. This quotation is from the context of describing two different models for a 
theological anthropology: the prevailing dualistic model and the single-nature anthropology. For a further 
discussion on the latter (and the former), and the problems of both, see Anne E. Carr, Transforming Grace: 
Women’s Experience and Christian Tradition (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 117-33. 
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applied notably in explaining how body is different from soul.2 Plato, for example, valued 
anything that had to do with the rational faculty over other faculties. He esteemed 
wisdom over other virtues, and a state ruled by a philosopher king over other forms of the 
state for this same reason. Contrarily, then, he underrated the appetitive faculty and the 
state governed by artisans and claimed that they were always in need of moderation. The 
appetitive faculty and the artisans were associated with things that are the opposite of 
rational or wise, i.e. physical/material. In such a bifurcation, the body was seen as an 
obstacle to the perfect, or at least truly, human.3 However, Plato did not make clear 
associations of male and female to higher and lower traits, respectively. In fact, Plato, 
albeit inconsistently, seemed to advocate at times a kind of equal-opportunity role 
assignment not according to gender particularities but according to individual talent, 
regardless of gender. 
But if it appears that they differ only in this respect that the female bears 
and the male begets, we shall say that no proof had yet been produced that 
the woman differ from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to 
think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same 
pursuits.4 
                                                 
2
 Sometimes this distinction was of body and spirit or body and mind. Authors meant something 
distinguishable when using mind, soul, or spirit. For my purpose, these differences are noted and admitted but 
without great relevance for this project. For the purpose of the discussion at hand, it is enough to notice that 
body is differentiated from “immaterial” part of the human body. See Margaret A. Farley, Just Love: a 
Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York: Continuum, 2006-8), 111. 
 
3Ibid., 112; Plato, Republic; Laws 896 a 1-2; Phaedo 85 e 3-86 d 4, 93 c 3-95. Note that this bifurcation is 
also a product of a tripartite division of the soul in Plato: rational, spirited, and appetitive. 
 
4
 Plato, Republic, 454e quoted in Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to 
Freud (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 54. According to Laqueur, Plato 
“wished to make a case for the absence of essential public difference between men and women, for equal 
participation in governance, gymnastic exercises, and even war…” However, I am not making a claim that 
Plato advocated gender equality since he said in Timaeus 42 that ‘when the incarnate soul loses its struggle 
against the passions and appetites, it is incarnated into a woman and then into “some brute which resembled 
him in the evil nature which he had acquired”’ quoted in Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 79. See footnote #86 in Laqueur, 260 for a discussion on this issue along 
with Monique Canto, “The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Reflections on Plato,” in Susan Rubin Suleiman, 
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It was left to his student, Aristotle, to make the binary division of body and soul more 
unequivocal. 
 In his biological works, Aristotle asserted that the female, and her organs, was 
somehow lesser, or lesser in being, than that of man.5 He came to this conclusion because 
of his fundamental belief about the nature of female and male. 
the female always provides the material, the male that which fashions it, 
for this is the power we say they each possess, and this is what it is for 
them to be male and female… While the body is from the female, it is the 
soul that is from the male.  
(GA 2.4.738b20-23) 
…the male and female principles may be put down first and foremost as 
the origins of generation, the former as containing the efficient cause of 
generation, the latter the material of it. (GA 2.716a5-7)6 
 
Aristotle clearly applied the distinction of body and soul that Plato initiated, and extended 
it to woman and man, along with all the associations that accompanied it. That the soul 
was from the male and that the male contained the “efficient cause of generation” meant 
for Aristotle that the male was clearly associated with the more important, especially 
when it came to generative matters; thus, male produced sperma and female provided 
catamenia [menstrual materials].7 Furthermore, Aristotle upheld the male as the natural 
archetype of mind or reason, explaining how the ruling class was a domain exclusively 
for men. In turn, he insisted that certain type of people, who included women, slaves, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
ed., The Female Body in Western Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 339-353; Gregory 
Vlastos, “Was Plato a Feminist?” Times Literary Supplement (March 17-23, 1989): 276,288-289. 
 
5
 Laqueur, 149, 151. 
 
6
 Ibid., 30; GA refers to Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals; italic Laqueur’s. 
 
7
 Ibid., 41. 
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barbarians,8 were naturally servile—represented by body and passions—and they had to 
be ruled by the “head” or men.9 The stage was set, then, for later thinkers to make use of 
this Aristotelian biology which androcentrically claimed that if the male “stands for the 
effective and active” and female “for the passive,” then the female serves as a vehicle 
[material] upon which male, or more accurately his sperm, can work.10 
Judaism: Procreation, Patriarchy, and Nuptial Metaphor 
 Much like the duality that Aristotle presented, the Jewish tradition also put 
women in a lower status. However, very differently from the Hellenistic tradition, 
Judaism did so by emphasizing not reason, but the creatures’ duty to be fruitful and 
multiply: a mandate from God. The outcome of this theology for the Jewish community 
is the religious command to procreate and be in a [patriarchal] marriage. One should be 
mindful, however, that this is a highly generalized claim. It is true that the duty to 
procreate and its patriarchal context account for many other obligations regarding sex-
related practices.11 However, how those two elements in the tradition manifest 
themselves is not as straightforward. At times, being procreative and part of the 
patriarchal context meant channeling sexual desires, at other times companionship and 
mutual fulfillment. At one point they meant the acceptance of polygyny, concubinage, 
                                                 
8
 For lasting examples of the division among women, slaves, and barbarians, see Wayne A. Meeks, “The 
Image of Androgyne: some uses of a symbol in earliest Christianity.” History of Religions 13 (1974):165-
208. 
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 Aristotle, Politics 1:5; Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 79; However, while Aristotle maintained that 
women and men are dualistic contraries, he did not go so far to say that they were separate species. That is, 
they differ “not a circle does from a triangle but as a circle or a triangle of one material does from a circle 
or triangle of another.” See Metaphysics 10.1058a29ff and HA 5.11.538a13; HA refers to Aristotle’s On the 
History of Animals; Laqueur, 254. 
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 GA 729a 25-30 trans. Arthur Platt in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: 
Random House, 1941), 676. 
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 Farley, 35. 
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divorce, and remarriage, and at another a ban against those practices.12 The Jewish 
tradition, as is true of Christian and most other religious traditions, is marked by tensions 
on this matter. In the Hebrew Bible, the story of Ruth, the book Song of Songs, and the 
purity laws coexist with strict legal codes, acceptance of some adultery as part of God’s 
plan (as in David’s sexual transgression), subordinating erotic desires, and indifference to 
women’s perspectives on rape.13 As the laws of onah affirmed many attitudes toward 
sexuality and made sex a nurturant of love, the law of niddah associated women with 
defilement.14 
 Amongst these tensions in the Jewish tradition, what became the ruling metaphor 
for the status of men and women over the years was that of bridegroom and bride. As 
noted in the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men 
and Women in the Church and in the World (2004) and in the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB henceforth) Marriage: Love and Life in the Divine Plan 
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 David Novak, Jewish Social Ethics. (New York: Oxford University press, 1992), 93 
 
13
 David Biale, Eros and the Jews: From Biblical Israel to Contemporary America (New York, Basic 
Books, 1992), Chap. 1, 11-32; Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist 
perspective (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 178-185; Farley, 34. 
 
14
 The mitzvah of onah refers to the biblical and rabbinic commandment upon the married man to provide 
his wife with her rights to sexual intercourse. Within the context of marriage, women are to “expect, enjoy, 
and demand an active and vital sexual relationship with their spouse.” Tova Hartman, Feminism 
Encounters Traditional Judaism: Resistance and Accommodation (Waltham, Mass: Brandeis University 
Press published by Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2007), 93. See Plaskow, 
Standing Again at Sinai, 184-185; The law of niddah refers to separation of husband and wife during the 
woman’s menstrual period (menstrual ritual impurity). Many scholars find this law problematic. “[The] 
restrictions imply that women are a ‘potential source of pollution and disorder whose life and impact on 
men must be regulated’” and that according to these laws, “it is difficult to conclude anything other than 
that women are a source of moral danger and an incitement to depravity and lust.” See in the same text by 
Harman, 82-84, 136; see Judith Baskin, “The Separation of Women in Rabbinic Judaism,” in Yvonne 
Yazbeck Haddad and Ellison Banks Findly eds. Women, Religion, and Social Change (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1985), 3-18; It is important to note that it is possible to take niddah as a 
more positive concept. See Blu Greenberg, “Marriage in the Jewish Tradition,” Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies 22.1(Winter 1985): 3-20. 
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(2009), passages like Isaiah 62:515 enforce a notion which claims that “God makes 
himself known as the bridegroom who loves Israel, his bride.”16 This kind of gender 
thinking is inextricably linked to the images found in the New Testament and in Roman 
Catholic writings. As a result, one is able to draw some positive concepts related to this 
nuptial image. That is, like any other healthy relationship, it is quite natural to draw 
beautiful imagery that comes from a wonderful relationship between two persons in 
marriage. These interrelated imageries include, although not exhaustively, intimacy, 
embodiment, interdependence, physical desire and delight, tender love, care, and 
closeness that exist between God and Israelites, priests and their followers, and husbands 
and wives.17 
 Notwithstanding these potentially helpful images, this nuptial image can also be 
limiting and harmful. When, for example, the purpose of the nuptial representation is not 
intimacy, or any of the images already mentioned, but sexual differentiation, it quickly 
becomes problematic. That is, if the focus is on the strict differences of the sexes, then it 
can result in a kind of gender thinking that claims men are essentially different from 
women. Putting that viewpoint alongside the Hebrew Bible / Old Testament discussion at 
hand, one can begin to see why such an essentialist thinking can be problematic. Since 
the Old Testament images of bride and bridegroom denote a position of the divine 
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 “For as a young man marries a virgin so shall your creator marry you, and as the bridegroom rejoices 
over the bride, so shall your God rejoice over you.” 
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 CDF, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the 
Church and in the World (2004), paragraph #9 
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 Carroll Stuhlmueller, “Bridegroom: A Biblical Symbol of Union, Not Separation,” in Leonard Swidler 
and Arlene Swidler ed., Women Priests: A Catholic Commentary on the Vatican Declaration (New York: 
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fundamentally and essentially as male, “maleness” is closer to divine than femaleness 
and since men and women are essentially different in this schema, no woman can ever be 
as close to the divine in a way that all man can.18 Certainly, I am aware of the fact that I 
seem to unfairly judge the texts out of their context. What I am criticizing here, however, 
is not the original texts but the modern usage of these ancient texts out their context. 
 Even worse yet is that this model portrays men and women in an asymmetrical 
way, which is characterized by the asymmetry of power in some19 of the nuptial 
relationship of the Old Testament. This asymmetry of power—where wives have little 
choices of marriage partners (e.g. Rachel) and where they are valued for their 
reproductive abilities (e.g. Sarah)20—resulted from the idea that women (brides) are 
essentially receptive / responsive and hence their role is limited to those characteristics. 
The outcome is the (subtle) reinforcement of the notion that women cannot really image 
God and, since they also cannot be the initiator, they cannot improve their status in this 
model.21 Given that women cannot fully image God, what some Christian women can 
image is Mary (and a particular perception of Mary at that). There is no room in the 
model for recognizing Mary as an active, decisive, or initiating woman. Rather, the only 
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 See Susan A. Ross, “Can God Be a bride?” America 191.13 (Nov. 1, 2004): 12-15; Extravagant 
Affections, 99, 101, 108, 111, 115. 
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 There are some spousal relationships in the Old Testament that are closer to equality than others; for 
example, Song of Songs and certain interpretations of Genesis 2-3. See Phyllis Trible, “Eve and Adam: 
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 Ross, Ibid., 48. 
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 Ross, Extravagant Affections, 110; Margaret A. Farley, “New Patterns of Relationship: Beginnings of a 
Moral Revolution,” Theological Studies 36 (December 1975). 
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room allowed in such theological anthropology is of imitating Mary as passive, uncertain, 
and receptive. While Mary often represents humanity as a whole, “the relationship of 
men and women is analogous to the relationship between God and Mary.”22 Perhaps, then, 
one can even make a case that the Old Testament nuptial metaphor, as the Roman 
Catholic Church chooses to see it at the moment, holds men in a special relation before 
God and women as close to God as a particular interpretation of Mary. Hence, the only 
way that the positive imageries of the nuptial metaphors will work is if the bride and 
bridegroom are not directly proportional to the relationship with male and female / God 
and humanity (Mary). To claim God in terms of male imagery (bridegroom) may not be 
problematic, as a metaphor, if God is also referred to in terms of female images (bride) as 
a metaphor. Also, to use the nuptial image for God and humanity, it must always 
accompany a caveat, explaining and enabling the audience to evade the dangers of 
misinterpretation, or strictly allegorical usages of the nuptial image.23 
These kinds of tensions and the notion of asymmetrical nuptial metaphors 
intensified when Jewish thinkers in the first and second century C.E. were influenced by 
Hellenistic philosophy. As a result, this ancient Jewish view of sex—and correspondingly 
of women—became increasingly negative.24 It is necessary then to study what ideologies 
of sex and gender were in the first and second centuries of the Common Era (CE). 
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 Ross, “The Bridegroom and the Bride,” 44; Mulieris dignitatem 3-7. 
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 The problem becomes even more serious if one were to claim that this is not only a metaphor but it is 
naturally the case; that men (bridegroom) naturally resemble God and women (bride) do not. I will discuss 
the problems stemming from such a position later in this dissertation. 
 
24
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Androcentricism and the First Two Centuries CE 
 Of all the influential Greco-Roman elements in the first and second centuries CE, 
Stoicism had “the greatest explicit impact on later developments in Western thought 
about sex.”25 While Stoics were not dualists, they were monists (materialists), 
characterized by their deep distrust of the body. They sought to eradicate most bodily 
desires. 26 Musonius Rufus, the influential Stoic philosopher in the 1st century Rome, 
thought that most improper human behavior (especially that of sexual desire) was a direct 
result of a lack of self-control of one’s body.27 Moreover, bodily pleasure, even in the 
context of sex within a marriage—and he did insist that it had always be within the 
context of marriage—was reprehensible.28 His pupil, Epictetus, also thought 
“immoderation in bodily activities irrational, for it made a man dependent on his own 
body.”29 Since the body was associated with the irrational, was disruptive, and liable to 
excess, it had to be controlled by the mastery of one’s body. This was done by reason and 
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reason only. Thus the dominant theme of mistrust of the body, its desires, and 
emotions/passions along with the obsession about greatness of mind, self-control, self-
sufficiency, and self-mastery carried through the later traditions. With the extension of 
this dichotomous thinking, the association with the active mind/soul—man—is trusted 
even further and anything connected to the passive body—woman—is thought of 
pejoratively.30 However, it should be very strongly noted that what the ancient 
philosophy meant by body, soul, nature, matter etc. meant something quite diverse and 
complex and that there were not a monolithic “Greek view” of these concepts. What I am 
trying to highlight are the ideas that gave impetus to the later, perhaps Cartesian notion of, 
radical dimorphic separations. 
 The biology of the second century CE seems to suggest that not only were the 
attributes of women downplayed, but that women as a sex did not really exist. That is, an 
examination into the writings of Galen, a second century Roman physician and 
philosopher of Greek origin, suggests that women were essentially men and, in so many 
words, proclaimed that there existed really only one sex (man) for human beings. His 
rationale for this assertion was this: women in fact had the same genitalia as men. Men’s, 
however, were outside the body and women’s were inside it. In talking about women, he 
thought that “you could not find a single male part left over that had not simply changed 
its position.” Hence, he was convinced that women’s sexual organs were simply turned 
inside from men’s. Interestingly, however, he did not think the opposite was true—that 
man could be changed from a woman. Simply put, women “are inverted, and hence less 
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perfect than men.” Moreover, “They have exactly the same organs but in exactly the 
wrong places.”31 They were “essentially men in whom a lack of vital heat—of 
perfection—had resulted in the retention, inside, of structures that in the male are visible 
without.”32 Since the “vital heat” had not come to women in sufficient quantities, they 
were “more soft, more liquid, more clammy-cold, altogether more formless than were 
men.” This was an easy conclusion to draw for men who grew up “looking at the world 
from a position of unchallenged dominance.”33 Of course this fact explained why 
women’s body “could not burn up the heavy surplus that coagulated within them” in 
periodic menstruation.34 
 Therefore, from the first century CE and thereafter, the literature seems to suggest 
that it was a commonplace for thinkers to consider sex dualistically and to see that men 
were rational, able to control themselves, and had mastery over their bodies and their 
female counterparts. Women, then, were the opposite of all that. In fact, standing against 
the backdrop of the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, men were some kind of perfect 
form, whereas women were some what defective. In this sort of a “one-sex” model, men 
and women were seen “along an axis whose telos was male.”35 
 Thanks to this outlook, any display of unmanliness by any man was considered 
problematic. If a (grown) man demonstrated passivity or effeminacy, for example, it 
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would be seen as problematic in Greco-Roman society.36 Passivity and effeminacy were 
not considered as problematic, however, for ones who were considered naturally servile, 
which included some males, i.e., boys.37 However, an adult man was expected to display 
or prove his manliness by his actions—being active (penetrator) not passive (penetrated). 
The Roman hegemonic masculinity was demonstrated, therefore, militarily, politically, 
and in his household.38 Such an attitude would have greater ramifications beyond the 
Greco-Roman milieu. 
In this setting and only after understanding this background, can one finally move 
to passages of the New Testament and understand the passages in an appropriate context. 
While being mindful of this Sitz im Leben, because passages in the New Testament are 
foundational for all Christians, and because the 1 Timothy passages are so crucial for this 
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project, I will investigate extensively what those passages mean for Christians and for 
this project. 
Ethics of the Pastoral Epistle 
[8] I desire, then, that in every place the men should pray, lifting up holy 
hands without anger or argument; [9] also that the women should dress 
themselves modestly and decently in suitable clothing, not with their hair 
braided, or with gold, pearls, or expensive clothes, [10] but with good 
works, as is proper for women who profess reverence for God. [11] Let a 
woman learn in silence with full submission. [12] I permit no woman to 
teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent. [13] For Adam 
was formed first, then Eve; [14] and Adam was not deceived, but the 
woman was deceived and became transgressor. [15] Yet she will be saved 
through childbearing, provided they continue in faith and love and 
holiness, with modesty. 
       1Tim 2:8-15 NRSV 
 
 Being a part of the “politically correct” culture in the United States, I had been 
hitherto convinced, along with many Christians, of the egalitarian interpretation39 of 
certain “problematic”40 passages in Scripture. It was only recently that I started to take 
many of the “hierarchical interpretations” seriously. 1 Timothy 2:8-15 is one of the most 
hotly debated passages in the Bible. Scholars basically fall into two camps with regard to 
its interpretation: (1) that this passage unequivocally limits women’s roles in churches or 
(2) that this is a commentary on Paul’s teaching that had been distorted by Christians at 
the turn of the second century, moving farther away from the egalitarian model of Paul’s 
teaching in Galatians 3:28 and therefore not necessarily applicable for Christians. I find 
neither of these positions to be sufficient. 
 In this section, I will describe why so many have selected 1 Timothy 2:8-15 as 
“problematic” and identify some verses that are crucial to this discussion. In discussing 
                                                 
39
 Examples of these will be discussed later in this section. 
 
40
 I put the word in quotations since the passages are not universally seen problematically. 
42 
 
 
these verses, I will make use of two popular hermeneutical options for this passage. In 
presenting both options, I will offer problems that I see with these interpretations. Finally, 
I will conclude with a new model— a third hermeneutical option—for understanding and 
applying the Pastoral Epistles, and scripture as a whole, in the gender-conscious post-
modern context. 
Identifying the “Problem” 
 Part of the reason why this Timothy passage seems problematic is that it has been 
used to support the traditional “patriarchal power arrangement,” which suppressed the 
leadership of women in churches and abused and oppressed women within the society as 
a whole.41 Furthermore, justifying slavery on scriptural authority added to the oppression 
and abuse of African Americans and other people of color. The African American 
theologian Howard Thurman learned of such oppression through his grandmother who 
never let him read from the letters of Paul because many of the passages were used to 
justify slavery.42 There are two things to note here: (1) there are difficult passages in the 
Scripture for many marginalized people and (2) these passages are only tricky in certain 
cultures and might not be so in other cultures. For example, the passages that were used 
to justify discrimination against women and African Americans in the United States 
would not be as problematic in South Korea. Although there is a history of slavery in 
Korea, scriptural passages were never used to justify it. Also, coming from a tradition 
where women were, and to a degree still are, expected to be quiet and serene, be dressed 
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cleanly, be proper in appearance, be obedient and dutiful wives, these passages would not 
have the shock value that they seem to have on many American interpreters.43 In fact, 
passages in Timothy only affirm the traditional values of many Koreans. More troubling 
passages for Koreans might be Luke 9:59-60 and 14:26 where the cost of discipleship is 
extended even to the point of leaving one’s family. This command is in direct contrast to 
the traditional Korean family value system, which especially values filial piety.44 In a 
cross-cultural context, one can see that since the Bible is translatable into many languages 
and cultures, what might be considered too difficult to accept in one culture, might be 
perfectly fine in another. Such cultural relativism is also problematic. Human sacrifice, 
for example, was accepted in one culture, but this did not make it right universally, even 
for that culture. Hence, we must also deal with these passages with the problems of 
cultural relativism. The answer, I suggest, does not lie only in what the passages say. It 
lies more in what we should do with those passages. What should we do with this 
Timothy passage? To start answering that question, let us go to the text. 
Comments on the Background of the Text 
 The letters of Timothy and Titus have been referred to as “pastoral letters” since 
the 18th century. This name was given to designate them because there is a clear concern 
for the pastoral oversight and order for the church and its leaders in these letters. 
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Concerns for the “godliness, sound teaching, church order, and good works,” as well as 
distress over “false teachers,” both seem to point to the pastoral apprehension for order in 
the church.45 How this background information plays a role will be an interesting issue 
that will be picked up on later. 
 Another important issue is that the author of Timothy claims to be Paul. The 
implication of such a claim is enormously important. However, in the last 200 years, the 
claim itself has been challenged. There seem to be many points of the letter that contrast 
with the undisputed Pauline letters. Some of these problems are open to question, and 
some seem to make very strong cases for pseudepigraphy. The particles, conjunctions and 
adverbs, and their uses differ notably from Paul’s undisputed usage. Pauline terms appear 
with slightly different nuances. Also, early documents are missing these Timothy 
letters.46 References to false teachers—1 Tim 1:3-22 and 1 Tim 4:1-3 for example—if 
criticizing the Gnostic movement, are something that developed later than Paul’s time. 
The Church structure envisioned by Timothy is more complex than that of Paul’s lifetime. 
All these observations suggest that the letters are pseudepigraphical.47 About 80 to 90 
percent of modern scholars agree on this and most of them place the letter as written 
between 80 and 100 CE.48 Although this evidence seems to push Paul, as author, away 
from the text, it is important to note that Timothy is still part of the canon and should not 
be dismissed solely based on the fact that it is pseudepigraphic. In the modern context 
                                                 
45
 Jouette M. Bassler, “1 Timothy: Introduction,” in Wayne Meeks ed., The Harper Collins Study Bible 
(New York, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc. 1993), 2229-2231 and 2015-1017. 
 
46
 For example, the Marcion canon and Beatty Papyrus II (P 46; ca. 200 32); Raymond E. Brown, S.S. An 
Introduction to the New Testament (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 662-664. 
 
47
 See Brown, 662-668. 
 
48
 Ibid., 668. 
45 
 
 
this practice might seem like a deceptive way to make people believe that Paul wrote this, 
but in the ancient context it was a common practice. Pseudepigraphy served to impress 
the reader by making the text appear genuine. The Pastorals are not simply forgeries and 
the audience might well have already known that they were not actually written by Paul 
himself: 
Within the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, the writing of 
pseudonymous epistles was a long-standing tradition. In such case the 
letter sought to extend the thought of his or her intellectual master to the 
problem of a later day. The writer said in effect, “The master would surely 
have said this if faced with this set of problems or issues.” It is quite likely 
that the original readers of the Pastorals knew very well that Paul himself 
was not the actual author and that the letters represented an effort to 
extend his heritage to a later generation.49 
 
Then, given that it is in the canon, the important question may not be whether or not this 
was written by Paul, but, rather, what we should do with this text in the context of today’s 
society. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will assume that the modern scholarship is 
correct and that this is a Deutero-Pauline text. 
Comments on the Text 
 Assuming that this is a Deutero-Pauline text, a reader can approach it as one of 
the first commentaries on Paul and his theology. This approach enables the reader to see 
how the author of 1 Timothy thought Paul would react and what Paul might say in the 
current situation that faced the author. This section will show that the dualistic and 
androcentric interpretation of Paul that the author of 1 Timothy had fed into the ethics of 
the Pastoral Epistles. Also, this method enables the reader to critique Timothy’s 
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interpretation of Paul and Paul’s interpretation of Jesus, in comparison with the modern 
interpretation of Paul and Jesus. 
 The verses preceding 1 Tim 2:8-15 instruct the community on prayer. Then, the 
verses following instruct the community about public worship. The passage is divided 
into two parts: How men should pray and how women should act in public worship. What 
one immediately notices is that a single verse was used in treating the first part (men), 
and the rest (v. 9-15) is used to instruct how women should behave in worship. Clearly, 
the author is much more concerned about instructing women than men. By now, this fact 
should not be so surprising. Here, the author—possibly facing some new problems 
dealing with women in the community—wanted to instruct women about how to behave 
properly. The only instructions that the author had for men was dealing with raised holy 
hands “without anger and argument.”50 Such a directive for controlling one’s anger as a 
man may be the result of the “protocols of masculinity” of the time, which I will discuss 
later in this section. For now, the only point that I wish to make is that the author spent 
only one verse in instructing men. 
 The concern that dominates these verses is women’s behavior.51 Verse 9 gives the 
reader a few details. By stating that women should dress modestly, it tells the reader that 
there must have been some women of wealth who dressed in fancy attire. It is not 
inconceivable that there were women who dressed in fancy attire, which could be a 
distraction in praying and worshiping. In this sense, the instruction is consistent with the 
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previous verse. That is, the author is trying to exclude anything that would hinder prayer 
or worship. Useless thoughts, like thoughts of anger or argument (v.8), could negatively 
affect the prayer and the worship. Extravagant attire and braided hair (v.9), too, could 
negatively affect the prayer and the worship of men.52 Hence, in order to have proper 
prayer and worship, men must be clean inwardly and outwardly (v.8: holy, or clean, 
hands, and no thoughts of anger or arguments), and women must not dress in ostentatious 
attire (v.9) because it could add to the distraction. Furthermore, just as v. 8 could be 
talking about the physical and the non-physical, v.9 could refer to physical and non-
physical appearances of indecency. katastolh/ (dress or deportment) can refer not only to 
external appearance, but it can also refer to character and disposition, and sometimes 
both.53 Some scholars (Dibelius and Conzelmann) maintain that the stress of vv.8-9 is not 
on women dressing and adorning (modestly) but on an “internal ornamentation.”54 
However, the possibility of the emphasis being both for internal ornamentation and 
against external ornamentation is still high. One might argue that the following verse is 
indicative of the accent being on the “internal,” since good works (e;rgwn avgaqw/n) in v.10 
come from a good internal ornamentation. L.T. Johnson, for example, has claimed that, 
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“these are the practices that reveal the internal moral disposition of the women.”55 
However, it is hard to get away from the external aspect of doing a good work. It might 
be helpful, then, to ask what constitutes a good work here. 
 Whatever “good works” entail, it is about women’s good works. It is the good 
works of women who “profess reverence for God.” Certainly that demands the internal 
moral disposition of women. I do not deny that. However, I suggest that overlooking the 
physical aspect of this verse would be detrimental to understanding properly the author’s 
intention. The usage of the words “good works,” elsewhere in the letter, whether 
“through good works (diV e;rgwn avgaqw/n)” or “good works (kalaV e[rga),” expect women 
who are to be supported as widows (5:10), elder (5:25), and wealthy (6:18) to do good 
work. These usages are indicative of good works not being “trivializing phrases, but point 
to a life of productive virtue.”56 This opens the possibility of a physical interpretation of 
the passage. Since this verse is speaking specifically of women’s good works, such works 
must include bearing children (hence v.15). Again, there is a coexistence of external and 
internal in the verse. Unfortunately, that opens up the possibility for an interpretation 
which extends inferiority of women not only externally but also internally.  
 The next two verses (v.11-12) have possibly been the most problematic and 
controversial verses in Timothy in the recent past. However, these verses should not 
shock us so much if we consider the audience and the aforementioned context to and 
from which the author of Timothy is writing. Readers of this letter have to remember that 
at the time this was being written, the household model was that of the male at the head 
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of the household (paterfamilias). In this context, words that were applied to women, like 
silence (h`suci,a|) and submission (u`potagh/|), are understandable.57 A proper relationship, 
in this context, is for wives to be submissive to husbands and keep quiet. The only 
extension that this passage is making, from this norm of the ancient world, is that now it 
is applied to the code of conduct of the church. This seems like a very easy, and almost 
inevitable, transition. In early “Christianity,” the church was also a household. We know 
that the first churches all met in private homes.58 In fact, this was not much of an 
intensification of the ancient world custom, but a mere extension. In the context of this 
paterfamilias model, we can now revisit v.11 and v.12. 
 One can identify three parts in v 11: One, a woman should learn (manqane,tw), two, 
when she learns, she should learn in silence or “quietly” (h`suci,a|), and three, that she 
should do both in full or complete submission (evn pa,sh| u`potagh/|). The latter two parts 
seem to shock many modern Westerners. Although h`suci,a could be softened to mean 
“quietly,” as L. T. Johnson translates and prefers it,59 it is more consistent to translate 
with a harsher tone of “silence.” That fits better with the harshness and directness of the 
tone in Timothy to women (subordination, forbidding to teach, fall of Eve as a 
stereotypical women, etc.) The authors demand for the “chiastic” pattern (abcb’a’) 
further supports the harsh translation. 
(a) learn in silence 
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(b) with full submission 
(c) [not] to teach 
    (b’)[not] to have authority 
(a’) keep silent.60 
 
Such translation might seem harsh, but in the context of paterfamilias model it is at least 
understandable. The “silence” for women in the ancient context, in fact, only has a 
normative force and no shocking force. Women’s voices must have been just as 
problematic (v.11) for the Pastorals as women’s appearance (v.9). The idea of voice 
being problematic and distracting is also present in Plutarch’s “Advice to Bride and 
Groom.” 
 …her speech as well, ought to be not for the public. (142B) 
A woman ought to do her talking either to her husband or through her husband. 
(142D, 32)61 
 
Paul seems to share the same viewpoints about women’s silence in 1Cor 14:33b-35: 
As in all the churches of the saints, women should be silent in the 
churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should be subordinate, 
as the law also says. If there is anything they desire to know, let them ask 
their husbands at home. For it is shameful for a woman to speak in church. 
(NRSV) 
 
Some scholars did suggest that this is an interpolation. However, even the most 
prominent scholar cannot provide direct manuscript evidences for this thesis.62 Also, if 
one were to claim that this is not an interpolation and that it is in fact Pauline (Deutero or 
not), we must deal with what, at first glance, seems to be an egalitarian claim by Paul in 
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Gal 3:28. I will come back to this issue later in this section. But for now, in 1 Cor 14, 
Paul agrees with the fundamental value of Roman society and the paterfamilias model. 
Just like “silence,” the same goes with “full submission (evn pa,sh| u`potagh/|)” in the 
context of paterfamilias model. As one can imagine, there had been many who tried to 
alleviate the ruthlessness of this word in a number of ways. For example, N. J. Hommes 
tried to argue that this submission would only apply to married women (as if that is so 
much better). However, her reason for such application seems weak and, as I will show, 
the understanding of women at that time makes this passage much more plausible to 
maintain the total submission of women to men in, not only marriage, but anytime.63 
 It is important to remember that the notion of gender equality did not exist in 
ancient times. The first century C.E. Jewish philosopher, Philo, had this to say about the 
relationship between women and men in terms of Adam and Eve: 
And woman is more accustomed to be deceived than man. For his 
judgment, like his body, is masculine and is capable of dissolving or 
destroying the designs of deception; but the judgment of woman is more 
feminine, and because of softness she easily gives way and is taken in by 
plausible falsehoods which resemble the truth. (Questions and Answers on 
Genesis I, 33)64 
 
Well before Philo, however, such a view of female weakness is also present. In the 
second century B.C.E. Jewish writing, Letter of Aristeas, a man was able to get along 
with his wife because he thought: 
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…that womankind are by nature headstrong and energetic in the pursuit of 
their own desires, and subject to sudden changes of opinion through 
fallacious reasoning, and their nature is essentially weak. (250)65 
 
If this were how women were seen, it is not difficult to imagine the existence of the 
instructions for the full submission of women to men in first Timothy. A fragment from 
Philemon, (4th century BCE) a writer of comedies understandably stated: 
It is a good wife’s duty, O Nikostrate, to be devoted to her husband, but in 
subordination; a wife who prevails is a great evil.66 
 
A Necessary Digression 
Incidentally, there is a silent yet widely held assumption about men in all this—
that is to say that the construction of women is also in a way the construction of men. 
What is the reason for the silence? When something is a given, it need not be explained. 
Similarly, when men are the norm, explaining is hardly necessary. If one requires 
elucidation, it probably means that one is not the norm, or in the position of power.67 
Hence, descriptions often dealt with women in the ancient milieu, but since they tell us 
something about men, we can hypothesize on the basis of them some attitudes attributed 
to men. From the three examples above—that women are more likely to be deceived, that 
women are impulsive, and that a wife must submit and not prevail—one can infer that 
men are essentially strong and less gullible and likely to overcome deception, men are 
reasonable and not impulsive, and a husband is superior and prevails over his wife. 
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Moreover, one can also get an idea about a notion of masculinity by looking at 
Timothy (and the rest of the Pastoral Epistles). According to Jennifer A. Glancy,  
In the Pastoral Epistles, we find such a specification of what constitutes 
legitimate masculinity, ranging from a valorization of self-control as the 
epitome of virtue to an insistence that Christian men should exert a 
controlling influence over their wives and offspring.68 
 
In fact, many of the qualities for the behavior of mature Christian men are associated with 
properly self-controlled masculinity, a common theme of the time.69 It seems as though 
control, whether of self, of one’s household, and/or of other subordinates (Cf. 1 Timothy 
2:8, 3:4-5, 5:1-2), played a crucial role in defining masculinity.70 Perhaps the 
prescriptions for women in the section at hand are a method through which men can 
practice such a control, including sexual practices.71 
 Beyond and related to the requirements of self-control, control over his household 
and his subordinates (including required marriage and child-rearing72), men are also 
warned, in 1 Tim 3:3 for example, about avarice.73 The reason behind this caution, 
according to Glancy, is that something like having avarice would “incline a man to 
surrender to desire”74 and that “display of temper and avariciousness were interpreted as 
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symptoms of effeminacy.”75 Thus, office holders, whether bishops, deacons, or elders 
(the exemplars who set the “standards of behavior for other men to emulate”), are 
expected to behave like men. That is. 
…be above reproach, married one time and able to control their children 
and their households; temperate, sensible, respectable, not arrogant, not 
quick-tempered, not prone to brawling, not quarrelsome; not addicted to 
wine, not avaricious; and able to teach sound doctrine in a straightforward 
manner.76 
 
In fact, she argues that the Pastoral Epistles separated themselves from unmanly 
images, even to the point of distancing from the unmanly images of Jesus at the 
crucifixion, an event virtually ignored by the Pastoral Epistles.77 My opinion, and I 
continue the theme later, is that ignoring Jesus’ vulnerability to corporal abuse, despite 
the fact that the inability to protect one’s body was seen as “less than manly” in the 
Roman code, is detrimental in correctly conceiving Jesus of Nazareth and understanding 
masculinity as a whole.78 
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Furnish claims that these kinds of views are very different from that of the 
Apostle Paul, at least in the undisputed letters of Paul.79 However, Paul’s view (even if 
Furnish discredits 1 Cor 14:34) is in harmony with such collective consciousness about 
women in 1 Cor 11:3, and correspondingly about men. Although some tried to make this 
passage an interpolation too, even Furnish admits that, “there is no evidence of any 
textual disturbance in chapter 11.”80 Slowly, Paul begins to appear differently from the 
Paul of Galatians 3:28. The door of possibility that many of us may have misinterpreted 
in Galatians 3:28 is beginning to open. Perhaps the view of the problematic passages in 
Paul as interpolations is due to the interpreter’s particular view of Paul. If one considers 
the possibility that Paul, in fact, was human and that he too can be conditioned by the 
social context and culture, she or he will start to see that there may have been a mistake 
in interpreting Gal 3:28 and in interpreting Paul as having an all-inclusive, gender neutral 
attitude. 
 Just as controversial as the previous two verses is the next verse (v.12). This verse 
has justified the unequal status of men and women in the church’s ministry for centuries. 
Now, with the above examples of Pauline claims, as well as Plato, Aristotle, Musonius 
Rufus, Epictetus, Galen, Philo, the Letter of Aristeas, and Philemon, it is easy to see how 
plausible this claim was at the time. Once again, many tried to soften this passage by 
claiming that elsewhere in the Bible (1 Cor 11:5 and Titus 2:3) there are implications that 
women can teach, or that the authority of which this passage is speaking is that of church 
and not in the general sense. Here, the question is whether Paul means ‘any man,’ or ‘a 
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husband,’ or a ‘man of the church’ by the usage of the word avndro,j or avnh,r. L.T. Johnson 
claims that Paul means ‘any man in the assembly.’81 This seems a reasonable enough 
claim in the light of the overall agenda of the author of Timothy. However, even if this is 
so, against the background I presented regarding the view of women in the ancient world, 
one also must realize that such claim of men’s authority in an assembly came about 
because of an underlying subordinate view of women in general at the time. A claim that 
this disallowance of the authority is a temporary way to resolve problems with particular 
women (i.e. wealthy women) to church authority is quite possible.82 However, it does not 
touch the core of the issue and is just trying to soften the text from its original harshness. 
 The next two verses are the author’s effort to justify theologically his position on 
the inferiority of women. The core of the author’s concern is not whether women should 
be able to teach in the church (while that could have been one of the author’s agendas). It 
is not that women could not teach or have authority in church, and therefore are inferior. 
It is that women are inferior and therefore could not teach or have authority over men. 
The issue for the author was men’s superiority and women’s inferiority. And this is what 
the author set out to defend theologically. 
 To that end, the author makes arguments from the order of creation. That is, since 
a male was created before female, he is dominant or superior over what was created 
later.83 Of course, following this logic can be problematic because humankind is last in 
the order of creation and, thus, can be considered the most inferior. But God commended 
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humankind, in Gen 1:28, to have dominion over all things on earth. Hence, it seems as 
though the author of Timothy thought that this idea applies only in the order, not of all 
creation, but of created human beings. 
Scholars think that it is likely that the author of Timothy is referring back to the 
second account of creation (Gen 2) where male was explicitly made before female.84 
What is unclear is where the idea of ‘first created, hence better’ came from. It is true that 
first born is recognized as the one with authority over the later born.85 However, as 
Bassler points out, this verse is not talking about the ‘first-born’ but ‘first-formed.’86 It is 
unclear why the author of Timothy thought this logic worked. It is just as logical to think 
that God had created Adam first as an experiment and seeing all the flaws decided to 
make a better being, namely Eve.87 Perhaps the author is picking up the theme of 1 Cor 
11: 7b-9, where the emphasis is not on the second created human being, but on the fact 
that the woman was made out of man and is created for man. This theme on 1 Cor 11:7b-
9 is the more consistent and the more probable meaning of the text than the argument that 
claims superiority of the first-created. The theological flaw of the latter, I think, seems 
too obvious for the author to have missed it. Also, 1 Cor 11:8 does hint at the earlier 
creation of Adam and perhaps that was what carried more weight by the time of the 
writing of 1 Timothy. What is certain is that at the time of the composition of the Pastoral 
Epistles, the effect of Paul on 1 Timothy fed into the already existing dualism of that time. 
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The next verse generates a bit more serious discussion (v.14). Eve, like anybody, 
is susceptible to deceit and did get tricked by the snake (Cf. 2 Cor 11:3). What is 
interesting is that the author claims that Adam was not deceived. Even if one claims that 
Eve is at fault for initiating the evil act, Adam never put up a fight for the “right thing to 
do” before God. Adam, in fact, did get tricked, at least by Eve. However, this text wants 
to put the blame solely on the woman. Even “authentic” Paul saw it differently. Paul 
implied that “Adam was deceived (Rom 7:11), and it is Adam (not Eve) whom Paul 
identifies as the first transgressor (Rom 5:12-21; 1 Cor 15:21-22).”88 Perhaps the idea of 
“first” plays an important role here again. That is, Eve was deceived first and therefore is 
guiltier. The author of Timothy does not say this, however. It is clear that the author, 
despite apparent problems with it, puts the blame on Eve alone. 
Even with the seemingly weak positions that the author of Timothy takes, what is 
clear is that the author is convinced of women’s inferiority. For some, this inferiority is 
convincing enough to claim that it is inappropriate for a woman, who is inferior to man, 
to teach and exercise authority over men in the church.89 As shown in the previous 
paragraph, however, certain theological problems exist with such stands. Not only is the 
inferiority of women theologically suspect, but so is the interpretation of Paul by the 
author of Timothy. 
The author gives a “way out” for the woman, who is inferior, susceptible to 
deception, and guilty of sin, on two conditions: that she bears children and that she 
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“continue in faith and love and holiness, with modesty.” There are two interesting issues 
here. First, there is something grammatically puzzling and, second, there is something 
theologically puzzling. Grammatically it is said that “she” will be saved if “they” remain 
faithful and loving. Why did the author use third person singular swqh,setai, while 
changing in the next clause to a third person plural form mei,nwsin? There are several 
possibilities for interpretation. It could be that the second instance makes explicit the 
general usage of “woman” in the first so that, women (in general) is saved through 
childbearing if women (in general) stay in faith. Or, the first subject remains singular (the 
woman) and the second clause refers to children so that the woman is saved through 
childbearing if the children stay in faith. Or, “saved” here does not mean salvation but a 
literal meaning of survival in the dangerous process of childbearing.90 It seems that the 
previous verse must be a continuation into this verse or there is a sudden break of 
continuity. In that sense, we are still talking about Adam and Eve and Genesis. Hence, 
despite the inferiority of women, Eve, as a model of all women, is saved through 
childbearing (Gen 3:16) if the children of Eve continue in faith. Here, the “children” 
could refer to all of us, since biblically we are all children of Eve. However, in the 
context of this passage and not to break the consistency of the author, the children of Eve 
here must refer to all women since Eve.91 
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What is theologically puzzling is that the author of Timothy puts himself in 
opposition to Paul. Since the author is using Paul’s name, he is obviously not out to 
challenge Paul. Rather, it is the lack of understanding of Paul by the author. Salvation for 
women in Timothy is based on childbearing and holy actions. However, Paul insisted that 
salvation did not come from what we do, not based on our actions but by our faith and the 
grace of God (Rom 3:21-28; 5:6-8).92 Although L. T. Johnson is wrong to identify Paul as 
radically different from the author of Timothy, he is correct in interpreting that, in vv.14-
15, Paul and Timothy are different.93 
Galatians 3:28 
 Aside from the author’s misunderstanding of Paul in vv. 14-15, I maintain that the 
author of Timothy is quite consistent with Paul. The biggest weapon to combat such a 
stand has been the apparent equality of male and female in Galatians 3:28. The work of 
Krister Stendahl94, along with Mary Hayter95 and Stanley Porter96, and especially the 
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monumental work In Memory of Her by Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza97, all contribute in 
working towards a gender-equal interpretation of Galatians 3:28. Despite Paul’s view of 
the inferiority of women, many argue that phrases such as those found in 1 Cor 14:34-35 
are not genuinely Pauline and that they are interpolations. They also argue that Paul could 
not have said anything degrading about women because women like Chloe, Euodian and 
Syntyche, Prisca (Priscilla), Phoebe, Junia, Mary of Rom 16:6, Tryphaena and Tryphosa, 
the beloved Persis, the unnamed mother of Rufus, Apphia, and Thekla in the Acts of Paul, 
all worked either alongside Paul or as some kind of ministers in house churches 
associated with him. 
 In recent years, however, the proof-text of gender equality has been under 
scrutiny. In 1998, Dale Martin, then a Professor of Duke University (now with Yale 
University), presented a paper at the Society of Biblical Literature entitled “Galatians 
3:28: ‘No Male and Female.’”98 In it, he tried to present the most historical reading of 
Galatians 3:28 to claim that it is not about “equality” at all.99 Historically speaking, it 
would not make sense to read the passage in terms of equality because the way people 
thought about men and women is radically different from the way we think now. 
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 His starting point is from Wayne Meeks’s seminal article, “The Image of the 
Androgyny.”100 From there, Martin pursues what “androgyny” meant in the ancient world. 
An androgynous person, according to Martin, “possesses both male and female traits or 
characteristics, or not enough of one or the other to allow confident categorization.”101 
This concept reminds one of the speeches of Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium. 
Aristophanes claimed, 
…each human being was a rounded whole, with double back and flanks 
forming a complete circle; it had four hand and an equal number of legs, 
and two identically similar faces upon a circular neck, with one head 
common to both the faces, which were turned in opposite directions. It had 
four ears and two organs of generation and everything else to 
correspond.102 
 
Aristophanes went on to claim that the reason why human beings were separated into two 
sexes is that they were too strong and rebellious towards the gods. So Zeus bisected 
her/him in half to make her/him weaker. This is why each half yearns for the other half 
and this is why we hug, kiss, and have sex, yearning to become one again.103 
 Martin’s examination of the ancient body also shows a radically different 
understanding of male and female. The ancient body was a “one-sex” body, that had both 
male and female aspects to them and these bodies could: 
shift upward and downward on the continuum, depending on how much 
maleness or femaleness their bodies contained at any particular time. In 
this system, any change that would be considered salvific must be 
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understood as a movement higher on the spectral hierarchy. Thus, women 
may experience salvation as a movement upward into masculinity…104 
 
Martin maintained that most of the ancient Christian authors read Galatians 3:28 in this 
kind of mindset of male, female, and body. Martin then visits the Acts of Thomas where it 
reads, “there is neither day and night, nor light and darkness, nor good and evil, nor poor 
and rich, male and female, no free and slave, no proud that subdues the humble” (129). If 
male and female were seen “equal” in this sentence, then one must also see good and evil 
as equal. This is certainly not the case here and, the argument would be that it is not the 
case in Galatians 3:28. If not equal, then what is the relationship between male and 
female?105 
 Some feminist scholars also argue against the interpretation of Galatians 3:28 as 
an “equality” passage. Kari Vogt maintains that it is a “sex changing metaphor.”106 That 
is, one must become more like male, the superior being. Lone Fatum also saw that it is 
not promoting equality between sexual differences. Rather, it gets rid of differences all 
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together and replaces a hierarchical spread of male-female with an asexual unity of 
completed male.107 In this line of thinking, let us read the end of the Gospel of Thomas: 
Simon Peter said to them, “Mary should leave us, for females are not 
worthy of life.” 
Jesus said, “Look, I shall guide her to make her male, so that she too may 
become a living spirit resembling you males. For every female who makes 
herself male will enter heaven’s kingdom.” (114)108 
 
Again, we see that the ancient thinking continues to point to “becoming male” language. 
In this schema, Paul was not a revolutionary of gender equality, at least not in the context 
that many Christians desperately want to see him. Furnish recognized that any attempt to 
soften Paul, or 1 Timothy 2:8-15, is preconditioned by the “sacred cow view of Paul’s 
ethical teaching.”109 When it comes to the issue of women, Pauline Christianity was not 
counter-cultural at all. Rather, it upheld the common understanding of gender of the time. 
 Martin does not definitively prove that his way of seeing the ancient body is 
applicable for everybody in the ancient world. The scholars’ claim that Galatians 3:28 is 
not about equality is not undeniable. However, they are legitimately disputed. What is 
certain is that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 have often been used without considering these 
legitimate disputations. One must consider the fact that certain dualistic interpretations of 
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Paul fed into the ethics of the Pastoral Epistles. Only after such a consideration can one 
come to a reasonable discussion about what to do with passages like 1 Timothy 2:8-15. 
The Postmodern View 
The egalitarian interpretation of Paul, at least the way we have it, does not work. 
This model has been guilty of making passages like 1 Timothy 2:8-15 moderate and not 
being true to the ancient context. Also, the very foundation of this model, namely 
Galatians 3:28, has been shaken. With the structure now collapsed, there is a need to 
build a new structure. However, the hierarchical model is not the answer either. This 
model has been guilty of oppressing women in churches and, perhaps more tragically, in 
many households. That does not mean, however, that the Bible should be read just like 
any other literature, as Benjamin Jowett also suggested.110 
What, then, might this new model look like? What is the new structure for the 
new model? First, let us take advice from Francis Young.111 At least initially, we must 
stay in the ancient world. Recognize that reading was a public activity in the ancient 
world and these documents are designed and written to persuade the audience. These 
texts are “audience-oriented.”112 Hence, we have to allow ourselves initially to be 
identified with the originally intended audiences. What is important in applying this 
method is to be sympathetic in hearing the words. With 21st century Western ears, 1 
Timothy seems outrageous. However, in the context of the original audience, as I suggest, 
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this was quite normal. This does not mean that we adopt such a maxim as an axiom. That 
is, we have to “hear sympathetically, but perhaps not adopt uncritically.”113 
What happens, then, when this method is used but comes to conclude that certain 
maxims do not work in today’s context? I propose a new model for dealing with such 
situations. If we stay true to the text, it is inevitable that we come across certain ancient 
maxims that simply do not work in the present Christian context. Instead of trying to 
work with a unworkable maxim, and instead of trying to alter or soften it, we simply need 
to reinterpret it altogether, as it is morally mistaken.114 I do not suggest that we drop these 
sayings out of the canon (that would be a whole new debate).115 However, if a maxim rips 
away the dignity of human beings, then it is directly contradictory to the love 
commandment of Christians and must be reinterpreted or dropped, at the very least, from 
being declared as the objective truth, the word of God, or a set of absolute rules.116 
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The Bible conveys the Word of God, but it is not God. I faithfully believe in the 
Spirit of the Bible, and when interpreted correctly, the Word of God comes alive. 
However, it is most certainly written by human beings. No matter how inspired the author 
was, the text was still written by the pen of finite and imperfect beings. Thus, the texts 
will inevitably reveal some shortcomings. If there are, we simply need to refrain from 
teaching these texts as if they were objectively true and pursue the love commandment 
that all Christians are supposed to follow and are called to pursue. 
Women most certainly are neither inferior nor should they be seen only in terms 
of men or “becoming” men.117 This is true even if one were from a different culture, like 
that of conservative Korea, where such passages may seem to be more permissible. Even 
cultural sensitivity and relative values would not make such passages right. Promulgating 
such a notion would only increase an unhealthy notion about not only women but also 
men, which results in detrimental outcomes—and that will become more visible as one 
moves along in this dissertation. 
Methodologically, then, I am making a claim that there should be more to a 
morally normative claims than simply stating that “the Bible says so.”118 This claim is 
                                                 
117
 It is important to note that this is not a simply ancient ideology. In today’s workplace, western and 
eastern, if a woman wants to break through the “glass ceiling,” she must embrace masculine structure and 
“sacrifice her feminine ‘nature’ and espouse a masculine ‘nature.’” Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, The 
Sexual Person, 118. I will go in a greater depth about the modern social implication in chapter 4-5. 
 
118
 The commission that guides Roman Catholics in giving thorough interpretations and suggestions for 
proper usage of the Bible, known as the Pontifical Biblical Commission within the Roman Curia, agrees on 
this point, albeit with a caveat. On one hand, according to the Commission, the Bible “does not present 
itself as a direct revelation of timeless truths but as the written testimony to a series of interventions in 
which God reveals himself in human history” and hence “the biblical writings cannot be correctly 
understood without an examination of the historical circumstances that shaped them.” On the other hand, 
the Commission is just as clear on the dangers of the historical-critical method because it can remain 
“absorbed solely in the issues of sources and stratification of texts.” For this reason, the historical-critical 
method, in fact, “cannot lay claim to enjoying a monopoly” in biblical interpretations. It can use the text as 
a “window” that gives access to one or other period, but it must make usage of other methods 
68 
 
 
especially important now that we have seen at least some limits to using the Bible as the 
source of theological ethics. While Bible may be of utmost importance, other sources for 
moral wisdom—such as tradition, secular disciplines, and contemporary experience—can 
serve to aid it, and vice versa.119 Furthermore, if the conviction of one’s biblical claims is 
strong, then there is no need to shy away from other disciplines. They not only need not 
be mutually exclusive, but also “what is” ought to have some relationship with “what 
ought to be” anyway.120 
I hold this position very strongly. However, this is not a “bible-specific” claim. I 
believe that for any claim, whether it is the passages in the Bible or any inherited 
tradition, if they are hurtful, a responsible citizen (Christian more specifically) should 
work to ameliorate the situation using the sources of moral wisdom. While the Bible may 
be of primary importance of these sources for me, it ought not to be the only source.121 
These sources for moral insight, each by themselves, may be quite limited but (and 
because of that limitation) they are all necessary, and hence necessary for this dissertation, 
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too.122 As I have demonstrated in this section, there is a need to move beyond just one of 
these sources. I shall now see whether we need to do so also for parts of the inherited 
tradition too. 
Early Christianity 
Tertullian 
 It is difficult, or better yet incorrect, to claim that there was one clear attitude 
toward man and woman during the early stages of the Jesus movement. There certainly 
were Stoic and Gnostic influences. Yet these influences were only partial since unlike the 
Hellenistic focus for self-mastery, the concern of the early Christians was more than that. 
They seek the connection to the afterlife and whatever their attitudes, they were 
inextricably linked to afterlife themes. Similarly, their attitudes toward men and women 
were profoundly salvific. Whatever the attitude toward gender, it had some kind of 
salvific connection. These writings tried to teach people what they could do to contribute 
to the afterlife of the people. 
 Tertullian had a clear idea of what got in the way of such a path: women. Having 
men as the norm, Tertullian saw women as an obstacle to men’s road to the pearly gates. 
However, women were not just an “obstacle,” but a medium through which the devil 
operated. They were to be blamed for the shortcomings of man in the Garden. This event 
was not an isolated incident but their guilty verdict was still in force at least up to the 
time of Tertullian. Women’s cunning was so strong that apparently even the devil was 
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not brave enough to attack women, according to Tertullian. Connecting all women to Eve, 
he claimed, 
And do you not know that you are (each) an Eve? The sentence of God on 
this sex of yours lives in this age: the guilt must of necessity live too. You 
are the devil’s gateway: you are the unsealer of that (forbidden) tree; you 
are the first deserter of the divine law: you are she who persuaded him 
whom the devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily 
God’s image, man. On the account of your desert—that is, death—even 
the Son of God had to die.123 
 
In these remarks, it is much easier for one to fathom why a woman had, in effect, to 
become a man in order to enter the kingdom of God. 
 Simultaneously, however, Tertullian spoke very highly of the Virgin Mother, as 
he wrote, 
The title of the Father expresses veneration and power. At the same time, 
the Son is invoked in the Father… But mother Church is not forgotten 
either. In the Father and the Son, one recognizes the Mother, by whom the 
name of the Father like that of the Son is guaranteed.124 
 
In this sense, according to Tina Beattie, the Father and the Son are only 
recognizable in the context that ‘she’ provides. That is, “the naming of the Father and the 
Son depends upon the Mother’s guarantee.”125 In this trajectory, women no longer need 
to worry about becoming, or simply depending on, men for the acknowledgement of their 
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existence. Like the Virgin Mother, women need not worry about being an obstacle for 
someone on the basis of their existence and fortuitous birth. Rather, a woman is 
dependent upon and on the grand scheme of all relationships exemplified by the Father, 
the Mother, and the Son. The symbolic possibilities (i.e. intermediary, empowerment, 
relationality, and interdependence) of this bond among the Father, the Mother, and the 
Son are endless, even in the midst of a Tertullian’s cultural and historical context that saw 
women pejoratively. 
While it is easy to simply dismiss pejorative attitudes toward women as ancient 
and outdated—and accept the certain selections of Tertullian, such as the one used by 
Beattie—one must be careful not to write the negative imageries off without realizing 
their lasting effect. That is, one must ask the question, “How different were the attitudes 
in the periods following Tertullian and how different are they now?” If it turns out that 
the particular wording and blunt nature of expressing has changed but the basic attitudes 
remained, then there is no doubt that we are in a serious need for a new paradigm. I shall 
see whether that is the case, starting with Augustine. 
Augustine 
 Like Tertullian, Augustine also blamed women for being the cause of men’s 
sinful behavior. As a case in point, one can turn to a letter that he had written to an 
otherwise unknown women named Ecdicia. In it, one can see that Ecdicia had requested 
Augustine’s advice. While they were still married and living together, she and her 
unnamed husband lived without sexual intercourse. This lifestyle was something which 
he had agreed to live. However, her husband found himself not being able to keep his end 
of the bargain. She wanted to continue the practice of sexual abstinence while her 
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husband ended up committing adultery. Augustine’s advice, or more like a ruling, was 
simple. The cause of this mess lay with Ecdicia. While he praised mutual and voluntary 
sexual abstinence in marriage, and admitted that returning to carnal intercourse after 
making a vow of chastity to God is a “source of grief,” committing adultery was a greater 
sin. However, this adultery was not of the husband’s fault but it occurred “in his rage at 
[her].”126 Ecdicia’s intention for writing this letter was to find out whether she should 
return to intercourse with her husband. The answer she received was, “…the question at 
issue is not whether you should return to intercourse with your husband.”127 The issue for 
Augustine was the fact that he thought she was the culprit. She should have, according to 
Augustine, “given way to him all the more humbly and submissively in [her] domestic 
relationship”128 since he yielded at her request to be continent. The right thing to do 
would have been for her to go back to having sexual relations with her husband as 
requested. That is not the real issue for Augustine, however. 
The problem that undergirded these sayings was the fact that Ecdicia took an 
active role instead of the proper (submissive) role as a wife. Augustine told her that “This 
great evil arose from your not treating him in his state of mind with the moderation you 
should have shown”129 and while she renounced sex by mutual consent, he wrote, “as his 
wife, you should have been subject to your husband in other things according to the 
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marriage bond.”130 Clearly, keeping the original promise, even when it is a promise made 
mutually before God, was less important than conducting herself “with a submissive 
demeanor that [she] might win him for the Lord, as the Apostles advise.”131 Hence, he 
concludes that he is “grieved at your husband’s conduct which is the result of your 
reckless and ill-considered behavior.” Just what is this reckless and ill-considered 
behavior? It is behaving “according to what you [wife] thought should be done” instead 
of consulting and ultimately obeying her husband.132 
 As one can see, the notion of “woman” in this sense sometimes meant that even 
when a man committed sin or wrongdoing, the ultimate blame often went to woman. Men 
were hardwired, in such a model, to take credit for the good of the world, dodging the 
fatal culpability thanks to this interpretation of Eve, and staying at the authoritative level 
over woman. In a certain sense, because women were by nature associated with 
bodiliness and (original) sin and thus contrary to salvation, they were forever marked as 
“a source of temptation to men… symbolically identified with evil,” and therefore had to 
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be controlled.133 Quite different from “becoming male” to solve this problem, a way out 
for women was to admit that they were naturally this way and be redeemed in 
childbearing or submit to a lifestyle that controls, or transcends their nature altogether. I 
will explain. 
 Woman’s redemption could only come from transcending her nature since her 
nature as such was contradictory to redemption. Some ancient writings, as I have already 
shown, worked out this transcendence of womanly nature by having them metaphysically 
become men. However, Augustine and other church fathers did not take this route. Both 
Augustine and Jerome denied that there would only be “male bodies” in the Resurrection, 
insisting that humanity will rise both as male and female.134 However, the female body as 
it is on earth must be transformed somehow. What is required of this transformation will 
indicate that women are no longer simply redeemed through childbirth, as pointed out 
above in 1 Tim 2:15, but through another path. 
 Because of a deep and undeniable suspicion about sexual relationships as such 
and woman’s body in particular, the early fathers had to juggle with the notion of sexual 
activities and redemption. How could one simultaneously claim that one was redeemed 
through childbirth and to accept the female body that is associated with shame in that 
same redemption? The answer was to remove the very characteristics that are problematic. 
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That is, in the Resurrection, the female body would not be able to have intercourse or 
bear children so that it would be adequately vectored “to glory rather than to shame.”135 
 In this same line of reasoning, Augustine maintained that while women are 
incorporated into bodiliness, he could not deny the possibilities of a woman being saved 
so long as she can overcome this bodiliness and live according to the spirit. He found a 
way for woman to be saved without becoming man: via virginity.136 
 Since Augustine and many early thinkers attributed the effects of sin to woman’s 
nature, virginity was the way to be “unnatural” for it was better for woman to be against 
her sin-susceptible nature. Through virginity, women were able to become more like 
better-natured men, albeit without the independence and autonomy of men as evidenced 
by the abovementioned Ecdicia.137 These redeemed virgin women would curiously 
become virile and “contrary to nature,” notwithstanding the fact that being contrary to 
nature is usually seen in a bad light in everything else. Such an attitude might also 
explain the passage against the fancy ornamentation of women in 1 Tim2:9 since an 
ostentatious appearance represented more womanly behavior of the time. The important 
thing is that he upheld virginity to the extent that it was salvific for women ironically 
because it represented likeness to the male. He never went as far as Jerome did, who 
upheld the superiority of virginity over marriage to the extent that he only stopped 
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speaking so harshly about women when they decisively remain virgins, at which point he 
turned ever so compassionate in his writings.138 While also praising virginity as superior, 
Augustine retained somewhat more positive attitudes towards marriage than Jerome and 
virginity was not so absolute a fast track way to salvation as Jerome thought.139 
Nevertheless, virginity—as it went against the sin-susceptible womanly nature—was the 
way for woman to enter the kingdom of God.140 
Thomas Aquinas 
 The Dominican Doctor of the Church contributed to theology with a kind of 
clarity of thinking unseen up to that point. Thomas Aquinas was, however, also a product 
of his time and even this great thinker could not escape the cultural baggage that was 
handed down to him. His writing reflected Aristotelian biology and Augustinian writings, 
yet these writings were in many ways unique. Aquinas’ works on sex manifested a 
continuation of androcentric views of his predecessors yet discontinued misogynic views 
as his patristic processors had it.141 While his views on marriage and sex may have 
improved a bit from the past, they unfortunately did not come with great improvements 
on gender issues. 
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 Aquinas contested the Greek fathers who thought that the imago dei resided only 
in the ‘nonsexual’ soul (but not body), and while they somehow could not deny its 
residence in the female soul, it existed much more fully in the male soul. In contrast, 
Aquinas acknowledged that both men and women, both in body and in spirit, participated 
in the imago dei, the image of God. Simultaneously, however, he was quick to point out 
that the participation in the imago dei occurred in different degrees. He could not fathom 
women being in the same status of imago dei as men because he, like his predecessors, 
could not get around the notion that women were somehow deficient as human beings.142 
As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, 
for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect 
likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes 
from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or 
even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which 
is moist, as the philosopher [Aristotle] observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 
2).143 
 
This “improvement,” then, slowly reveals itself in a certain sense as deterioration in 
reality. 
 Man, woman, animals, and in fact the whole of the creation have a mark, a 
footprint, or stamp (vestigium) of God and the spiritual soul.144 Since sexual difference is 
considered something “corporal,” it is relevant only in this domain. The vestigium, then, 
is sort of a “second degree” of image of God and hence relates to the bodily plane. On 
this bodily plane, woman’s existence is validated for Aquinas by her function as a 
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helper.145 The reason is that on the bodily plane, the imago dei exists in man “in a way 
that is not found in woman.”146 Hence, unlike the Greek fathers, Aquinas thought that the 
image of God existed in both sexes’ bodies, yet in different (superior/subordinate) 
degrees. The subordinate state of women (mulier, femina) is actually for her own good 
since she, because of her weakness, needs man’s direction and benefit from such 
leadership.147 Such a notion stems from the idea, again, that woman is somehow 
imperfect as a male manqué (or misbegotten male).148 Nevertheless, simple admittance, 
whether more or less perfect or not, of the existence any trace of God’s image in the body, 
including that of woman, is a kind of improvement from the Greek fathers. But how does 
Aquinas’ view fare in the discussion of the imago dei in the “intellect,” or soul? This may 
be a more important question since this image of God is in a more perfect form in the 
soul. 
 Again, Aquinas’ starting point is at the presence of imago dei in both sexes. 
Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the 
image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created 
them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction 
of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the 
mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the image of 
God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no 
sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Colossians 3:10), after 
saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, 
"Where there is neither male nor female."149 
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Moreover, in the reality of souls, Aquinas claimed at times that there is nothing to 
distinguish between man and woman.150 However equally present these passages make 
imago dei sound, Aquinas is clearly not consistent when he stressed the inequality and 
subordinate nature of woman. According to Kari Elizabeth Børresen, in discussing 1 Cor 
11:3, Aquinas starts from the statement that man is more perfect than woman and the 
imperfection of woman is defined both in her body, as I have shown earlier, and in her 
soul, referring both to Aristotle and Eccl 7:28.151 She continues to quote Aquinas in 
emphasizing that woman is more imperfect than man even as regards to soul (etiam 
quantum ad animam viro imperfectior). Perhaps these collateral imperfections occur (that 
is, of body and soul of woman) since there is a certain participation between what 
belongs to the realm of body and the realm of soul. Since the human soul is the 
“substantial form of the body and has a certain power which works through bodily 
organs,” how one’s body is conceived may have an effect on how one thinks about one’s 
soul.152 Given that woman’s conduct is not perceived as “based on solid reason, but easily 
swayed by passion,” it follows for Aquinas that, like her body, woman’s soul is also 
inferior.153 In other words, woman’s inferior quality and the finality of her body 
“inevitably works a deleterious effect on woman’s soul.”154 Unlike the Latin fathers who 
thought that the imago dei resided inferiorly in women’s body, Aquinas now thought that 
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it also resided inferiorly in women’s soul.155 Aquinas, by admitting some sort of presence 
of imago dei in both male and female, and both body and soul, in fact differed from the 
Greek and Latin fathers by making woman ultimately inferior in every state of her being. 
Børresen does acknowledge the fact that there are some places in Aquinas’ 
writing that seem to suggest equality of the sexes in the reality of souls.156 Nevertheless, 
even in those few exceptional cases, she maintains that woman’s body—because it is 
incapable or imperfect/subordinate157—ultimately leads to the subordination of her soul. 
The reason is that the body has too great an influence on the faculties of intelligence and 
will. Hence, while woman does have the capacity for the equal knowledge of God as in 
man, it will not be fully realized until the state of glory. In the meantime, then, a 
postlapsarian woman is to remain in subjugation and comply in her subordinate roles in 
the domestic sphere. Consequently, then, man is in control domestically and enjoys sole 
possession of power outside the family. 
Roman Catholic Writings Up to Pope John Paul II158 
Encyclicals 
 Aristotelian, Augustinian, and Thomistic—along with biblical—notions of sexual 
status became the cornerstone of Roman Catholic encyclicals and church documents in 
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the ensuing years. The blunt descriptions of woman’s inferiority continued to linger for a 
very long time. One can find, for example, such degrading expressions as recently as in 
the 1880 encyclical by Pope Leo XIII. Quoting Ephesians 5:25-32, Leo made sure that 
there was no question of which of the two sexes was associated with Christ and which 
one was not; which was the head, which was the subject; and which was to order and 
which was to obey. 159 He did have some points in this encyclical where he advocated 
mutual sacrifice and love in the marriage and that the obedience of the wife came not in 
the same way as a servant.160 However, those statements are juxtaposed with the 
language of male headship and dominance over female. He did not resolve this tension. 
In fact, no one can deny the clear emphasis on the hierarchy of the relationship and hence 
one can conclude that Leo resolved this tension by being on the side of male headship 
over true mutuality of the relationship.161 Nevertheless, just for the sheer fact that such 
language of mutuality made it in to the encyclical gave great possibilities for later Popes 
and (many feminist) theologians to struggle with the resolving of this tension, as will be 
shown in chapter 2.162 
 However pioneering those additional words were, Leo unequivocally maintained 
his position on what the role of man and woman should be according to his previous 
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opinion on the hierarchy of the sexes. In an encyclical written in 1891 titled On the 
Condition of Labor (Rerum Novarum), Leo claimed that by nature woman was not suited 
for works other than what she was “fitted for,” namely domestic duties involving 
promoting the good rearing of children and the well-being of the family. Woman taking 
up extra-domestic work was like “rough weather destroy[ing] the buds of spring.” So as 
to protect woman and children, man, the wage-earner, must be sufficiently paid to 
support his family and must not be taxed too heavily and woman must fulfill her 
domestic duties.163 In part, Christine Firer Hinze is impressed with the development of 
the notion of the worker’s right to a “living wage” or “Family living wage.”164 She also 
agrees that such a wage should avoid elements contributing to hunger and disease, and 
should yield—in a reasonable degree—food, clothing, shelter, insurance, and mental and 
spiritual culture.165 Since Hinze sees family as an “essential locus for spiritual education 
and formation” and that “in a real sense the civic and the economic spheres are there for 
the sake of the family,” she praises Ryan’s assertion that “Remuneration inadequate to 
secure all of these things to the laborer and his family falls, below the level of a Living 
Wage.”166 However, she sees some limitations. Instead of seeing working women as 
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exceptions or economic devaluation of work performed in the home,167 she advocates for 
a “full” employment of the family living wage, i.e. “for every adult wage worker, male or 
female, regardless of marital or family status.”168 Full employment, including 
“childbearing and home-work,” would mean not just cash amounts, but hours and 
conditions of work, career tracks, benefits and leave policies, pension and insurance 
plans,” enabling both public and domestic vocation.169 Such a usage of wages and 
policies would ease the economic burden that a man carries—dealing with the pressure of 
sole economic responsibility—while initiating a process to terminate an attitude that 
continually views woman as a being that could not do much without the help of man. 
Indeed, this notion of family living wages is very conducive to my thesis and my ultimate 
goal for the project at hand, namely to construct a definition of masculinity that fosters 
the flourishing of both sexes. 
 Beyond 19th century documents, unfortunately, one continues to find the image of 
woman in an undignified manner in the 20th century encyclicals. In the 1930 encyclical 
On Christian Marriage (Casti connubii), Pope Pius XI, on one hand, picked up where 
Leo XIII left off and associated the husband with “primacy” which gave him the 
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authority over wife and children. The wife remained with “ready subjugation,” and 
“willing obedience” because that was the natural “order of love.”170 Also, similar kinds of 
economic, social, and familial expectations for men continued. The ramification for 
Catholic men is that they are solely responsible for material support (and not so much 
responsible for paternal or family obligations) and often chose a higher-waged job and/or 
profession that they might dislike for the purpose of maintaining their breadwinner status 
and maintaining the family. 
On the other hand, just as Leo’s small additional word or two can be seen as 
pioneering, Pius also made a slight, yet monumental, move in the same encyclical. This 
move concerned the dignity of woman as human being. Notwithstanding his remarks 
about womanly obedience/subjugation, he did not mean by those words that the woman 
should be deprived of the liberty that “fully belongs” to her “in view of her dignity as a 
human person.”171 Moreover, he expanded on Leo’s comments about the mutual nature of 
love by stating that the mutual “molding” of husband and wife “can in a very real sense,” 
“…be said to the chief reason and purpose of matrimony” “…as the blending of life as a 
whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof.”172 Just as Leo created tension by 
adding a few phrases, Pius created a tension by simultaneously acknowledging both man 
and woman as bearer of human dignity and to be called into increasingly mutually and 
equally loving relationships, and holding on to her required ready subjugation and willing 
obedience. Pius also did not resolve this tension. In fact, Casti connubii found itself being 
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used in defending “different but equal” attitudes about women and their bodies being 
primarily, or solely, a vessel for procreation and family nurturing after marriage.173 Also, 
Pius—along with other popes—does not deal with the possibilities of deprivation of 
man’s dignity in his model for the family when these possibilities are plentiful. The 
burden of living up to the standard of male perfection, with the pressure of maintaining 
the responsibilities of male headship, may yield anxiety, depression, and violence. This 
danger increases exponentially when he fails to live up to these expectations or when he 
is born with a more cooperative instinct, which simply does not fit the “hierarchal” model 
for man. In these instances, the model which calls for a complete responsibility of a role 
as a breadwinner disregards the dignity of a man.174 These unresolved problems were 
again left to his successors to settle. 
The question, then, about how to deal with these received notions in the tradition, 
is still at large. If a tradition, as it was in the case for the Bible, contains elements that are 
disregarding of human dignity, a responsible Christian should work to ameliorate the 
situation using other sources of moral wisdom and materials from his or her own tradition. 
To begin this process, I will examine some exceptional aspects of the tradition that may 
prove more helpful in this trajectory. 
Exceptional Writing 
 It would not be fair to claim, therefore, that there has been a monolithic 
characterization of man and woman since Augustine. To be sure, there was at least a 
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general consensus on defining men and women in terms of headship and subjugation in 
the hierarchy, respectively. There existed, however, some other distinctively different yet 
very important exceptions within the Catholic tradition. It was these kinds of exceptional 
writings that enabled popes Leo XIII and Pius XI to include more progressive ideas that 
continued (and continue) to crystallize in the Roman Catholic attitudes toward woman 
and man. I will discuss in greater detail some alternative viewpoints within the Catholic 
tradition in the next chapter and chapter six. At this point, I wish to briefly discuss John 
Chrysostom, and only mention Alphonsus Liguori and Patrick Kenrick. I believe that a 
great example that set precedence to some of these improvements was St. John 
Chrysostom, a contemporary of Augustine. 
 I do not intend to present Chrysostom, however, as someone who championed 
gender equality or who completely broke away from the normative model of the time, 
namely paterfamilias model. It should be made perfectly clear that Chrysostom was also 
the product of his culture and did not challenge the hierarchal model that he and his 
culture inherited. To put it explicitly, Chrysostom held that it was part of God’s intention 
to delegate the “more necessary and important part to the man,” namely managing public 
affairs. On the other hand, God assigned the “lesser and inferior part to woman, namely 
domestic affairs.175 
 Yet, well before Leo XIII expressed his thoughts, Chrysostom preceded him in 
not treating wives, in his writings, as servants of husbands. A wife was to be chosen not 
as someone who would best fit for the husband as a servant but should have “virtue of 
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soul and nobility of character” so to live in “peace, harmony, love and concord.”176 Of 
course, I am very aware that even these statements are highly androcentric and that 
Chrysostom never wrote a book entitled How to Choose a Husband. The androcentric 
nature of the expression notwithstanding, the kind of language used by Chrysostom may 
be seen to be much more radical if one were to put it in the context of a contemporary 
such as Augustine. Unlike Augustine who—along with some of the most significant 
theologians—unfortunately preoccupied himself with the troublesome influence of 
women, Chrysostom took the classic Roman ideal of harmony in a well-ordered marriage 
and put it in a context of “a largely, if not wholly, positive Christian reading of sexuality, 
women, marriage, and parenthood.”177 He considered marriage as an opportunity for “a 
fellowship for life” and “a warm and genuine friendship.”178 He continued to call for “a 
close collaboration of wife and husband…mutual love and respect in marriage, attend[ing] 
to both men’s and women’s faults, and potential virtues… [and] concentrat[ing] on 
family stewardship of assets…”179 
 Even more striking is his treatment of the body. His treatment of sexuality 
establishes the body as “an axis of common experience.”180 Despite the norm of the time 
where the body was a “marker of class difference,” he insisted that since we all have 
bodies, we share in common a struggle with the excessive pull of sexual desire. His 
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solution is to be simple, restrained, and modest.181 Children should be taught these 
modest values of sexuality in preparation of a marriage of mutual devotion and respect.182 
“Only John was prepared to see” the bodies of men and women as “a shared body.”183 
Again, his interpretations and expressions are androcentric. Nevertheless, compared to 
most of the writings of the time, the amount of “mutuality” achieved, and the notion of 
possible “friendship in marriage” reached, is extraordinary. The body, as the common 
shared experience, is a source of compassion as well as passion for the spouses. Even 
with the “patriarchal packaging” of the time, he was able to come up with his version of 
mutuality in family, marriage, and sexuality.184 
 Furthermore, Chrysostom—while continuing to advocate a kind of male 
preeminence—opened, however slight, a possibility for women’s leadership. In a telling 
relationship with a women named Olympias, who had an aristocratic lineage and 
connections, Chrysostom seemed to allow, or was indifferent at the very least, a kind of 
leadership by her. Because of her lineage/connections and her choice not to marry after 
being widowed, Olympias was able to support church-related projects and people, 
including Chrysostom. She served as advisor to the bishop of Constantinople and was 
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eventually ordained as a deaconess.185 She enjoyed exercising a considerable amount of 
authority among male religious associates because of these associations with the 
powerful186 and her virtues. Chrysostom, for example, praised her “modesty, humility, 
asceticism, and charity” in his surviving letters to Olympias.187 He never really moved 
away from the cultural norm of paterfamilias but “his attitude toward Olympias shows 
that this model did not entirely exhaust his ideas of women’s leadership.”188 
 Aside from a more positive image of women, for somewhat mutual ideas of 
married relationships, and more possibilities for women’s leadership, one can turn to 
Alphonsus Liguori (18th Century) and Patrick Kenrick (19th Century) for yet more 
encouraging possibilities, this time for the “body” which had traditionally been 
pejoratively associated with women. As shown earlier, body and bodily pleasure had 
been tangled up on the negative side of the dualistic thinking of the ancient world. As 
such, anything associated with women/body/bodily pleasure remained in the negative 
realm. However, Alphonsus Liguori affirmed that bodily pleasure produced by marital 
coitus was not only permissible but also recommended based on natural law.189 Patrick 
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Kenrick, the bishop of Philadelphia in the nineteenth century, also claimed that not only 
was physical pleasure allowed, a husband sinned venially “if he failed to remain sexually 
active until his wife climaxed.” 190 
Conclusion 
 A clear historical analysis of the ways in which men and women were viewed is 
crucial for this project. Undoubtedly, the received notions of dualism and the 
androcentricism of the Greco-Roman period play a significant role. However, they are 
not the only causes of modern attitudes about sex and gender. It is impossible to detail all 
the influences which led to the current models for gender, especially when there is not a 
single model for gender today. Despite these diversities, it is possible to identify some 
major players and sources. I have highlighted some of them in this chapter. Broadly 
speaking, some commonalities in attitudes surfaced regarding men and women. For the 
most part, the Ancients, the Bible, the Patristic thinkers, the Scholastics, and the modern 
papacy, in some form or another, advocated a kind of male preeminence, leadership, and 
authority. While some acknowledged female human dignity more than others, they 
ultimately maintained women as being opposite or less than men, needing manly 
leadership for receptive and responsive women to obey. This fact, however, does not 
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stand alone. There have been thinkers whose imaginations went ahead of their times. 
Albeit not without problems, some thinkers were able to achieve a level of mutuality in 
thinking about family, marriage, and sexuality unforeseen during their time. Suffice it to 
say, then, that much of our outlook on sex and gender has not come into being out of a 
vacuum and that there were a number of thinkers who were able to see to a degree 
beyond the social stereotypes of their surroundings. 
 Hence, the next proper step—after having an idea about how we got here and how 
there existed some exceptional thinking about the subject matter at hand—is to see if the 
received tradition is acceptable. In the next chapter, I will discuss some 20th Century 
Catholic feminist critiques of the received tradition, focusing my attention on the writings 
of John Paul II. In doing so, I will highlight how harmful a dimorphic model for gender 
roles is. Also, I will make a case critical of the current Roman Catholic nuptial imagery 
for all men and women. I will demonstrate once again that there are yet more possibilities 
for improvements within the tradition by using documents from the Second Vatican 
Council and other post-Vatican II encyclicals. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MORE RECENT CONSIDERATIONS: 
CHURCH DOCUMENTS AND FEMINIST RESPONSES 
 
 In the last chapter, I pointed out that there are some ancient ideologies that 
contributed to a trend that has shaped the way we think about gender and sexuality. I also 
indicated some exceptions to that trend. As is true in most investigations concerning 
historical tendencies, what we received from the past did not continue on with perfect 
consistency. In some very important ways, Pope John Paul II (hereafter JPII) also did not 
continue on the same trajectory as his predecessors. Starting with the publication of 
Familiaris consortio, JPII and the Church began to make a slight, but immensely 
important, shift of language in the Church’s official writing concerning gender, sexuality, 
and marriage.1 Underscoring his writings on gender was the idea of “the equal dignity 
and responsibility of women with men” that practices “reciprocal self-giving.”2 
Comparing this idea with the attitudes held by previous pontiffs, one can easily sense the 
modified tone of the encyclical. The most visible evidence with respect to the subject 
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matter at hand is the elimination of the language of submission and inferiority regarding 
women. 
In this chapter, I will explore both the extent to which JPII has made great 
improvements and to which he has left some room for improvements. I will then present 
how, along with the dualistic and androcentric ideologies of the ancient times and its 
biology, JPII’s Thomistic personalism, theology of the body, and his nuptial imagery 
have all contributed to essentialism, physicalism, and the modern Roman Catholic notion 
of gender complementarity. With the help from the writings of some feminist theologians, 
it will become evident that his results are an incomplete representation of the reality of 
the human sexuality and gender. Because his writings on sex and gender are not adequate 
descriptions of humanity, his vision is not enough to resolve our current problems of 
patriarchy, abuse, unjustly assigned gender roles, and deeming fecundity and motherhood 
compulsory. Therefore, unless the model that undergirds the current papal understanding 
of sex and gender changes, it will be difficult to solve the problems that the Church faces 
today and that it will continue to face in the years to come. 
Pope John Paul II 
 In Familiaris consortio, JPII maintained that man, with regard to woman, is “not 
her master but her husband” and instructed man that a woman is “not your slave but your 
wife.” As such, the direction to the man was to “reciprocate her attentiveness to you and 
be grateful to her for her love.”3 In order for man to do so, the church must provide the 
condition for the possibility of following through with such an instruction. Hence, JPII 
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urged that the church must promote as far as possible, the equality of rights and dignity of 
men and women.4 
 In other places, JPII continued, indirectly but consistently, to support the idea of 
eliminating harsh and direct prescriptions for the submission and obedience of women. 
Referring, for example, to the passages which had been used to justify women’s 
obedience and submission (e.g. Ephesians 5:22-23)5, JPII claimed that the passages are 
actually pointing not to a one-sided spousal subjection but “mutual subjection out of 
reverence for Christ.”6 In fact, in the same document, he referred to passages in Genesis 
(1:26-27, 2:18-25, 3:16) to require married couples to understand that 1) by “helper,” it 
refers to help provided “on the part of both, and at the same time a mutual ‘help,’” and 2) 
by dominion, it cannot mean that the woman “become the ‘object’ of ‘domination’ and 
male ‘possession.’”7 
 One can also see how the Church’s position on gender roles shifts according to 
the changing milieu. Women had few options outside the domestic sphere within the 
official Roman Catholic writings before this era. While JPII acknowledged some social 
changes for women that had already occurred by his papacy—to work in the public 
sphere and to allow women’s role beyond the private realm—he is commendable insofar 
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as he accepted some of the social changes.8 Against the backdrop of the time of this 
encyclical (1980’s), JPII’s accomplishment in such an expression is understandable. It is 
fitting in that, by this time, the women’s movement was already about 20 years old by the 
time the encyclical was published. Historically and contextually, JPII’s allowance for the 
public functions of women seems to make sense. However, in a way, it is remarkable 
because the Roman Catholic Church, JPII more specifically, recognized the signs of the 
time—more so than the previous Popes—and wrote about and gave more attention to 
women. 
 More pertinent to this project, JPII claims that for a man, the love for his wife and 
his children is the natural way of understanding and fulfilling one’s own fatherhood.9 He 
speaks against societies and cultures that discourage the father’s involvement in the 
family and calls for fathers to realize their important role in and for the family. While not 
referring directly to social scientific data but using its language, he asserts that 
“experience” teaches us that, 
…the absence of a father causes psychological and moral imbalance and 
notable difficulties in family relationships, as does, in contrary 
circumstances, the oppressive presence of a father, especially where there 
still prevails the phenomenon of "machismo," or a wrong superiority of 
male prerogatives which humiliates women and inhibits the development of 
healthy family relationships.10 
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A man can achieve such fatherhood by sharing in the education of children, taking a job 
that promotes the unity and stability of the family, and by living a Christian life.11 
 Already, one can see that JPII had made some great strides in seeing the signs of 
the times and in recognizing what we now know about the social situations in which we 
find ourselves. Nevertheless, a responsible and faithful scholar should ask whether there 
are any places in the tradition where there are yet more possibilities for improvements 
and/or for criticisms. Notwithstanding the aforementioned accomplishments, there are 
areas in which more improvements are possible. I will place JPII’s theological 
anthropology at the root from which these possible areas of improvements stem. 
 One of the problems that many scholars have with JPII’s thought is his 
idealization of a “biology is destiny” approach. That is, given his approach as a 
phenomenological essentialist, JPII teaches that the nature and role of women (and men) 
are biologically determined and that “women as mothers have an irreplaceable role.”12 
While because of this attitude JPII rightly acknowledges the miraculous moments of 
conception and birth, he places women on such a high pedestal that women cannot escape 
their femininity and the roles stemming from it.13 In other words, by accepting this kind 
of theological anthropology, women are acknowledged as doing something natural, 
something miraculous, and, in fact, something as wonderful as what Mary—the 
embodiment of true femininity and the example par excellence for women— had done. 
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Women would find a definition of femininity, elevated in such a high place, unrealistic. 
As I will make clear later, most women did, and do, deviate from it. 
Theology of the Body 
This notion of biological/natural destiny of the sexes stems from the longstanding 
ideas outlined in his series of addresses to the Wednesday audiences in the Pope Paul VI 
Hall on the “theology of the body” and the first chapters of Genesis. In this series of 129 
lectures lasting from September 1979 to November 1984, JPII continues what he had 
been preaching and writing as Karol Wojtyla long before he became Pope. The general 
idea of the theology of the body goes something like the following. 
 The foundation for JPII’s theology of the body is Thomistic personalism.14 
Thomistic personalism is characterized by an insistence that persons, in their subjectivity, 
rationality, objectivity, and sociality, are radically different from non-persons.15 This 
uniqueness of human persons, however, does not mean that a person is seen as a single 
countable individual who is interchangeable with any other member of the species in a 
homogenous species of beings. Rather, a person in this schema is characterized by 
uniqueness and irreplaceability.16 A person is “a concrete self, a self-experiencing 
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subject”17 and cannot be replaced by another person the way one can replace an apple 
with another because it is just as good.18 In this sense, a human person is essentially 
different from all other species and it is in this unique subjectivity that a Thomistic 
personalist can claim that “Subjectivity is, then, a kind of synonym for the irreducible in 
the human being.”19 As such, each human person possesses human dignity unique to that 
person and this fact requires one to treat human beings as an end in themselves.20 For 
these reasons, it is understandable that JPII’s notion of theology of the body claimed that 
personhood is the “highest perfection” in the created order.21 
 A related concept of the theology of the body more relevant to this project, 
however, is his notion of sociality of human persons.22 Distinct from the mere fact of 
human beings’ social nature, JPII specifically means by communion the sociality of 
human persons; it is a deeper sense of sociability than one that is applied to all animals. 
After all, animals form social groups and interact with each other, often for the sake of 
their own gain or other interests.23 However, God’s love is not of self-interest but of life-
giving. Similarly, it is self-surrendering and life-creating when man and woman love 
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within a family.24 The family reflects God’s love and enters into a communion of persons 
(communio personarum).25 Whereas society may locate the need for sociality and 
attempts to find the personal realization in self-interest, according to Thomas D. Williams, 
Thomistic personalist locates them in “a sincere giving of himself (sic).”26 
 Consistently, JPII sees relationships of total self-giving thereby achieving a 
communio personarum as the point of human existence.27 Then, we must strive to give 
ourselves totally in order to find ourselves in the communio personarum—in our schools, 
our workplaces, our family, and even in our bedrooms. More specifically, the communion 
of two persons (man and woman) expressed through their bodies (sexually) is an act of 
mutual self-giving, mirroring God’s self-giving covenant with human beings.28 In this act 
of (God-like) self-giving, expressed through the body, differently from any of our other 
acts, human beings touch “the central mystery of the human person,” enabling them to 
“transcend truths they know about themselves from their other acts.”29 In order for the act 
to be self-giving and selfless, then, it cannot be done for the sake of fulfilling desire, in a 
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self-fulfilling way. It must be done in a way that overcomes concupiscence so as to 
“participate in the mystery of the redemption of the body.”30 
 Hence, unlike many of his predecessors, JPII praises and celebrates human 
sexuality, body, and sexual relationships. He does not, of course, have a complete trust in 
the body. JPII does argue that before the Fall, there existed a sort of original self-mastery 
and self-control (represented by the unashamed nakedness) which was lost as the result of 
the first sin.31 Consequently, our bodies are marked by concupiscence and are in forever 
need of self-mastery and self-control since they are connected to the sexual desires, 
reactions, and emotions that constantly cloud our visions. We struggle with the limits of 
concupiscence, being able to redeem ourselves only in the “nuptial” or “spousal” 
meaning of the body.32 In this nuptial setting, then, spouses are called, once again, to 
become a full (selfless) gift for one another, in their masculinity and femininity, in one 
flesh, and in procreation. 
How indispensable is a thorough knowledge of the meaning of the body, in 
its masculinity and femininity, along the way of this vocation! A precise 
awareness of the nuptial meaning of the body, of its generating meaning, is 
necessary.33 
 
As a phenomenologist, then, JPII takes seriously the notion of the body and 
sexual relations. In his theological anthropology, I conclude that for JPII, marriage, and 
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sexual relations within it, must be about God, that is, a selfless and total gift of oneself to 
the other. One can achieve this in the context of marriage in which self-control against 
our tendencies to surrender to concupiscence is practiced. In terms of sexual intercourse, 
the spouse in one’s masculinity and femininity must fight self-serving desires and give 
oneself to the other. However, while these wonderful images of selfless love and gift can 
possibly serve as a beneficial model, many scholars have noted some serious problems. 
Ronald Modras, for example, argued that “most lay Catholics would not connect 
with the pope’s focus on self-control, his distrust of erotic desire, or his assertion that 
anyone involved in a sexual relationship that is not heterosexual, non-contraceptive, and 
marital is ‘using’ another person.”34 The lived experience of sexual relationships is such 
that it is not always under complete control, rarely if ever about complete and total giving, 
sometimes great and other times not, and often about love as a result of receiving, not 
always of giving.35 In the lived experience of many Catholics, then, “What the pope 
approaches from the outside and calls lust, they live on the inside and call love.”36 
Completely losing one’s body or desire, or merely wanting to receive pleasure, may 
indeed lead to “using” another person. Nevertheless, the extremity of the spiritualization 
of the body, the idealization of sexual intercourse, and the lingering suspicion and 
degrading of human desire and pleasure is the key element of JPII’s theology of the body 
that many scholars and laity find difficult to connect to the reality of their lived 
experience. 
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Gender Complementarity 
 Related to such a criticism is his notion of “gender complementarity.”37 This 
concept essentially claims that all men and women possess qualities and characteristics 
specific to their sex which enhance the other both in their biological and personal realm. 
In this model, men and women are born with internal and external organs that 
complement and perfect (via procreation) each other.38 Also, resulting from the physical 
complementarity, it further claims that men and women are hardwired to complement 
each other in all aspects, including physical, emotional, psychological, spiritual, and 
relational and social realms.39 The implication is that a true balance is created between a 
man and a woman to do what they are naturally equipped to do: to procreate and to 
properly rear children.40 
Table 1. Types of Sexual Complementarity in Magisterial Teaching41 
I. Biological Complementarity 
  Type      Definition 
Heterogenital complementarity The physically functioning male and female 
sexual organs (penis and vagina) 
 
Reproductive complementarity The physically functioning male and female 
reproductive organs (testes and sperm, 
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Anthropology (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 140-145 for further explanations. 
 
39
 Ibid., 127-138 and 145-150. 
 
40
 Ibid., 138-150. 
 
41
 The summary of the types of sexual complementarity is found in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith’s (CDF’s), Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between 
Homosexual Persons (2003). The table is from Salzman and Lawler, The Sexual Person, 141.  
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ovaries and ova) used in sexual acts to 
biologically reproduce 
 
II. Personal Complementarity 
Type      Definition 
Communion complementarity The two-in-oneness within a heterogenital 
complementarity marital relationship created 
and sustained by truly human sexual acts 
 
Affective complementarity The integrated psycho-affective, social, 
relational, and spiritual elements of the 
human person grounded in heterogenital 
complementarity 
Personal complementarity Heterogenital complementarity parents who 
fulfill the second dimensions of reproductive 
complementarity, namely, the education of 
children 
 
 
Such a view also posits “both men and women as being incomplete outside marriage.”42 
It also presumes that all “traits and roles are essentially sex-based,”43 making all men and 
women essentially (physically and otherwise) different. In such a model “…a man will be 
more different from all women than from any man.”44 Thus, in JPII, the polarity, 
“opposing” sex, and the differences are emphasized and similarities downplayed. One of 
the possible harmful effects of this is couples not being able to relate (mentally, 
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 Christine E. Gudorf, “Encountering the Other,” 74; Later Catholic mentality on gender thinking resulted 
from gender complementarity. Cf. USCCB, Marriage: Love and Life in the Divine Plan, November 17, 
2009 8-11; Of course, a long tradition of Catholicism claimed that staying celibate is a superior option to 
living a married life; See also chapter four of Rubio, “Traditional Ways of Speaking about Marriage,” 65-
75 for a brief historical analysis of discussion of marriage vis-à-vis celibacy. In this sense, religious priests 
and nuns may be seen as being more fully human. However, a single person who is not part of a Catholic 
religious order does not share the same status in the church. Note, for example, Mulieris dignitatem 20 
where it praises virginity for the sake of the kingdom only if one is part of the religious order. “This [the 
evangelical ideal of virginity] cannot be compared to remaining simply unmarried or single, because 
virginity is not restricted to a mere "no", but contains a profound "yes" in the spousal order: the gift of self 
for love in a total and undivided manner.” 
 
43
 Ibid., 75. 
 
44
 Ibid., 75. 
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physically, and intimately) to one another and being detached emotionally, or in rare 
cases, even justifying dominance over one another as a consequence.45 I will consider the 
discussion on whether such strong claims of harm are true, directly or indirectly, wholly 
or partly, later in this dissertation. 
History certainly shows that such a schema—which is a byproduct largely of the 
history of dualism of gender as shown in chapter one— disadvantages women46 since 
often women are often restricted to less socially valued domestic/receptive/ inferior 
roles.47 Collaterally, men are de facto missing from the family because JPII’s 
“understanding of mothers alone as ‘detecting the cry of the infant,’ or understanding 
children and loving each of them, excludes men from relational intimacy in the family.”48 
Gender complementarity that continues to praise and romanticize the agapic sacrifice of 
women is, in fact, harmful also for men—because of unrealistic expectations and what 
happens when those expectations are not met—as I will show in later chapters. The 
current Roman Catholic position that claims that we are incomplete in ourselves if not for 
our “complementary” (sex) partners can mistakenly lead to our not seeing the inherent 
value in a single human life as such.49 I agree with Farley that “as the poet Rainer Marie 
Rilke once wrote, we must move toward a time when ‘there will be girls and women 
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 Ibid., 74-79; Farley, Just Love, 156. 
 
46
 Farley, Just Love, 134-135. 
 
47
 Note for example, “…society must be structured in such a way that wives and mothers are not in practice 
compelled to work outside the home,” Familiaris consortio 23. Women, while technically allowed to take 
part, are discouraged from encroaching into the public sphere, where many important, self-determining, 
free, and “leadership” decisions are made. Cf. Cahill, Family, 91. 
 
48
 Gudorf, “Encountering the Other,” 71-72. 
 
49
 Also note the discussion about celibacy in such a representation of complementarity, Christine E. Gudorf, 
“Encountering the Other,” 75-76. 
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whose name will no longer signify merely an opposite of the masculine, but something in 
itself, something that makes one think not of any complement and limit, but only of life 
and existence.’”50 The complementary position could easily result in unhealthy 
relationships for all the members of the family and potentially leads us to think that life’s 
worth depends on what we do and with whom we choose to live.51 
In her article “Papal Ideals, Marital Realities: One View from the Ground,” 
Cristina L.H. Traina agrees with JP II that when sexual activity is done according to the 
complementary expectations for the purpose of procreation where “pregnancy is a hope,” 
52
 there is no anxiety about unwanted pregnancy and consequently no fear involved, 
making sex a joyous experience.53 However, Traina rightly points out that since JPII 
prohibits the use of contraception, the “opportunities for generous, appropriate marital 
sexual expression are few in a lifetime” in his complementary model.54 The complexity 
of marital life is more than the complementary model can encompass.55 The total giving 
of each other, being open to conception, and finding the energy and the right time to have 
sexual activity are rarely possible, at least in a world where the married family lives come 
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 Farley, Just Love, 157. 
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 Ibid., 78-79; Susan A. Ross, Extravagant Affections: a Feminist Sacramental Theology (New York: 
Continuum, 1998), 101. 
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 Cristina L.H. Traina, “Papal Ideals, Marital Realities: One View from the Ground” in Patricia Beattie 
Jung ed. with Joseph A. Coray, Sexual Diversity and Catholicism: toward the Development of Moral 
Theology (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 278. 
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 Ibid., 274. 
 
54
 Ibid 278. 
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 Ibid., 275-278. 
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with the social, physical, and emotional package.56 Traina argues that the notion of 
gender complementarity is out of touch with reality—more specifically, the reality of the 
lived experience of women and men. That is, because not all women have regular cycles 
and most people have many other responsibilities, a genuine sexual relationship as 
defined by JPII is rarely possible. In fact, I think a proper sexual relationship, as defined 
by JPII, adds to the worries, instead of alleviating them. Not only will the unrealistic 
selfless expectation in sexual activities increase anxiety but also the possibility of 
unwanted pregnancy using the often inconsistent rhythm method will add to the worries. 
Since in her view and experience, Traina is able to give herself more fully and wholly 
through a “worry-free” intercourse, she maintains that the complementary model is not 
enough.57 The model must be extended so that it is not defined by the unrealistic 
expectations (total self-giving, always with procreative possibility, and complete self-
control) doomed for failure. It can be “complementary.” However, rather than “falling 
under the stereotypical gender lines” supposedly engraved in nature, it can be grounded 
in something else. Rather than being grounded in a model that complements a generic 
person (or a specific person) or grounded in ontology or anatomy, one can use a model in 
which the couple complements a particular person and his or her particular personality.58 
JPII’s suggestion of ontological complementarity, then, is misleading, according 
to Traina. She maintains that one’s relative skill at a role depends on how much practice 
                                                 
56
 By “right time” I mean not only the right time of the cycle but I am also referring to (1) the time when 
the couple is able to find in the midst of their busy married lives, and (2) the time that pregnancy is desired. 
Pregnancy indeed may be desired at certain times in one’s life but undoubtedly it is not desired all the time. 
 
57
 Ibid 278. 
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 Ibid., 281-282. 
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one gets at it. Furthermore, and consequently, the “role” of maleness or femaleness in 
lovemaking, in her experience, becomes less and less significant.59 Instead of simply 
deciding that male and female fit into certain roles, she concludes that fruitfulness and 
durability of any union has to do, not with physicality, complementarity, or procreation, 
but affection and hard work along with faith, friendship, generosity, and support.60 
The fact that gender complementarity as a model does not come with any room 
for change, or improvements, adds to the problem. The rigid division between the two 
continues on, I think, without any possibilities of compromise. To be fair, this fact is not 
simply due to JPII’s uncompromising attitude. It has more to do, I believe, with his 
conviction that since gender complementarity is an “ontological” truth, it is an external or 
eternal law. Hence, the rigid division between the sexes cannot be altered not because he 
does not want to; it is because, in his view, a human being is not able to do so. Since this 
unalterable gender complementarity undergirds any theology relating to it, JPII could not 
fathom any modification to it. Nevertheless, JPII’s conviction that all of this is out of his 
control does not change the fact that the problem that the Catholic Church is unwilling to 
improve on the one-size-fits-all model for men and women remains. Also, there are a 
number of other problems—to which I alluded previously—stemming from such an 
inflexible division of the sexes: the abusive demand for sacrifice and the tendency to 
downplay the integrity (in terms of wholeness) of persons. 
Gender role assignments resulting from gender complementarity usually mean 
that men and women are not only different biologically but also assigned a role toward 
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which they are “naturally” inclined (“domestic” childbearing and childcare for women 
and “public” warfare and material productivity for men).61 Historically, any attempt to 
restrict social roles on such a basis inevitably leads to inequities that hinder growth in 
human and in Christian life.62 The perception of agapic self-sacrifice, for example, 
continues to be a notion more specifically applied to women because they are 
traditionally associated with receptivity, passivity, and submission. While some women 
may possess some of these qualities, the absolute nature of these traits (i.e. that all 
women possess all these qualities) becomes very harmful in many ways.63 Firstly, such a 
firm stand gives a potential message to a battered woman to be submissive or that she 
should be subject to her husband.64 While a complementary model is not a direct cause of 
such violence, it does help to support a picture of reality where such practices can come 
to seem justified. Even if it is not a case of domestic violence, one can easily come up 
with numerous situations where different manifestations of abuse and violence can more 
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 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Gender and Christian Ethics,” in Robin Gill, The Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 113. 
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 Margaret A. Farley, “New Patterns of Relationship: Beginnings of a Moral Revolution,” Theological 
Studies 36 (Dec 1975): 634. 
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 The culpability for supporting such traits does not lie solely on religious institution, of course. These 
traits are socially supported. I will save this discussion for chapter 4. 
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 Margaret A. Farley, “The Church and the Family: An Ethical Task,” Horizons 10.1 (1983): 66. Joanne 
Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, “For God So Loved the World,” in Carol J. Adams and Marie Fortune 
eds., Violence Against Women and Children (New York: Continuum, 1995), 37; I do not agree with Brown 
and Parker’s overarching and assertive claims that “Christianity is an abusive theology that glorifies 
suffering (56)” and that if such is not condemned, women have no reason to stay in it (38). There is not a 
monolithic “Christianity” to make such a generalizing statement and there may be many other reasons to 
stay in, one of which is to ameliorate it. Also, sacrifice is “essential in the furthering of the kingdom,” so 
long as it is “always aimed at the establishment of mutual love.” Christine E Gudorf, “Parenting, Mutual 
Love, and Sacrifice,” in Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, Christine E. Gudorf, Mary D. Pellauer eds. Women's 
consciousness, women's conscience : a reader in feminist ethics (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 
190. Nevertheless, I find Brown and Parker’s article helpful insofar as it points to the dangers of 
romanticizing and accepting abuse. 
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easily come to appear acceptable in this schema.65 Hence, many have found this agapic 
model unsatisfactory since these situations too often mean that women are more prone to 
destructive self-abnegation and that the sacrifice of women is for the sake of men, 
whether it was in the family, in the workplace, or anywhere else.66 
Secondly, focusing only on those qualities undermines the multifaceted nature of 
women and men alike. That is, the current Roman Catholic complementary model would 
downplay men’s domestic capabilities and capacities along with women’s potential and 
competence for participating in active public roles.67 In this model, all the ways in which 
men receive, encircle, and embrace and all the ways in which women are active, giving, 
                                                 
65
 I want to be very clear that I am not claiming that agape is problematic per se. It only becomes a problem 
in a society of inequality where it is more specifically applied to, or stressed for, one group, especially the 
socially disadvantaged, more than the other. The idea of “forgiveness” or “love your enemy” would carry 
similar problems for the same reason. For non-Catholic Christian perspective, see Karen Lebacqz, “Love 
your Enemy: Sex, Power, and Christian Ethics,” in Lois K. Daly ed. Feminist Theological Ethics: A Reader 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1994). My point is that there are limitations of agape as a norm. 
See Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, “Agape in Feminist Ethics,” in Lois K. Daly, 146-159. 
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 Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, “Agape in Feminist Ethics,” 150-153; Valerie Saiving Goldstein, “The Human 
Situation: a Feminine View,” in Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow eds., Womanspirit Rising (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1992), 25-42; Farley, “A New Patterns of Relationship,” 627-646; 
Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1973), 100; Rosemary Radford Ruether and Eugene Bianchi, From Machismo to Mutuality—Man 
Liberation (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), 49-50. 
 
67
 During the recent economic downturn in the US, many men became “stay at home dads” and women 
“breadwinning moms.” Even excluding men who had been “forced to” stay home with kids, stay-at-home-
dads jumped 38 percent in the last three years, according to 2009 census estimates. See Kim Janssen, 
“More dads at home playing Mr. Mom: a choice for some but men lost most jobs in recession,” in the 
Metro & Tri-state section, Chicago Sun-Times September 30, 2010 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/2755976,CST-NWS-dads29.article; Cf. Jeremy Adam Smith, The 
Daddy Shift: How Stay-at-Home Dads, Breadwinning Moms, and Shared Parenting are Transforming the 
American Family (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009); My point is that an inflexible complementary model based 
on the sex of a person, vis-à-vis such a reality of today, would result in negative consequences stemming 
from feeling that one is doing something that they are not supposed to be doing. My contestation is that the 
complementary model would make one feel “less manly” and “less womanly,” which could have 
unfortunate consequences in one’s life. I will examine whether that is the case or not later on in this 
dissertation. 
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and penetrating would be ignored.68 The destructive result is that these gender role 
assignments become obstacles for the possibility of growing insights into patterns of 
mutual, loving, and Christian relationship.69 By focusing on some aspects of human 
sexuality as if they were the whole, one (man or woman) is not able to wholly express 
oneself in relation to one’s spouses, family, and ultimately God. 
Thirdly, and related to how one cannot fully express oneself to one’s spouse, 
Catholic thinkers often deemed compulsory childbearing and procreativity as not only 
natural but also as one of the two essential ends for love-making in a marriage.70 The idea 
was that women, unlike men, are naturally (reproductively) vectored toward childbearing 
and hence men and women are made for each other with fecundity as their ultimate goal. 
Before Vatican II, while many sought to allow sexual relations within a marriage even 
when conception could not occur (i.e. infertility, rhythm method)71 these instances are 
inevitably seen as either a lesser, abnormal, or deficient form of the love relationship. 
These cases raised some serious questions about people who choose to live as single, 
separated, divorced, widowed, married but without any offspring (infertile or not), 
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 Ibid., 637 Scientific discoveries of the 19th and 20thcentury show that even in the physical bodily 
structural level, women’s body is not simply receptacle for sperm. Ovum and sperm meet “together in order 
to form a new reality,” forever ruling out the analogy of earth receiving a seed. The ovum plays an active 
role in aiding the passage of the sperm. These studies show that receptivity and activity began to coincide 
and that receiving does not necessary mean passive. There will be more extensive discussion of such facts 
in the chapter dealing with scientific data. 
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 Farley, “New Patterns of Relationship,” 638. 
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 Pontifical Council for the Family, Family, Marriage, and “De Facto” Unions, July 23, 2000, 23. Until 
the Second Vatican Council, the Roman Catholic tradition (For example, St. Augustine, The Council of 
Trent, Alphonsus Liguori, Casti Connubii), regarded the marital sexual act as a remedy for sin and/or 
procreative, with the superiority of celibacy acknowledged. However, see Farley, Just Love, 47-49 for 
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homosexuals, or even celibates (religious or not).72 Also, such an attitude forced one to 
focus on a relationship between “physical” body parts or sexual organs and biological 
functions, not between the two full human beings with interpersonal moral dimensions.73 
Since Vatican II, however, some of the problematic notions of body, sexual 
relationship, and marriage have changed.74 The Council famously stated that the unitive 
and procreative functions must be held together.75 JPII, as I mentioned earlier, developed 
the idea of theology of the body where body became important. Nevertheless, there is still 
a very strong emphasis on childbearing, to the point where a sexual act that is not open to 
procreation is still seen as a disorder “in the heart.”76 Again, this kind of an emphasis 
raises the question about the legitimacy of the existence of single persons and couples 
who choose not to have a child. Moreover, such a notion of the compulsory procreativity, 
even for active, fertile, heterosexual couples, forces them to express their marital love 
sexually only legitimately during certain times of the monthly cycle and only during 
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 Jung, Patricia Beattie, Heterosexism: An Ethical Challenge (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1993), 
especially Ch. 2. 
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 James P. Hanigan, “Unitive and Procreative Meaning: The Inseparable Link,” in Patricia Beattie Jung ed. 
with Joseph A. Coray, Sexual Diversity and Catholicism, 22-38, especially 33. Again, this attitude was more 
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 Gaudium et spes, 48; Cf. 29, 49, and 60. 
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 Modras sees using birth control as an example, Modras 155; The idea is that an intentionally non-
procreative sexual act can only be seen as man committing adultery in his heart because he is treating her 
“as an object to satisfy instinct.” JPII, Theology of the Body 43.3 (October 8, 1980). 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp2tb42.htm). While I must applaud a call against the objectification 
of women for a selfish purpose of fulfilling just one of the spouses’ desires, I must raise the question about 
what is defined as objectifying. It is my opinion that even in an intentionally non-procreative sexual activity 
the couple can express themselves lovingly and participate in a “unitive” act, without one “objectifying” 
the other for the sheer sake of fulfilling one’s instinct. 
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childbearing years, that is, if they want to limit children.77 Similar to the previously 
mentioned problem, such a model limits—here, specifically in a sex act—one’s ability to 
wholly and freely express oneself in relation to one’s spouse. In order for the church that 
holds the unitive function (i.e. love) equally as important as the procreative, it is 
imperative that the church’s model does not unrealistically limit either of the two 
functions. 
One of the common threads in these criticisms, then, is that the gender 
complementary model fails to accommodate the integrity and complexity of the human 
person. That is, whether by limiting the growth of the loving couple through demanding 
unjust sacrifice, undermining the multifaceted nature of persons, or requiring an approach 
to sexual acts which is always open to childbearing, the model fails to allow for the 
fullness of loving expression. As I briefly highlighted above, many Catholic feminists, 
along with many others, pointed out a number of serious limitations in the 
complementary model in this regard.78 Only in a model where complementary roles are 
assigned not according one’s sex but one’s talent, both the passive and active aspects of 
oneself are acknowledged regardless of one’s sex, and partners are able to more fully, 
freely, and realistically express their love sexually, could a complementary model 
function properly in the Christian Catholic context. 
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 Jung, Heterosexism, 41-42; the first public presentation of this matter presented at the 1990 Annual 
Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America in San Francisco, Idem, 201. Cf. Traina, “Papal 
Ideals, Marital Realities.” 269-288. 
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 Despite these problems, however, one may still consider gender binaries more 
favorably if it is nature’s intent. Even if one wants to follow obediently JPII’s notion of 
gender, however, many will find it not only difficult but also quite naturally unable to 
follow. I can imagine, for example, a woman who has a non-regular menstrual period 
failing to adhere to JPII’s rules for sexual activity. Again, related to the discussion above, 
this problem stems from not recognizing the integrity, or the whole, of the person. The 
kind of dimorphic, dualistic, complementary model of gender does not adequately serve 
all men and women. Many, including myself for example, do not fit the norms set forth 
by JPII and previous thinkers who insisted on definitive characteristics for men. A great 
number of men tend not only to enjoy and be good at “domestic” roles and duties, but 
also have characteristics that go along with this domesticity. I do not particularly think 
that they are abnormal either. The idea of gender complementarity does place them as 
deviants nonetheless. These “deviants,” in fact, are forced to fit the current Catholic 
paradigm despite natural tendencies that contradict that model. What makes these 
arguments especially heated is the fact that, with scientific developments, there is 
increasing evidence that many gender differences are the products of social construction, 
and are not necessarily all innate.79 In addition, there is theoretical and experimental 
evidence of much diversity in human sexuality as a whole.80 
 Christine E. Gudorf also sees the papal assumption about dimorphic sexuality as 
limiting. She claims that all three of the major Western religions, as well as most other 
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the issues at hand in more detail in Chapter four. 
114 
 
 
ancient religious texts, presume that humans are naturally divided into two sexes; this 
determines sexual identity, reproductive roles, social roles, and the sex of one’s partner.81 
If one does not fit neatly into this bifurcation, one may be considered abnormal. In 
contemporary Western medical practice, for example, when one is not born in accordance 
with these dimorphic norms, one is treated as an “emergency” and undergoes a 
“necessary” treatment that would “assign” their sex according to the either of the two 
dimorphic sexes.82 As Natalie Kertes Weaver noted, 
When they do occur, however, they are not regarded as variations but 
pathologies. Physicians, psychologists, gender theorists, pediatricians, and 
an array of others treat sexual variety as birth defects that can be corrected 
surgically and with hormone therapy. Labeling sexual variety as defective 
birth invites us to ask, defective for whom? In rare cases where the 
condition prevents, for instance, the normal drainage of urine, the condition 
could be life-threatening. In more common cases, for example, when a 
female has an enlarged clitoris or a male a micro-penis, the “pathology” is 
hardly life-threatening. The question of defect is largely a question about 
what parents, doctors, and the presumed world-at-large can tolerate in its 
midst, irrespective of the intersexed person who may not experience his or 
her body as particularly problematic until it is pointed out to her that she 
should. 
Naming intersex as a defect or disorder reflects powerful 
assumptions about the presumed heteronormativity of sex and gender, while 
simultaneously silencing the decentering anthropological questions that 
sexual ambiguity raises. It is no wonder that the standard medical practice 
for decades… was to keep silent parents and to withhold information about 
their conditions and surgeries from intersexed patients- even into adulthood.83 
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 However, there are certainly non-Western societies where there are much more open 
practices than that of the dimorphic practices of the West.84 Also, some scientific 
discoveries give some grounds for the reasonableness of these practices. According to 
Gudorf, the biology of dimorphic sexuality is not and has not been as “clean-cut” as 
many people think.85 She maintains that human beings have obligations to God and our 
society and how we follow such obligations differs according to many factors. However, 
sexuality should not specially oblige or excuse us from following them. Since it is 
becoming more and more evident that sexuality is at least more complex than the binary 
model, one must not, according to Gudorf, make a definitive classification of sexuality 
and recognize the diversity of sexuality.86 
 I will discuss scientific data in chapter four. My purpose at this moment is simply 
to note that there are a number of Catholic feminist scholars who insist that JPII’s 
approach of gender complementarity can lead to much harm and also claim that it may 
not be social-scientifically or biologically sound. Even when one accepts the dimorphic 
model, however, there is a great diversity within the two sexes. Women are very diverse, 
as are men. There is not a monolithic “woman” or “man.” Sexual and gender diversity is 
a reality about which more people are feeling comfortable, as diversity is becoming more 
evident, more extensive, and more accepted. Society and religion lean toward 
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categorization and neatly organized realities. However, such a rigid categorization can 
only house a few people. 
 Some, albeit rare, who do not fit into these categories receive the spotlight. The 
recent controversy about the South African runner, Caster Semenya, who is “too fast to 
be considered a woman” and who is declared to have both male and female organs, may 
be an example of such a person.87 Such a case yields some tough questions. 
For instance, in marriage legislation, should a religion recognize or perform 
a marriage for a woman and her transsexual fiancé (who is chromosomally 
female) or for a man and his chromosomally male fiancé who suffered a 
circumcision accident at birth and was surgically reassigned and raised as a 
girl from six months? Or how about the transgendered person—a couple, 
chromosomally and anatomically male and female, both present themselves 
as women who want to bear and rear children as joint mothers? How does 
one interpret the (dimorphic) regulations in these situations? Who is male, 
and who is female?88 
 
However, the point that many scholars are making, and the point that I will make more 
explicitly in chapter four, is that people do not fit neatly into the two categories in a 
variety of ways and forcing someone into those categories or into the “abnormal” 
category is destructive, damaging, and dangerous, regardless of one’s sexuality. 
New Catholic Feminism 
 Some have responded to these feminist responses quite negatively. In the political 
arena, the conservative Catholic activist, Phyllis Schlafly, became famous for a kind of 
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“grassroots conservatism”89 that spoke against feminism per se.90 Catholic activists such 
as Helen Hull Hitchcock also continue to speak against the dangers of feminism, 
especially when it comes to the liturgy and the threats of using inclusive language.91 Of 
these groups, there is a group that is not as extreme—and perhaps influenced by the 
personalist and phenomenology movements of the 20th century—called “new feminists.” 
People in this movement, largely Catholic (to whom Tina Beattie refers as the new 
Catholic feminists92) try to take the middle ground between “feminism” and the 
conservatism that rejects feminism altogether. Following JPII’s Evangelium vitae, this 
form of feminism (NCF henceforth) rejects male dominance, discrimination, violence etc., 
thereby acknowledging that they do exist and are problems.93 Thus, NCF has “some 
affinity with the ‘old’ brand of feminism… associated with the women’s liberation 
movement.”94 Ultimately, however, this group claims that the old version is a failure. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a great deal of the works of NCF are being “plundered for 
‘sound bites’ but never discussed or analyzed in any detail, and at times [their] embittered 
and narrow-minded assault… casts serious doubt on the scholarly integrity and judgment 
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of the authors,”95 it must be taken seriously, according to Beattie. The reason is that some 
of the criticisms are fair and not uncommon, and NCF does not claim to speak for all 
women.96 
 Some of the more serious and fair criticisms of feminism by NCF are exemplified 
by the work of Michele Schumarcher.97 Aside from rejecting male dominance, 
discrimination, and violence and thereby agreeing in part with feminism, NCF 
disapproves of feminism on the grounds that, by advocating the socially constructed 
notion of human nature, it has failed to see the essential aspect of that nature.98 That is, 
NCF maintains—by drawing attention to Judith Butler—that concepts like the social 
construction theory went so far as to reject the metaphysical and real (essential) part of 
nature that is simply there a priori, before any cultural influence took effect.99 In the eyes 
of NCF, the social constructionists are extreme relativists who deconstruct to the point of 
nihilism. In response, Beattie, in spite of the fact that she finds problematic 
Schumarcher’s selectivity in arguing against feminism and feminists, offers a solution by 
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way of Nancy A. Dallavalle that Schumarcher does not offer.100 Building on Dallavalle’s 
notion of “Critical Essentialism,” Beattie rediscovers the Catholic sacramentality that can 
acknowledge the body’s grace.101 This is an attempt at taking seriously the constructed, 
contextual, and a posteriori nature of a person (thus avoiding essentialism) while 
simultaneously acknowledging the innate value in the engraced body (thus avoiding 
extreme forms of relativism, deconstructionism, and nihilism).102 Thus, Beattie demands 
not just a criticism of sexual stereotypes of NCF but also says that 
…a recovery of the sense of the essential giftedness of the self, which 
brings with it an absolute valuing of the dignity of the self as the gift of God, 
made in the image of God, may offer feminist theology a new model of 
relationality that is not parasitic upon the autonomous subjectivities of 
modernity, nor prey to the many forms of subordinationism and subjugation 
which haunt the Christian theology of woman.103 
 
 To be sure, Beattie is very aware of the danger of the uncritical acceptance of 
essentialism, complementarity, and of NCF’s sexual stereotypes. Although she would 
ultimately disagree with NCF, she finds its “insight into the graced relationship between 
the bodily self and God… vital for the development of a feminist sacramental 
theology.”104 She rightly identifies how selective and sometimes scholastically 
irresponsible NCF can be in choosing feminist thinkers to the advantage of its 
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arguments.105 Concurrently, she also rightly identifies the shortcomings of some versions 
of feminism for overlooking the sacramental meaning of the body. Instead of taking 
social constructionism to the point where there seems to be no meaning to our bodies 
other than constructed meaning, she claims that our engraced selves already have a 
sacramental significance and meaning a priori.106 By drawing upon the notion of the 
graced body, she masterfully comes to this viable solution in between essentialism and an 
extreme form of relativism and deconstructionism.107 Thus she says, “However 
problematic the new feminism might be in its uncritical acceptance of sexual stereotypes 
and essentialism… [f]eminist sacramentality… needs to incarnate hope beyond nihilism 
by rescuing the female body from the weary truths of an exhausted religion, as a potential 
catalyst for sacramental transfiguration.”108 
She refers, often yet understandably, to the female body, feminist sacramentality, 
and woman’s experience. She claims that the understanding of the female body and 
female self as sacramental—a gift—is necessary. Much of that has to do with how female 
body and self were viewed pejoratively. However, her solution is very much applicable to 
the embodied, graced, masculine body as well. It works because she wants to move 
beyond including women in the notion of imago dei and to pursue the notion of imago dei 
and Catholic sacramentality that retains “its sense of the revelatory significance of gender 
and sexuality, while acknowledging the equality in difference of the sexes as beings 
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before God… constituted… by the dynamics of difference and desire which suggest to us 
something of the nature of our relationship to God.”109 Male body and self, then, can also 
be the source of revelation, graced in imago dei, and seen as sacramental—a gift. Hence, 
the male body, equally engraced, can also be the starting point for sacramental 
understanding of the self. It follows that men’s body, similar to women’s body, has a 
certain innate meaning as well as a constructed meaning. This notion will play a pivotal 
role in the constructive portion of this dissertation. 
Hope in the Tradition 
 Unlike the divisive language of ontological gender complementarity in the 
encyclicals and by the new Catholic feminists, there is some language of shared identity 
of the sexes within the tradition. Of course this language is concurrent with other 
language that emphasizes the essential difference between the sexes. It is important, 
however, to point out the fact that there has been a shift in language starting with Vatican 
II and that there clearly is a reason to hope for improvements in the tradition regarding 
justice for women and men. In order to demonstrate this reason for hope, then, we must 
go back to Vatican II. 
 My examples come from documents from Vatican II.110 In Gaudium et spes, the 
Council proclaims that discrimination based on sex be eliminated and equality between 
the sexes be implemented. 
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…with respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of 
discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, 
social condition, language or religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as 
contrary to God's intent. For in truth it must still be regretted that 
fundamental personal rights are still not being universally honored. Such is 
the case of a woman who is denied the right to choose a husband freely, to 
embrace a state of life or to acquire an education or cultural benefits equal 
to those recognized for men.111 
 
The Council advises further and gives possibilities for men and women to participate in 
society according to their own particular and natural, given—and perhaps even acquired 
—talents. 
We must strive to provide for those human beings who are gifted the 
possibility of pursuing higher studies; and in such a way that, as far as 
possible, they may occupy in society those duties, offices and services 
which are in harmony with their natural aptitude and the competence they 
have acquired. Thus each human being and the social groups of every 
people will be able to attain the full development of their culture in 
conformity with their qualities and traditions. 
Women now work in almost all spheres. It is fitting that they are 
able to assume their proper role in accordance with their own nature. It will 
belong to all to acknowledge and favor the proper and necessary 
participation of women in the cultural life.112 
 
This sort of language is consistent with the Council’s decision to drop ranking 
terminologies such as “primary and secondary” with respect to the telos of marriage. 
Instead, the Council teaches that love is essential to marriage as are spousal love/union 
and offspring. 
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By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love 
are ordained for the procreation and education of children, and find in them 
their ultimate crown. Thus a man and a woman, who by their compact of 
conjugal love "are no longer two, but one flesh" (Matt. 19: ff), render 
mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their 
persons and of their actions. Through this union they experience the 
meaning of their oneness and attain to it with growing perfection day by 
day. As a mutual gift of two persons, this intimate union and the good of the 
children impose total fidelity on the spouses and argue for an unbreakable 
oneness between them.113 
This love is uniquely expressed and perfected through the 
appropriate enterprise of matrimony. The actions within marriage by which 
the couple are united intimately and chastely are noble and worthy ones. 
Expressed in a manner which is truly human, these actions promote that 
mutual self-giving by which spouses enrich each other with a joyful and a 
ready will. Sealed by mutual faithfulness and be allowed above all by 
Christ’s sacrament, this love remains steadfastly true in body and in mind, 
in bright days or dark. It will never be profaned by adultery or divorce. 
Firmly established by the Lord, the unity of marriage will radiate from the 
equal personal dignity of wife and husband, a dignity acknowledged by 
mutual and total love.114 
 
Pope Paul VI, JPII, and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith all went on more 
explicitly to affirm the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meaning for 
marriage.115 In the latest document from the USCCB in November 2009, the US Catholic 
bishops were clear in stating that “the procreative meaning of marriage is degraded 
without the unitive,” and in fact “the unitive meaning of marriage… is ordered toward the 
equally obvious procreative meaning.”116 The conference reiterated the clarification of 
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the meaning of the word “helper” as not necessarily “inferior,” seeing the union as still 
blessed, complete, and useful even in some cases where a marriage does not result in 
procreation.117 
While not without some problems,118 the inclusion and the tone of the language in 
the document is of some value. Along with the promotion of equality, equal participation 
according to talent, and the elimination of sexism, the document’s language about the 
unitive function of marriage as equally important as the procreative can all serve as a tool 
for advancing a more mutual, not dimorphic or gender complementary, vision of the 
sexes and their appropriate roles. However, while language has a profound effect on 
people and there is a reason to stay hopeful, such an influence is a good inasmuch as it is 
followed up with appropriate changes in policies, stands, and rules accordingly. 
Conclusion 
 JPII has made some strides by acknowledging women’s dignity alongside men’s, 
encouraging men to be involved in the family and not to be abusive, giving at least some 
extra-domestic possibilities for women, and jettisoning the direct and harsh language of 
inferiority for women along with superiority for men. However, this model for 
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improvement is “a causal model.”119 That is, he is using a model which deals only with 
the “superficial cause” of the problem, namely the usage of language, and not with the 
“basic cause.”120 In this case, the basic cause of the problem has more to do with the 
fundamental notion of men and women. What JPII deems essential (i.e. motherhood 
defined by her domesticity and fatherhood by his public work and leadership, 
complementing each other in this way) is only partially true. JPII does not acknowledge 
or account for the multiplicity and diversity that exists not only between the “two sexes” 
but also among them. Because of this approach, his model may be too simplistic to 
explain the complex spectrum of sex and sexuality. Furthermore, because of his 
essentialism and physicalism, his complementary and nuptial models come short of 
solving the problems of 1) associating women with a lower (humanity) realm vis-à-vis 
men’s association with God, 2) disadvantaging and not doing enough to oppose the 
tendency to abuse against women, 3) expecting men to be “manly” breadwinners, and 
solely and financially responsible for the family, and 4) making compulsory fecundity 
and motherhood vis-à-vis single(d), infertile, or homosexual persons. To solve these 
problems more adequately, one must locate the basic cause of the problems and improve 
upon it. One must, that is, grasp the nature of men and women better. In order to do so, 
one has to realize the need to go beyond JPII’s changes in some of the language. To that 
end, I now turn to some contributions that male scholars have also made on the subject-
matter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEOLOGICAL CRITICISM BY MEN… AND BEYOND 
 Thus far, I have shown how dualism, androcentricism, and spousal imagery were 
the major players in the germination of unequal viewpoints about gender, especially 
affecting women. In the process, many brave woman scholars came forth to criticize 
inequity. Most of their critiques, however, are based on the fact that women are the 
victims and/or that men are the perpetrators. Such problematic notions and practices 
against women and male complicity in them notwithstanding, there is also a need for 
closer attention to men in order to improve the conditions for all human beings. The 
problem originated, in part, from thinking that one only needs to pay attention to the 
problem (women) and not the norm (men). A better understanding of men and their 
realities, therefore, will yield clearer notions of the gender spectrum and ultimately will 
enable men to appreciate and accept themselves as true gifts of God. 
Via Positiva 
 To achieve this goal, however, men must overcome their defensive attitudes and 
society must help by using a different methodology. The reason is that many become 
defensive, not because they deeply reflected on the issue, but because they too feel, 
rightly or not, victimized. For example, some writers believe that it has been popular in 
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the modern world “to engage in male bashing and blame men for all the ills of the 
world.”1 Conservative commentators, in particular, claim that such tactics have been used 
as an excuse to say or write many harmful statements about men in general. Bernard 
Goldberg, for example, shares his frustration with some reporters and anchors, especially 
women, who make pejorative statements about men on air without them becoming an 
issue or much less their being held accountable for them.2 Goldberg’s argument is that if 
it is unacceptable for men to make similar statements about women, the same should hold 
true for women making statements about men.3 While I do not entirely agree with 
blaming “liberals” and their biases in the media,4 I do agree that it has become somewhat 
culturally à la mode to present men as infuriating, childish, or naturally uncontrollable. 
Whether it is simply putting the blame on men for the ills of the world or making a 
mockery of men as being childish, this negative approach is not a healthy way to a 
solution. This is “neither therapeutic for men nor helpful to women who may be seeking a 
suitable partner.”5 It will only lead to the perpetuation of the same problems since the 
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vicious cycle of negativity, or the chain reaction of evil, will impede any progress made 
by feminist and sympathetic male scholars. 
 If, on the other hand, one considers a more positive way, a better solution can 
emerge. That is, instead of continually blaming the privileged—whether that would be 
men, white, the upper class, etc.—the time has come to go beyond pointing out the 
problems. While this is necessary, we must seek a solution that works for not only 
women or men but for both. Gender is best understood only as part of a system. In the 
words of Christine E. Gudorf, “we can never adequately address the injustices to women 
in our society without at the same time transforming the process of socializing men, for 
they are two sides of the same coin.”6 The first step into the right direction, then, is to 
reject unjust practices and simultaneously to foster a healthy way for women and men to 
achieve that objective. My goal in this effort is to use more positive language, a language 
that men can and are willing to understand, so as to help men open up and start to accept 
the unjust gender structure of society.7 This strategy may foster a better conversation for 
men because they may feel less defensive and less personally responsible or guilty about 
the structural problems of the society that benefit and favor them over women. 
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 To that end, I will undertake an investigation into the ways that men can and 
ought to embrace positive ideas of masculinity. I will point to a several authors through 
whom a more integral picture of men and masculinities will emerge. Such work is a 
necessary initial step since it calls not for an invention of something new, but bringing to 
new light something already in existence and hidden within men. Through this process, I 
hope that the reader will conclude that both aspects of the traditional notion of 
masculinity and newly highlighted characteristics of men should be embraced. Ultimately, 
similar to what Tina Beattie has done for women, this methodology will lead to a 
sacramental understanding of men and their bodily experiences in the final chapter.8 
James B. Nelson 
 I find the work of James B. Nelson to be a very helpful source for such a task. I 
am aware that he is a Protestant theologian and I am working towards a “Roman Catholic” 
masculinity. However, since it is obvious that Protestant theology can contribute to 
Roman Catholic theology, I will proceed to use his helpful insights.  
 Nelson’s starting point is that of the male body. Just as many feminist scholars 
have been able to find the particular experience of the female body as an important mode 
of revelation— i.e. the nature of their breasts and genitals, the experience of menstruation 
and birthing— so too can men find the idiosyncratic experience of the male body a 
source of a great discovery and awakening. Following Mircea Eliade’s view that sees 
“our human sexual experience as an ‘autonomous mode of cognition,’” and “a 
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fundamental way of knowing reality immediately and directly,”9 Nelson goes on to claim 
that sexuality is “a manifestation of the sacred, revealing to us what is beyond our 
conscious rational apprehension.”10 As such, the best place to start exploring the most 
distinctive masculine part of man and his sexual experience is the male genitals.11 
 Prior to a discussion about male genitals, however, some caveats warrant 
necessary attention. First, a discussion about male genitals is a delicate subject. The 
meanings associated with them are often violent and detached, “as its slang names amply 
suggest—cock, prick, tool, rod, and even a gun with its bullets.”12 Hence, I must admit 
that, like Nelson, I am aware of these connotations, the dangers of giving any kind of 
attention to male genitals, and the possibility of accidentally being part of the same 
masculine oppression that I criticize. These connotations are true of masculinity in 
general. As Victor Seidler writes, “masculinity is an essentially negative identity learnt 
through defining itself against emotionality and connectedness.”13 Thus, I can only do my 
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best and honest work to evade these problems or, to face them directly and offer an 
alternative. 
Secondly, as shown in the earlier chapters, the effects of dualism have a 
tremendous amount of influence in seeing and overvaluing a more one-sided reality of 
male genitalia. Such conditions have resulted in not only undervaluing the other aspects 
of male genitalia but also creating discomfort about the topic per se. More specifically, by 
a “one-sided” approach to a discussion about the male genitalia, I am referring to 
Nelson’s notion of the phallic interpretation vis-à-vis penile interpretation. That is, our 
society spends most of its energy talking about the rigidity and the (big) size of the male 
genitalia, forgetting the fact that for the majority of the time, the reality of it is much 
more malleable and small. By focusing too much on one side of the reality, Nelson 
argues, it is only seen—like the rest of the body—as something to be controlled and 
disciplined “by imposing upon it an alien will, treating it in short as a dead object to be 
pushed around,” or to become alive (resurrected) again.14 The outcome from this 
approach, either of devaluation (of softness) or overvaluation (of hardness), does not do 
justice to the reality.15 That is, seeing our bodies, genitals more specifically, in a dualistic 
                                                 
14
 H.A. Williams, True Resurrection (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 32-33 quoted in Nelson, 
“Embracing Masculinity,”196. Nelson is aware that Williams is speaking of bodies in general but sees 
applicability in genitals in particular. 
 
15
 This is true of course of women also. For dangers of overvaluation, see my earlier discussion of Gudorf’s 
“pedestalization” in Chapter 2. Also Cf. Sallie McFague, “Mother God,” in Anne E. Carr and Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza eds. Motherhood: Experience, Institution, Theology, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 
139-140. McFague discusses how it is dangerous both to devalue the female body by claiming it is 
biologically hardwired to only have and raise children (patriarchal binary patterns continued) and to 
overvalue it, which creates “a new hierarchy dualism with a matriarchal model of God.” She finds vital the 
affirmation of uniquely female experience of female body inasmuch as such an assertion not claim that 
therefore women are essentially suppose to take on limited roles. I agree wholeheartedly with McFague’s 
method, hoping that I could extend this insight to men also in this dissertation. For a discussion of these and 
for a work using this kind of method, see Irene Oh, “Performativity of Motherhood: Embodying Theology 
and Political Agency” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 29.2 (2009), 3-17. 
132 
 
 
master-slave relationship, oppresses and denies “the right to live except as slave 
machines.”16 On the other hand, giving our bodies an unadulterated freedom, the sexual 
revolution for example, allows them to give in to compulsion, probably more so because 
of the years of suppression.17 Thus, the dangers of oppression and compulsion must both 
be noted as something very real, as we proceed. In order to have a serious discussion of 
this subject matter, one must do away with a one-sided focus while avoiding an 
extremely relativistic approach and see the reality as it is.18 
Phallus 
 In discussions about male genitals, it is the phallus that is the customary center of 
attention. The meaning associated with the phallus is pretty typical: it is linear and 
vertical with its “strength, hardness, determination, sinew, straightforwardness, [and] 
penetration.”19 Nelson extends his criticism of the amount of attention given to the 
phallus to claim that in fact not enough attention is given to it in reality. He is convinced 
that a much better understanding of the phallus surfaces after a careful examination. That 
is, he claims that not only do male genitals have more than phallic reality, but even the 
phallus—as is true in most of the dualistic views (i.e. man/woman, conservative/liberal, 
black/white, Eastern/Western etc.)—is also not a monolithic reality but a diverse one. 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,”196, italic Nelson’s. 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 196-197. 
 
18
 Nelson attributes the continuation of this dualistic one-sidedness to the following categories of possibility: 
historical inheritance and conditioning, biological misinformation, sexual fears (Freudian) male envy of 
women’s biological power, “father-wounded son” (Greek mythology and Freudian) and 
homophobia/sexism. James B. Nelson, Between Two Gardens: Reflection on Sexuality and Religious 
Experience (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1983), 47-52. 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 197. 
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Borrowing the term coined by Eugene Monick, he distinguishes the phallus into the 
earthly20 and solar.21 
 The earthly dimension of the phallus is perceived as “sweaty, hairy, throbbing, 
wet, animal sexuality.”22 Positively speaking, it has a life-giving energy with strength, 
vitality, and vibrancy. Negatively, it has the potential to use others solely for gratification. 
This side of the phallus is helpful and useful inasmuch as it is balanced with the 
consideration of the other side to curb its ugly, brutal side.23 
 The solar dimension is perceived as erect, tall, proud, transcendent, and “the 
satisfaction of straining to go farther intellectually, physically, and socially.”24 It is the 
driving force, an engine, which impels men to build “the church steeples and skyscrapers.” 
It gives a man direction and movement. Yet, the distortion of it oppresses those who do 
not “measure up,” claiming bigger, powerful, richer, etc. is necessarily better.25 This 
dimension shuns mediocrity, effortlessness, and idleness and drives a man to challenge, 
excel, and be motivated inasmuch as it does not idolatrously claim itself an absolute 
standard to which every man should measure up. 
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 Monick calls this the “clithonic phallos.” See Monick 94-96. 
 
21
 Monick, 48-49. 
 
22
 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 198. 
 
23Ibid., 198. 
 
24
 Ibid., 198. 
 
25
 Ibid., 198-199. 
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 Because both dimensions are “not fully under a man’s conscious control,” the 
notion of phallus “seems to be an appropriate metaphor for the masculine unconscious.”26 
However, since both the “earthly” and “solar” dimensions are unconscious metaphors, 
regardless of how valuable and beneficial, they must be balanced with the awareness of 
the aforementioned dangers for the optimal usage of these metaphors. Being aware of the 
benefits and dangers, then, the earthly and solar metaphors can be used for men and the 
notion of phallus can become a vital part of masculine experience. 
 Nevertheless, the phallus is just that: a part. The phallus is a part, a much smaller 
part (of the shared time) at that, of the male genital experience. It is truly ironic, therefore, 
that there has been a preoccupation with the phallus in anything related to the male 
genital experience. 
In Roman mythology Priapus…was the god of fertility…marked by 
grotesque ugliness and an enormous erection. In human sexual disorders, 
priapism is the painful clinical condition of an erection that will not go 
down. Priapus and priapism are symbolic of the idolatry of the half-truth… 
Phallus, the erection…is only part. Were it the whole thing, his sexuality 
and his spirituality would be painful and bizarre, both to himself and to 
others. That this in fact is too frequently the case is difficult to deny.27 
 
While the phallus is vital, important, and necessary, to better understand the male 
experience—and to avoid the demonic and self-destructive results that come from taking 
partial truth as the whole truth28—one must turn to the examination of the phenomenon 
which is the reality for man most of the time. 
                                                 
26
 According to Nelson in Ibid., 197-198; the limitation of the metaphor is duly noted. While the “control” 
may be unconscious, men are more conscious of it once erected than when limp. Hence this metaphor 
works here only when one is talking about the “control.” Cf. Nelson’s discussion in Ibid., 199. 
 
27
 Ibid., 199. 
 
28
 Ibid., 202. 
135 
 
 
 
Penis 
 Nelson uses the word penis in contrast to “phallus” to designate it as “the organ in 
its flaccid, unaroused state.” 29 Years of neglect of the notion of penis resulted partly from 
undervaluing it. Certainly, part of the undermining comes quite naturally from the fact 
that the penis does not demand our attention the way the phallus does. However, Nelson 
argues that another important part is from a quite intentional valuation. These are values 
obtained from patriarchy: “bigger is better… hardness is superior to softness… upness is 
better than downness.”30 In this setting, the penis represents all that which is inferior: 
small, soft, vulnerable, cyclical, horizontal, and mortal.31 Nelson claims that one of the 
products of this representation is “the deprivation of a significant kind of masculine 
spiritual energy and power.”32 
 That is, just as representing God both through a via positiva (affirmation, 
thanksgiving, ecstasy) and a via negativa (emptying, emptied, darkness)33 may be needed 
for balance and completion—as over-development of the one will bring distortion of the 
other—the historical neglect of the penis (associated with via negativa) brings about a 
distortion of male experience and spirituality. The reality, however, is that the experience 
of via negativa is a man’s experience, perhaps even more so than that of the phallus, and 
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 Ibid., 199. 
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 Ibid., 200. 
 
31
 Ibid., 196 and 200. 
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 Ibid., 200. 
 
33
 The two terms come from Nelson, Ibid., 200-201. 
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its symbolic strength can be just as energetic, powerful, and necessary. All the ways in 
which man experiences “sinking” and “emptying” lets him learn to trust God; “that we do 
not need to do, that our being is enough.”34 All the ways in which man experiences 
darkness lets him admit fear, anxiety, anger, death and the unknown in him. Without 
darkness, “there is no growth, no mystery, no receptivity, no deep creativity. Without the 
gentle dark, light becomes harsh.”35 If this significant aspect of being a man is not 
highlighted, acknowledged, and studied, he is left to achieve an unrealistic expectation, 
possibly resulting in stress, depression, and deprivation.36 
 Nelson does not think, however, that the model of androgyny is the answer. First, 
it assumes “both” characteristics in one being, as if there were one set of masculine and 
one feminine characteristic. Second, this model either calls, like the ancient thoughts 
mentioned in chapter one, for woman to become more like (perfect) man or man (who 
lost his perfection) to develop the feminine side for his human completion. Here, Nelson 
uses the image of a second language/bilinguality to demonstrate his point. Requiring man 
to “add on” feminine qualities is like learning a second language as an adult. However, if 
one were born into a bilingual family/society, one would naturally learn both and not feel 
“foreign” because it is just as originally part of him or her “as the language with which, 
by accident of circumstances, we have become more familiar.”37 He claims that the latter 
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 Ibid., 201. 
 
35
 Ibid., 201. 
 
36
 I will go in depth about whether this assumed result is true or not in the later portion of this chapter and 
the next. 
 
37
 I am, as Nelson certainly is, very aware the limitation of this example. Languages are social inventions 
and bodies are not, at least not fully like languages. But the point is that we are given “bilingual bodies”; 
that our bdies are also, to some extent, socially constructed. See Ibid., 204. 
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is the appropriate image for man. Men are not to develop feminine energy, personality, or 
sides. Rather, men are to develop their masculine energy, personality, or sides, but just 
more fully. The “issue is fullness.”38 The vulnerable, soft, receptive, small, horizontal, 
and mortal qualities are not feminine. They are, as a penis is, as authentically masculine 
as are the characteristics associated with the phallus.39 Men do not need to add on, be 
feminine, or be who they are not. However, men do need to be manlier, which means he 
is to develop his masculinity more richly, more fully, and more honestly. Men are active 
and passive, unwavering and vulnerable, hard and soft. In this sense, men do not 
necessarily “need” women to become fully men, to become complete. Women certainly 
may bring much joy, delight, love, etc. but men are already fully men and fully human. 
The qualities that they lack are the result of neglect of the qualities already existent in 
their beings, not from “complementary” reasons40 or not being in touch with their 
“feminine” side. For this reason, no man, be he a Catholic priest, the pope, or even Jesus 
of Nazareth, ever needed to develop his feminine side; he simply need to be more fully 
manly to be more real and honest, less oppressive and violent, likely to avoid compulsion 
and depression, and closer to wholeness and authenticity. Ironically, then, the very 
assertion that I set out to criticize—“be a manlier man”—is what I now proclaim. The 
only difference is that being “manlier” means something quite different than being active, 
hard, stoic, stronger, faster, etc. It does mean being honest about all aspects of being a 
man and not trying to categorize or fit into an extremely one-sided social definition of 
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 Ibid., 204, italics Nelson’s. 
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 Ibid., 204. 
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 See his discussion of Karl Barth’s gender complementarity as in “fellow-humanity” in Ibid., 202. Cf. 
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics vol III part 4 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), especially 166. 
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masculinity. In fact, a closer look at Jesus, the most wholly, holy, and complete man for 
Christians, reveals that he would not be considered “manly” enough for today’s dualistic 
or complementary norms of masculinity. 
Jesus Christ the Man 
 For Christians, including Roman Catholics, seeing man as such more fully, quite 
naturally leads one to Jesus of Nazareth. The theological implications of Nelson’s claims, 
then, are profound. However, confronting Jesus in the same breath as talking about male 
genitalia or sexuality can be a difficult and delicate exercise. Much of that can be traced, 
Nelson believes, back to ancient thoughts and practices. 
 A deep suspicion about sexuality and the shameful treatment of it can be found 
throughout history. Consistent with this propensity, Docetism and Gnosticism 
desexualized Jesus in a way that had a rippling effect on history and Christianity more 
specifically.41 Undermining Jesus’ sexuality and its goodness and beauty raises many 
problems. However, patriarchy did open up some conversation about Jesus’ sexuality, but 
only inasmuch as it is used as an instrument of patriarchal oppression: to emphasize 
maleness, to prove the maleness of God, and to keep men in control over women. What 
kind of a picture would surface if one examined Jesus as man, a representation “of male 
sexual wholeness, of creative masculinity, and of the redemption of manhood from both 
oppressiveness and superficiality”?42 
 The picture would be one with which many men as well as women could find 
intimate connection. Seeing Jesus fully, not in a one-sided way, not complementarily or 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 209. 
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 Ibid., 211; Emphasis mine. 
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androgynically, enables his followers to relate to him better. Here is how. Just as we have 
been concentrating on one aspect of men (that is the strong unafraid side) so too have we 
been concentrating on the “maleness” (in its stereotypical definition) of Jesus,43 when in 
fact we should be concentrating on his humanity as a whole (and his true maleness as a 
result).44 By concentrating on his humanity, one can not only extract a dominating judge, 
and ruler but also a compassionate man who risked being vulnerable in becoming man 
and dying on the cross, who cared and empathized with the weak, who was “deeply 
moved” and cried over the death of Martha and Mary’s brother, and who received even 
the worst of the sinners as forgivable because they knew not what they had done. In many 
accounts of modern standards of masculinity, Jesus of Nazareth is simply not manly 
enough.45 Yet it is with this Jesus that Christians are to identify. Because he was perfectly 
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 Just as an aside, a quick search on the internet yields many writings and images of “macho Jesus” some 
of which are fully equipped with firearms. Also Cf. G. Ronald Murphy S.J. The Heliand: the Saxon Gospel: 
A Translation and Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), for an English / pagan 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 211. 
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 One can make an argument that some German thinkers of the modern era share similar views about Jesus 
and religion in general. Whether seeing religion as the opium of the people, or as something unnecessary if 
you are (Übermensch) man enough, Jesus and Christianity represents “weakness” for some. Nietzsche, for 
example, thought that Christian appeal to God’s mercy “weakens the believer’s general state of vitality.” 
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Christians do this by 1) finding “selfescape through fostering oneness with God,” 2) offering “eternal 
happiness as a reward for devotion,” 3) providing “vicarious sense of power by virtue of his or her 
relationship to [or association with] God,” and 4) promising “an escape from death” and “endless bliss for 
the devout.” Without this safety, Christians do not feel strong enough to feel secure. Kathleen Marie 
Higgins, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 50-55, 62 and passim; 
Karl Marx also argued that religion serves the world and its people as a “spiritual aroma,” that it serves as 
the “opium of the people” who cannot take the reality as is, because we cannot bear the sufferings of our 
lives. However, Marx maintained that these are just illusions of reality, illusions of suffering and that we 
must dis-illusion man “so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality as a man who has lost his illusions 
and regained his reason; so that he will revolve about himself as his own true sun.” see Karl Marx, 
“Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Edward T. Oakes ed., German Essays on 
Religion (New York: Continuum, 1994), 95-96, which is volume 54 of a series called The German Library; 
Finally, Sigmund Freud thought that religious ideas were illusions stemming from a kind of “wishful-
thinking” of mankind [sic]. Religion, in this sense, is the “universal obsessional neurosis of humanity,” 
similar to that of the obsessional neurosis of children. Most of these neuroses, wishful-thinking, and 
140 
 
 
human and perfectly divine, “he possessed the same human nature we all have, but 
remarkably and fully open in mutuality with God’s loving power.”46 For this reason, 
women can also find their connections with him. For the same reason, men can find their 
connections but in new ways. Seeing Jesus fully enables one to realize that he “embodied 
the divine-human communion with a fullness that awes, compels, judges, challenges, 
comforts, and attracts us.”47 
 It is precisely because of this conviction that I believe men and women can relate 
to each other better if we stop seeing each other as essentially different or as opposites. 
This argument would also claim, then, that it does not help to think that “men are from 
Mars and women are from Venus” but that they are all from the earth and are created 
imago dei. I believe that seeing the other not only as similar but also (or more so) as 
intimately relatable is a healthier approach to relationships.48 Similarly, understanding 
our relationship with God not only as profoundly different, or even worse, dominating or 
being dominated, but also as intimately relatable, is more effective, affective, healthier, 
and theologically sound. There is a crucial need for a new definition of masculinity 
precisely in order to make this situation possible. 
                                                                                                                                                 
childishness “are overcome spontaneously in the course of growing up.” Again, religion is for the weak, not 
yet fully grown, and something of which one grows out. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans 
John Strachey (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 38-42, 54-55 and passim. Cf. 
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans John Strachey (New York, London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1989), Chapter 8. 
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 I set out to argue for this position in this dissertation and it will become more evident as one moves along 
this project. 
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 I do find Nelson’s method somewhat problematic since in some ways he 
perpetuates a dualistic understanding. That is, while rightly acknowledging the “other 
side” or aspects that have been neglected, he still works in a bifurcated paradigm: 
earthly/solar, via negativa / via positiva, humanity / divinity, soft/hard, between “two” 
gardens, etc. Also, while I do acknowledge that often he uses these dimorphic examples 
within one side of the greater bifurcation—a step forward from the past, no doubt—he 
also maintains at least a kind of dualistic thinking without addressing potential problems 
with it or acknowledging that he is aware of all this but that it is purposely done for a 
reason. Because I will later demonstrate that in fact there is much more diversity than 
these dualistic approaches, especially when it comes to gender, I find his continual use of 
the language of dimorphism problematic without a caveat. If he were aware of his usage 
of dual and dualistic categories—and I think one can rightly raise the question whether it 
is possible to talk about all this without “duality”— then what is missing is a more 
thorough explanation of the diversity of qualities that exists between the two 
characteristics. 49 Nevertheless, his work is pioneering and has immense benefits for 
projects such as mine. 
Daniel C. Maguire (Roman Catholic) 
 The starting point for Daniel C. Maguire is the mistreatment and exclusion of 
women and the consequences that follow from those behaviors. He asserts that such 
maltreatment results in impeding, impoverishing, or blinding our moral and religious 
perceptions. Since he believes that women have at least four experiences that give them 
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 He does differentiate dualism (dichotomy) from duality (polarity). Unlike a dualism, a duality is the 
perception of two elements, while distinguishable, that truly belong together. Nelson, Body Theology, 44. 
Again, this is certainly an improvement; nonetheless, he does not avoid the two-way approach or explains 
why this is acceptable. 
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some advantages in their moral and religious knowing, to limit or deny such advantage 
will deprive the human species an opportunity to more clearly see and know. For this 
reason, he welcomes the incipient feminization of our culture (and hence the title of one 
of his articles, “The Feminization of God and Ethics.”)50 
 The moral sensitivity of women is, Maguire insists, “generally enhanced and 
therefore better in at least four basic ways.”51 First, women’s intellectuality is more 
“wholesomely rooted in the terrestrial order” through pregnancy and nursing, and their 
realities such as menstrual experiences remind them of “earthy service of the body and its 
actual environment.”52 In this sense, women are less alienated from bodily existence, less 
likely to think abstractly, and more likely to be attuned to values in the concrete. Second, 
because women’s affectivity is less suppressed by society, they integrate affect in moral 
judgment and recognize it as “the enlivening mold of moral judgment”—as opposed to 
“hypothetical dilemmas.”53 Third, women have historically been graced with closeness to 
the “normative primacy” of the “gentlest rhythms of our humanity,” including trust, 
celebration, love, and joy—as opposed to accepting “misery as normatively normal.”54 
Fourth, women even tend to take their negative experiences of alienation and turn them 
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 Daniel C. Maguire, “The Feminization of God and Ethics,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 
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into an opportunity for growth; they have had many such occasions to build up their 
growth in history.55  
 Adding to the problems of ignoring these ways for enhancing our moral visions, 
Maguire continues, are “the perils of macho-masculinity.” He can think of at least four 
consequences from instilling warrior-like macho-masculine qualities as the norm for men. 
First, men are prone to violent modes of power. When they cannot find a violent mode of 
power in war, it is manifested in other forms of aggression in their work, religion, homes, 
schools, teams, governments etc. A better and a more productive approach for Maguire is 
a “more feminine model.”56 
Second, macho-masculinity tends to lean toward an anti-communitarian and more 
hierarchal structure. This model encourages competition, domination (and hence violence) 
and control, instead of cooperation, community, mutuality, and harmony.57 It is inevitable 
then that men become more divisive than harmonious and seek control rather than 
solution or communion. Third, flowing from the first two, macho-masculinity feeds the 
idea that violence requires and begets abstractionism. The idea is that killing a million 
only becomes a number, removed from the reality of actual people being killed. Hence, 
fourth, it is the result, outcome, bottom-line, the “end” that matters. The end becomes 
everything and the idolatry of the outcome is yet another product of machismo.58 Finally, 
the macho attitude, when applied to women, reveals itself as hatred of women. It is this 
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attitude, which directly or indirectly but undoubtedly and inevitably, subordinates women, 
Maguire maintains, that has caused the Roman Catholic Church to distrust women.59 This 
aversion is so great that (all-male) priests stay “uncontaminated” in and through their 
celibacy.60 Maguire believes that this attitude toward women is from a male-centered 
mind-set deeply rooted in the culture and, more specifically, Roman Catholic culture. 
Following Aristotelian teachings, it was Thomas Aquinas who infamously stated that a 
woman is “something deficient and misbegotten,” (aliquid deficiens et occasionatum) 
and therefore “children and even the insane could be validly ordained as priests—as long 
as they were male—but adult and healthy women could not be!”61 
 In the end, Maguire believes that the continuation of feminization will heal 
distorted notions of masculinity and femininity. Hence, he encourages the feminization of 
God and ethics. Ultimately, however, his goal is not to have femininity triumph over 
masculinity. Demonizing men as a class, or excluding man from the conversation about 
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gender, is not the answer. (After all, how often do we actually think “men” when looking 
at a university course on gender studies?) Maguire asserts, “Gynocentrism is no better 
than androcentrism. Macha is not superior to macho….Male anatomy, any more than 
female anatomy, is not destiny.”62 Rather, he envisions “an emerging humanity” that 
“blends the masculine and the feminine into ever more genuine modalities of the species 
human.”63 He is hopeful, as I am, that despite many of the injustices of the religions, it is 
the same religious institutions that contain within them “renewable moral energies… 
awaiting creative application to the human alienations and terracidal threats that confront 
us.”64 This project at hand is indeed in search of that creative application within the 
tradition. 
Clearly, Maguire’s conclusion and his work, especially as a Catholic man, are 
ground-breaking. He not only sees the harm caused by the mistreatment of women but 
also sees the damage caused by hyper-masculine expectations. His conclusion points to a 
much needed Catholic male voice proclaiming the termination of unjust treatment of 
women, feminization as the method of getting there, and the collaterally positive results 
for men. Notwithstanding all this, however, I see yet more possibilities for improvements 
in some parts of the process through which he comes to his conclusion. 
 Firstly, despite the fact that he points to the dangers of the acceptance of the 
absolutist Freudian formula, “anatomy is destiny,” he does not escape the very 
generalization he criticizes. While accepting meaningful differences between boys and 
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girls, he himself goes beyond that and continues to make generalized statements about 
men and women—which may be fair and true to a degree—but without taking up the 
problems of such simplification, other than merely asserting that there is a danger in 
generality. Secondly, if there are indeed positive or even superior aspects of “femininity,” 
what are some of the positive dimensions of masculinity? Are there any? Is finding only 
negative aspects of men ultimately unavoidable or is it helpful to designate general 
categories of positive attributes of the sexes? Finally, and related to the first two, he does 
not discuss the opposite problem of extreme relativism in depth. If his solution of 
feminization ultimately moves towards the “blending” of the two into an emerging 
humanity, what is the need for masculinity at all, other than either to pay back what is 
owed to women or to ameliorate situations for women and only correlatively or 
collaterally helping men? Are there some things that anyone can do to more directly and 
effectively influence, help, and improve the situation for men, and thus for women as 
well?65 
 Unmistakably, Maguire is aware of the first two dangers: generalization and 
simplification. He does not think that the “feminine advantage” is “only in women, or in 
all women, or that… macho-masculinity [is]… only in men or in all men to the same 
degree.”66 Moreover, he states that “feminine advantages do not imply immaculate 
conception,” of women and “men… have not just done ill.”67 Yet, he too makes similar 
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66Maguire , “The Feminization of God and Ethics,” 5. 
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generalizations. He claims that “the moral insensitivity of women is generally enhanced 
and therefore better.”68 In sexual encounters, for example, “man can inseminate and ride 
off dreamfully into the sunset, but for woman a biological drama… will tie her to the 
moment for many months.”69 Although he acknowledges that men and women are not 
completely hardwired to have certain traits and to behave in certain ways,70 he portrays 
the two sexes in such a way that it certainly looks as though those traits are pretty much 
true. While he speaks against the notion that gynocentrism is better than androcentrism or 
that macha is superior to macho, in the end, he seems to think that one is better, or 
advantaged, than the other.71 However, he must ask the question: to what extent is the 
“feminine advantage” already an important part of men, or “masculine” traits already a 
part of women? To what degree are these characteristics present in their own respective 
categories? Also, since he acknowledges the existence of some positive attributes in men 
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 Maguire, “The Feminization of God and Ethics,” 6-7; Interestingly in sociobiology, there is evidence in 
nature that it is the female, not the male (the female chimpanzee for example), who “flirts, seduces, and 
does everything she can to attract males—whom she then abandons as she moves on to the next customers.” 
While her aim may be different from the male chimpanzee, does this evidence demonstrate “that females 
are genetically programmed toward promiscuity and male toward monogamy?” Michael S. Kimmel, The 
Gendered Society 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), 28. I will examine this further in the 
next chapter. 
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 For example, Maguire claims that “For three hundred years, Christian literature was pacifistic,” and that 
as late as the year 240 CE, “Origen conceded… that Christians were pacifists.” When Constantine required 
one to be Christians (men) to enlist in the army and gave more power to men, however, the “non-macho 
style of life collapsed.” While this may be a huge and barely substantiated claim, what is important for the 
discussion at hand is the fact that he seems to be hinting that (Christian) men were not bio-naturally 
(macho-like), warriors but the Sitz im Leben led them to a warrior-hood and warrior mind-set thereafter. 
Ibid 10. 
 
71
 He claims that “only a man could have stood in the ashes of the totally destroyed village of Ben Tre 
during the war in Vietnam” to say that they “destroyed the village in order to save it” and that woman’s 
experience would not allow women “to miss the disconnection between ashen destruction and saving.” See 
Maguire, “The Feminization of God and Ethics,” 6; However, serious questions must be raised as to 
superiority of this maternal instinct vis-à-vis the enormous evidence of infanticide as a method of birth 
control throughout Western history, and the fact that it was women who did most of the baby killing.” 
Lloyd DeMause, “Our Forbears Made Childhood a Nightmare,” Psychology Today (April 1975) quoted in 
Michael S. Kimmel, The Gendered Society, 29. 
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and some negatives in women, what are those and can those qualities help us to better 
understand sex and gender?72 Are those traits too insignificant for serious consideration 
or is not discussing them at all perpetuating dichotomous gender injustice?73 Can such 
generalizations, which have hurt women throughout human history, also hurt men? 
Dichotomous and Androgynous Problems 
 These are difficult yet crucial questions. For the most part, men doing “feminist” 
theology seem to have a difficult time escaping dimorphic thinking. When they 
acknowledge some inevitable differences between the sexes, they seem to forget the issue 
of differences among men and among women. Stanley J. Grenz, for example, begins by 
rightly highlighting that the Christian triune God is fundamentally relational and mutual. 
The ancient Christian approach is of linear conception. A linear or asymmetrical model of 
the Trinity is characterized by a hierarchal system in which the authority flows from the 
Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. 74 Contrast to this model, a “two directional 
model” is characterized by the fact that the Father not only generates the Son but also the 
Son constitutes the Father; The Father is not the Father without the Son and the Son is not 
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 Evaluating those qualities is important since it is my desire to find a positive solution to the problems. It 
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the Son without the Father.75 In contrast, the “linear conception” of the triune God is 
harmful in many ways since it encourages hierarchal paradigm, which has been the model 
that promoted males having authority over females, just as the first person of the Trinity 
would over the second and the third. He advances the idea that, like Origen and 
Athanasius, no person of the Trinity is greater or less than the other and insists that the 
relation between the Father and the Son is two directional.76 One can see that Grenz 
solves the theological problem of linking God to every man and humanity to every 
woman but also creates new questions. The first question is whether subordination is on 
an equal level with dependence. The second question flows from his argument that a 
fundamentally relational God created fundamentally relational human beings in the 
imago dei. He pursues this notion to claim that for this reason God created a “female 
counterpart” because the “fulfillment of our sociability depends on fellowship with the 
opposite sex.”77 However, if, as he correctly states, “we are fundamentally social beings 
[a]nd rather than finding fulfillment within, human completeness arises from outside the 
individual self,” how is it that this relational/social/communal fulfillment comes solely 
through the opposite (sic) sex?78 Insofar as we are communal, is it not possible that such 
communal fulfillment can arise from other groups outside the individual self, not 
necessarily from the “opposite” sex? Better yet, is it not possible that our fulfillment 
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 Ibid., 618. 
 
76
 Ibid., 617-619, 622-623. 
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 I find problematic that this kind of phrasing also makes it sounds like man is still prior. 
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 Ibid., 620-622; also quoting Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, Gender and Grace: Love, Work and Parenting 
in a Changing World (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1990), 41. Notwithstanding these problems, I do want 
be sure to give credit where credit is due. The amount of “mutuality” achieved in this article and Grenz’s 
efforts to eliminate the idea that strict gender roles are rooted in the Judeo-Christian Creation narratives are 
commendable. My only purpose in this section is to suggest further possibilities for development. 
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arises from within our own sex along with the “opposite” sex? If, in fact, “man and 
woman are as mirrors to each other…[and] their differences reveal to each other who he 
is or she is,”79 then how much better can we know about ourselves if even more people, 
not just the “opposite sex,” participate in such examinations? Again, these problems stem 
from dimorphic thinking about sex and gender, and seeing man and woman as monolithic 
realities. 
 Using a dichotomous model for gender also has a harmful effect on men doing 
anti-feminist theology. Leon J. Podles, for example, places the blame for men’s lack of 
interest and/or involvement in religion and the Church in the present on women.80 This 
phenomenon of men’s absence in the Church was not always the case, he insists. Two 
major reasons for a lack of men in the churches is the feminization of the Church and 
threats to masculinity resulting from the feminization. His argument states that since the 
13th Century, when women began to get more involved in the Church and the focus 
started to shift to women, the feminization of Western Christianity began and never 
looked back.81 Since then, the churches became more and more feminine and “normal 
men,” as they do with their mothers, broke away from anything feminine, including their 
churches.82 All this—along with having girls as altar servers and the new family model 
that does not have man as the head—contributed to the Church becoming a threat to their 
masculinity. The mainline (Protestant) churches have seminaries with a female majority 
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and hence, Podles predicts, “shortly the ministry will be a female occupation” and that 
one “will have to say male ministers as one now has to say male nurse.”83  
Podles’ solution? Welcome boys back to the churches by having more physical 
training joined with religious training. Also, the father should lead prayers, read the bible, 
and get more involved in the church so that the boys do not see the Church as something 
feminine. Most importantly, that means the role of the pastor should be that of father, not 
mother.84 The assumptions in this (2001) article are clear. A lack of men in Christian 
churches is due to women and their “sentimental motherhood” from which “normal men 
stay away,” because men want to break away from mothers.85 He makes no exceptions. 
“Men can be taught to be men only by men, and all too many pastors are not real men.”86 
According to Podles, it is a lack of masculinity as a result of dominance by women that 
threatens men and the future of Christianity. Podles’ article is an extreme example but it 
demonstrates how demeaning such rigid models of masculinity and femininity can be. 
Assuming that all, or most, men and women are a certain way can make femininity the 
cause of ill or evil just as strongly today as in the ancient periods. Moreover, it can lead 
men to think that masculinity is defined by power and that without that power and control, 
a man is not really a man—the effect of which will be discussed later. 
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 Ibid., 31; It should be noted that while he acknowledged Protestant Christian complicity, Podles places 
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 Contrarily, the “blending” of the two, by way of feminization, is not the answer 
either. Maguire’s idea of blending will lead man to learn from woman—which as such 
may be very wise, yet not wholesome without mutual learning—or to accept that 
woman’s moral sensitivity is somehow better than man’s is—or in the extreme case, that 
women are just better than men. This approach, if successful, will lead not to equal power 
but to reversal of power dynamic. The one-side-as-the-answer approach is what got us 
into trouble in the first place. Also, the popular idea that it is woman’s turn to enjoy 
benefits at the expense of man (this attitude is not Maguire’s) may be a short term 
solution but a quick fix thinking is often the cause of great evil87 and such a “pay back” 
approach is not an effective model anyway, especially for Christians. Aside from all this, 
any “blending” must confront the issue of extreme relativism, already discussed in 
Nelson’s call against androgyny. That is, when categories are blended into a melting pot, 
there is a danger of losing self-identity for the sake of a single category or no category at 
all. The task should be, then, to maintain and to acknowledge individuals without melting 
his or her self-identity.88 
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 See for example African American theologian Howard Thurman’s discussion of the dangers of wanting 
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 Ultimately, for this dissertation, the questions are these: what are some positive 
paradigms for men? Can such an optimistic approach lead to enhanced lives for men and 
also save them from guilt-stricken defensive responses, help them acknowledge their 
historical advantage, work towards reconciliation, fairness, mutuality, and justice in the 
face of the very real history of unjustifiable male dominance?89 The first step in 
answering these questions must be to identify the ways in which certain assumptions 
about men and women have hurt not only women but also men. 
Christine E. Gudorf (Roman Catholic) 
An avalanche of articles has reflected on the effects of those suppositions on 
women over the years. In her article, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” 
Christine E. Gudorf was the first Catholic theologian to consider the effects of the Judeo-
Christian model of family (masculinity and femininity inclusive) on men.90 Maguire’s 
article already took the necessary step and uncovered the kinds of negative consequences 
of the traditional model for others, including women, social institutions, countries, and 
the world at large.91 Adding to Maguire’s significant contribution, Gudorf now turns to 
the subject and examines the profound and poignant effect that such a model has, not 
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 These challenges are evermore significant as news and researches are starting to report that there are 
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117 (Dordrecht, Netherlands : Kluwer, 1992), republished in Kieran Scott and Michael Warren eds., 
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only on the others caused by men, but also on men themselves.92 If she can show, then, 
that inherited socialized norms are not only causing much pain and harm to those with 
whom men associate themselves but also to men themselves, then there are more reasons, 
and a greater motivation for men perhaps, to construct a better and a more just model for 
gender and family structures. 
 The Jewish tradition as well as the Christian tradition conferred power on men.93 
However, according to Gudorf, this power was not bestowed on all men equally. Only a 
small number of the male elite enjoyed social power. For the most part, men benefited 
from this power in their own homes in the form of the absolute headship of men over 
women and children. Such a power structure is directly proportional to the amount of 
economic responsibilities expected of men for the entire family. The result of this socially 
mandated association of man with work outside the home is that often his worth, and that 
of his dependent spouse, is measured by his “paychecks.”94 The pressure from these 
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onerous expectations, along with the fact that work often means for man “remuneration” 
alone (not “contribution to the society” or learning/development of his talents), only adds 
to the stress, albeit with some expectation for receiving “the warm refuge of the family 
hearth” as a reward.95 
 However, Gudorf sees several problems with the power that men have, other than 
the injustice that it has caused. First, unshared power means unshared accountability for 
the family. The effect of the kind of sole responsibility of a single breadwinner reveals 
itself as a tremendous burden for man. Secondly, if and when something happens to male 
headship and his role as a breadwinner in the current model—either by way of getting 
laid off, of women and children not needing to be dependent any longer, or even of 
having women bosses—man’s value, worth, recognition, and contribution to the family 
are all in jeopardy. Without power and material provision, man now becomes anxious to 
find that recognition necessary to gain warmth and acceptance in his own family.96 When 
a man does feel this way, he may have a loving home to which he can return and share 
this anxiety. Unfortunately, men are socialized not to show these kinds of “unmanly” 
weakness or emotions.97 One can imagine how this is increasingly the issue in a recession 
                                                                                                                                                 
in America: A History (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 12-14 in Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology 
of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), Chapter 7 especially 130-132; Stephanie Coontz, 
The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 1992 new 
edition 2000), especially Chapter 3, 42-67; This is not just an American phenomenon either. See Stephanie 
Coontz, Marriage, A History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage (New York: 
Viking, 2005), especially 145-176; Cf. Colin Creighton, “The Rise of the Male Breadwinner Family,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 38 (1996). 
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(in the U.S. starting in 2008, for example), where older “male” (industrial) jobs are either 
outsourced to other countries or eliminated due to technology.98 
 Consequently, man becomes emotionally isolated, feels lonely, anxious, and 
emotionally repressed in his struggle to find an identity in power and responsibility. 
These conditions potentially yield a lack of relational skills in nurturing children, in 
friendship, and in married spouses, often with lethal consequences.99 Adding to the 
problem is that the fact that manifestations of power in its illegitimate forms (including 
domestic violence of women and children), unfortunately, have not been adequately 
countered by religious institutions and sacred texts—with Christian churches and states 
only recently recognizing marital rape as a reality/possibility.100 These illegitimate uses 
of power have occurred beyond the personal and also have happened in an institutional 
and religious level. Religious institutions’ legitimatization has included, though not 
exclusively, marital rape, enforced pregnancy, wife beating, exclusion from property 
ownership, restriction of domestic space, sexual harassment, religious exclusion, and 
spiritual inferiority.101 On the personal and institutional (religious) levels, men have 
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responded to these legitimatizations defensively, much of which is due to their sole and 
onerous responsibility and the inability to channel emotions that comes with such 
accountability.102 Gudorf suggests that there are other important historical events that 
galvanized this trend—including the Industrial Revolution (when women were no longer 
producers but consumers depending on male producers) and the shift from “extended” to 
“nuclear” families (making the family more prone to domestic violence). The most 
important of these, however, is the gender expectations stemming from the dimorphic 
paradigm for human sexuality—wherein human sexuality is split definitively and 
unequivocally into male and female realms, rather than a multidimensional model that 
accommodates gay, lesbian, transgender, and sexually ambiguous persons.103 They, 
together with many feminists and sexuality researchers in biology and medicine, 
“question the division of all humans into male and female, behaviors into masculine and 
feminine, and sexual orientation into homosexual and heterosexual.”104 
Apart from the pressure, stress, and anxiety suffered by men, men are also 
deprived of many important human experiences due to their “Headship” and the 
responsibility of breadwinning. One can easily imagine a number of situations where 
needing to make work a priority could exclude a man from important family experiences. 
However, Gudorf sees a deeper issue at stake. Where direct nurturing of ordinary life is 
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relegated to women by social and religious norms, men find themselves not directly 
participating in activities related to nurturing life. Gudorf argues that this approach forces 
men to miss out on the intimacy and affectional power that men desire especially in 
situations of caring because they are unable to be vulnerable.105 By missing out on some 
of the ordinary activities involving important moments in “sustaining life”—which is 
what is “sacramental” and what the sacraments represent—men are denied participation 
in the very sacramental meaning and therefore sacramental power.106 If men simply 
participate in the sacraments and the (ritual) reenactment of basic human experience and 
make only that reenactment meaningful and powerful, then we draw our attention away 
from ordinary human life, to which sacraments are supposed to point and imitate. The 
sacraments, she writes, “should not draw our attention away from ‘ordinary’ human life, 
but should transform ‘ordinary’ life by causing us to understand it more deeply.”107 As 
such, the call for men to be directly involved in life nurturing process is nothing short of 
sacramental and suggests that sacraments, officially, take men away from “earthly” 
experiences.108 
People are starting to make some efforts to overcome these problems, especially 
in the West. The masculine model is shifting toward a more masculine co-operative, 
interpersonal, mutual teamwork model that is caring and intimate. However, the 
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hierarchal and outdated family model still serves as an obstacle.109 My own view is that 
these efforts work to men’s detriment if practiced simultaneously with the hierarchal 
model for men at large. The idea is not to encourage sole responsibility of “double duty” 
and of being a “super-dad,” but to share in those responsibilities. The ideas of the 
“double-shift” and the “super-mom” are not just wrong for women; they are also wrong 
for men.110 Sadly, according to Gudorf, religious tradition—which “manifests itself in 
opposition to all changes in what is perceived as the revealed tradition”—is holding us 
back from moving towards the direction that allows for healthier individuals and 
relationships.111 How then should a religious person go about ameliorating the inherited 
model of masculinity? 
As a Catholic Christian, one must look to Jesus of Nazareth as the model par 
excellence. It is crucial to look at “Jesus’ treatment of women, children, work, and 
power.”112 More pertinently for this project, however, we must imitate his mode of being 
and how Jesus exercised his freedom in behaving in a particular manner. By today’s 
standards, Jesus is quite “feminine.” In all the ways in which Jesus was active, aggressive, 
in control, dominant, etc., he was also the opposite of all that. Jesus exercised his freedom 
“in tears, in pity and tenderness, in eschewing the privileges of authority, and especially 
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in serving others in subordinate roles as when he washed his disciples’ feet.”113 He cared 
deeply about nurturing life especially those marginalized from society.114 Jesus as the 
model for masculinity works in “revamping” the harm that the traditional model has 
caused men, not necessarily because he had more “feminine” characteristics, but because 
his characteristics are just as masculine and necessary parts of being a man. 
Christian Manliness 
It should be noted that some thinkers have maintained that even these “vulnerable” 
qualities are “manly” ones. Their purpose is not to demonstrate those qualities as a 
natural part of the male characteristics but to claim that it took a man’s strength to be 
gentle. That is, “far from saying that Jesus was not manly”, “…there was nothing mushy, 
nothing sweetly effeminate about Jesus… [he was] a man’s man.”115 Already in the 19th 
century, Reverend S.S. Pugh, for example, claimed that Jesus, and his gentleness, was an 
example of a man 
…who is strong, who in fidelity and courage and self-reliance and self-
mastery can keep the even tenor of his ways, can afford to be gentle without 
fearing to be suspected of weakness.116 
 
Christ’s sacrifice is a 
true prowess, the true prowess, the true valour, the true chivalry, the true 
glory, the true manhood” to which we should all aspire.117 
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However, in these kinds of movements—such as the “Christian manliness” movement 
from the Christian Socialist, Thomas Hughes118—there are, generally speaking, 
ambiguities in emphasizing the tougher and more “masculine” aspects of the Christian 
faith. In a certain sense, attempting the masculinization of gentleness and compassion 
generates the kind of characteristics that such a movement is endeavoring to avoid. Yet 
someone like Thomas Hughes rejects pacifism (e.g., Quakers) as impracticable, even 
though one can easily conceive pacifism as “masculine,” just as Hughes did with the 
notions of gentleness and compassion.119 Hence, there remains “the unsolved tension” 
between what is seen as masculine and what is not.120 
 The product of these kinds of movements—resulting sometimes in jettisoning any 
attributes of femininity altogether—which include those of Robert Bly, Brandon O’Brien, 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Lionel Tiger, Brett McKay, W. Bradford Wilcox, the “retrosexual” 
movement, and Brad Stinne’s “God men” ministry, to name a few, deserves more 
attention. I will give it appropriate consideration in the later chapter. At this point, I 
would simply like to assert that alternative perspectives on Jesus do in fact exist. 
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Conclusion 
There are very good reasons to rethink our notion of gender dimorphism. Maguire 
formulates his reasons from the perspective of women and some feminist scholars. 
Gudorf gives reasons from both the victims and the perpetrators. She also reveals the 
religious obligations and motivations that should necessitate a reevaluating and 
remodeling. In his process of remodeling, Nelson points to the importance of the realities 
that are often overlooked and neglected—namely passive, vulnerable, soft, and receptive 
characteristics of men—and guides his readers towards the fullness manhood. 
 Despite these efforts, gender dimorphism remains an issue. To begin to resolve 
the issue more effectively, however, one cannot move towards “blending” of the sexes. 
The identity of a person as a man or a woman still and must remain important. The most 
promising solution, then, is threefold: (1) continue to point out how unhealthy, unjust, 
and rigid binary models—whether it be complementary, dualistic, or dimorphic—can be 
for women and men; (2) flesh out some of the positive attributes and paradigms for men 
and for masculinity as a whole; (3) allow for a multidimensional model where the sexual 
spectrum of men and women is much more diverse and fluid. In such a model, the two-
sex prototype remains intact while the diversity within and among the two-sex spectrum 
is acknowledged. It is true that the edges of spectrum do become blurred in this model. 
The only difference with the “blending” model that I previously discussed is the fact that, 
in this example, blending occurs in parts (edges) of the spectrum. Instead of blending the 
two sexes in entirety—a melting pot, where an individual identity and characteristics are 
melted and lost—the new model accepts as natural both the tremendous amount diversity 
within the two sexes and the edges of the spectrum where the lines become unclear. In 
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the end, the task is not to come up with different kinds or names of sexes every time there 
is evidence of diversity but to allow for a multidimensional spectrum of the two sexes as 
natural and “normal.” 
These important arguments will be more compelling and convincing, however, if it can 
be shown that not only ought we to rethink gender but that scientific evidence also 
demands us to do so. Thomas Aquinas may also agree—coming from the natural law 
tradition after all—that one way of discerning what and how God is communicating to us, 
while not enough in itself, is by turning to empirical evidence and looking at the world 
around us. Gudorf, as I have shown, has already begun such an endeavor. She refers to 
some socio-biological works to illustrate her claims; it is, in fact, impossible to take on a 
project of this sort without using these data. Prompted by her method, one soon realizes 
that data from other disciplines are not only desirable but are necessary. It is important to 
make this point because none of the Roman Catholic encyclicals relevant for this project 
use or mention any other sources from scientific disciplines.121 Only theological 
references from within the tradition—most of which are based on the biology of Aquinas 
and therefore Aristotle—are used. This is problematic. Using scientific data, one must see 
how it can inform us about men and women. In order to see whether Gudorf’s findings 
are true, to extend on her introduction, and to see how viable the alternative 
interpretations from Christian manliness’ perspective are, then, I will now turn to the 
social and natural sciences for some assistance. 
                                                 
121
 There are occasional scientific footnotes from documents by the United States Catholic Bishops’. See 
for example, USCCB, Marriage: Love and Life in the Divine Plan (Washington, DC: 2009), 27; Even 
when encyclicals seem to use scientific terms such as psychological imbalance, the phenomenon of 
machismo, or “absence of a father,” the scientific sources are never acknowledged, credited, or footnoted. 
In fact, more often than not, scientific progress is acknowledged only in passing (especially when it is 
advantageous to the encyclical’s viewpoints) and mostly (ultimately) downplayed as dangerous and/or 
suspicious. See for example Familiaris consortio, # 25, 30; Cf. Veritatis splendor, #33, 46, 76. 
164 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM OF SEX DIFFERENCE 
 In previous chapters, I suggested that it is imperative to use social and natural 
sciences to guide this project. In this chapter, however, I want to clarify my intentions. 
The sciences are not perfectly objective and “true.” When something is said to be 
scientifically proven (i.e., fact), it must be taken with a grain of salt. Fundamentally, this 
chapter claims that the sciences do not dictate the truth, but “at the very most, they 
whisper suggestions.”1 I believe that empirical research can certainly inform ethics but 
ultimately cannot dictate how people ought to act.2 Pope John Paul II seems to have 
agreed on this point: 
Moral theology cannot be reduced to a body of knowledge worked out 
purely in the context of the so-called behavioral sciences. The latter are 
concerned with the phenomenon of morality as a historical and social fact; 
moral theology, however, while needing to make use of the behavioral and 
natural sciences, does not rely on the results of formal empirical 
observation or phenomenological understanding alone. Indeed, the 
relevance of the behavioral sciences for moral theology must always be 
measured against the primordial question: What is good or evil? What 
must be done to have eternal life? … The affirmation of moral principles 
is not within the competence of formal empirical methods. While not 
denying the validity of such methods, but at the same time not restricting 
its viewpoint to them, moral theology, faithful to the supernatural sense of 
                                                 
1
 Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect (New York: Penguin 2002) 
quoted in Michael S. Kimmel, The Gendered Society 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), 31. It 
should be noted that Ehrlich is talking not about the sciences but specifically about “genes.” 
 
2
 Cf. James M. Gustafson, “The Relationship of Empirical Science to Moral Thought,” in Ronald R. Hamel 
and Kenneth R. Himes eds., Introduction to Christian Ethics: A Reader (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 
429-430, quoted in Patricia Beattie Jung, and Aana Marie Vigen eds., God, Science, Sex, Gender: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian Ethics (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 2010), 11-12 
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the faith, takes into account first and foremost the spiritual dimension of 
the human heart and its vocation to divine love.3 
 
Nevertheless, the sciences do inform us in many important ways. We rely on the 
results of science and also make “use of the behavioral and natural sciences” by “not 
denying the validity.” While this project is not socio–biological or psychological in 
nature, findings from these disciplines must be considered since ignoring the data could 
create incomplete and inadequate results. One might imagine, for example, the 
consequences of developing a model for gender roles based on outdated Aristotelian 
biology by ignoring what we scientifically now know about men and women. 
Methodologically, then, one of the important sources for ethical discernment, but 
certainly not the only one, is science. While “religious and moral reflection bears the 
burden of discerning the morally proper ends of human action,” many Christian Ethicists 
today are “convinced that current scientific knowledge and faith claims aren’t mutually 
exclusive and won’t ultimately contradict one another.”4 I intend to keep in mind both the 
fallacies and facts of science as I proceed. 
Because I could not address all of the relevant sciences and theories here, 
however, I have concentrated and relied mostly on the social sciences, with some 
reference to the natural sciences. Through these sources, I argue (1) that the differences 
between men and women are real but significantly exaggerated because of 
presuppositions and social constructions, (2) that the diversity within the normative 
                                                 
3
 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, 111,112. I am aware that the emphasis in this section of the encyclical is 
on upholding the authority of the Magisterium, and the sciences are downplayed and only acknowledged in 
passing in this encyclical. However, this section clearly gives some credence to the sciences. 
 
4
 Jung and Vigen, God, Science, Sex, Gender, 9-11; see also Stephen J. Pope, “Descriptive and Normative 
Uses of Evolutionary Theory,” in Lisa Sowle Cahill and James F. Childress eds., Christians Ethics: 
Problems and Prospects (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996), 177. 
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categories of men and women are great, and (3) that the similarities between men and 
women are greater than once thought. If, contrary to my claims, the scientific data 
support the traditional views of gender, then one must acknowledge the validity of these 
views.5 To test my claims, I begin by considering some common beliefs about sex and 
gender, including Darwinian natural selection and biological, sociological, psychological, 
historical/anthropological, and socio-theological perspectives. Although my discussion of 
these beliefs is not comprehensive, my survey of these perspectives provides the 
minimally appropriate foundation for discussion of gender and the notion of masculinity. 
The extent to which these common beliefs are sound (or not) play a major role in this 
project. 
Exaggerated Differences and Downplayed Similarities 
Common Beliefs 
 One common belief is that men and women are different from conception. The 
proponents of this position are vast and diverse, though their arguments generally hinge 
on certain biological qualities, sexual characteristics, historical tendencies, and/or 
empirical data. Therefore, I examine the following common beliefs: (a) Men and women 
throughout history developed certain reproductive strategies in accordance with their 
biological make-up in order to survive; (b) Survival instincts caused men’s psyches to 
develop naturally to be more aggressive, controlling, and managerial than women’s; (c) 
the natural sciences (concerning genes, brain, hormones, chromosomes, organs, etc.) 
                                                 
5
 Although even in such a case, one must evaluate and continue to question what is the just and loving 
model for Christians. For example, just because historical data show that murder has always been a reality 
and is part of human nature, it still does not make it right, just, or loving. Similarly, if sciences show a 
certain result with some consistency, one must continue to check how the study was conducted, by and to 
whom, in what location, during what period etc. This arduous method must be employed so that one can 
draw a more objective conclusion. 
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prove that men are one way and women are the opposite; and (d) the history of humanity 
shows that, compared to women, men are more analytical, competitive, aggressive, 
controlling, abusive, brawny, rational, organizing, cold, and dominant.6 
 These viewpoints seem especially convincing because they do not reflect just 
Western or Eastern values. Rather, these beliefs seem to be universal and not bound by 
time or location, with a very small number of exceptions. Their persistence is part of the 
“proof” for the fundamentally essential nature gender differences.7 
 Thus, the arguments point back to the essential question of nature (biology) vs. 
nurture (sociology). Were we born into certain genders or are our genders constructed? 
Does gender difference cause gender inequality or is it caused by gender inequality? My 
answers to these questions, I anticipate, will bring some dissatisfaction from both 
naturalists and nurturists. However, if successful in my arguments, I may satisfy both 
groups in some ways. 
Darwinism and Beyond 
 In his seminal theory of natural selection, Charles Darwin claimed that species 
that tend to survive have reproductive success, and pass on the very characteristics that 
enable them to survive because they have the best adaptive characteristics necessary for 
survival.8 As opposed to artificial selection, in which, for example, a farmer determines 
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 These issues are named by Michael S. Kimmel in his The Gendered Society 2nd ed. (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2004), 23-71. 
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 Likewise, the Roman Catholic Church’s attitudes toward gender stem from such essentialism. 
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 Joan Roughgarden, Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 160; Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Species in the Struggle for Life (1859), facsimile 
reprint. (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 
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what survives in an attempt to breed the best possible species, natural selection holds that 
it is the natural environment that selects species that best fit the survival model.9  
In their effort to survive and pass on their genes to the next generation, males 
choose females who are “more vigorous and better nourished” and rear a large number of 
offspring. Females choose showy, virile, strong, and vigorous males.10 According to this 
idea of sexual selection, over time, the “retarded” females are more likely to unite with 
the “conquered and less powerful males,” are less likely to survive, and will eventually 
die off.11 Furthermore, it seemed to Darwin, during this process, women tend to show 
“greater tenderness and lesser selfishness,” and men are more competitive, ambitious, and 
selfish.12 Hence, the weak females are the weakest of the weak and less likely to survive 
as humans evolve. 
Facing possible extinction —according to the post-Darwin sociobiology in the 
tradition of evolutionary biology—humans developed certain strategies to ensure that 
their genetic code passed to the next generation. Through these attempts, which are the 
result of obeying biological principles,13 we have observable differences between women 
and men. That is, to make certain that their genes pass on, males try to fertilize as many 
eggs as they can with as many females as possible (thus, they are naturally promiscuous). 
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10
 Ibid., 164-165. 
 
11
 Ibid., 165. 
 
12
 Kimmel, The Gendered Society, 23. Darwin cited in Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The 
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107. 
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 See Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 167; Richard 
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For their eggs to be fertilized, the females, requiring only one successful breeding—
preferably with the best potential male parent—are choosy (thus, they are naturally 
monogamous).14 Thus, the survival instinct of both sexes further advances the idea that 
males and females have distinctively different characteristics. 
According to socio-biologists, even psychologically, men and women think 
differently, according to their hardwired biological conditions. Men are aggressive, 
controlling, and decisive, whereas women are reactive, emotional, and passive.15 Hence, 
the hunter–gatherer characteristics of men and the domestic characteristics of women—
from hunter–gatherer societies to most other societies all over the world—are not just 
anthropological realities, but the result of the natural course of biology and evolution 
refined over the human evolutionary cycle.16 For some extreme thinkers, these data even 
explain the phenomenon of rape in that men who rape are fulfilling their predisposition to 
reproduce when they cannot do so in any other way.17 
Alternative Interpretation 
The one who has interpretive sway holds the power. That is, it is not what 
evidence is found that is important, but how and by whom the evidence is interpreted. 
Michael S. Kimmel gives one alternative interpretation of Darwinian explanations. 
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Shields and L.M. Shields, “Forcible Rape: An Evolutionary Perspective,” Ethology and Sociobiology 4 
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Instead of using the data to conform to preconceived ideas, Kimmel does the opposite. 
For example, one could take the same data from Darwin and deduce that human females 
are uniquely equipped in the biological sense (thereby psychologically developing a 
corresponding sexual strategy) to enjoy sex primarily for physical pleasure, and are not 
naturally monogamous, choosy, or primarily concerned about reproductive potential.18 
Human females are the only primate females with the potential for sexual receptivity of 
pleasure. For example, the human clitoris has no other function other than sexual pleasure. 
Furthermore, most women experience their peaks of sexual desire just before and just 
after menstruation, the most infertile period.19 One can just as convincingly make an 
argument, then, that women are equipped primarily to enjoy sex, rather than procreate, 
and to be polygamous to fulfill that end. 
Continuing on with Kimmel’s thought experiment, for most of human history, 
when a baby was born, fathers were not completely certain that the baby was theirs. 
Hence, even if the goal of the mother were to ensure the survival her offspring, it would 
make more sense to “deceive as many males as possible into thinking that the offspring 
was theirs … since none of them could risk the … death and obliteration of his genetic 
material.”20 In this interpretation, and in this schema of hardwired biological conditions, 
women can be seen as aggressive, controlling, and strong-minded, the traits formerly 
associated with men. Kimmel demonstrates that socio-biological science has not 
definitively revealed the truth about men and women. If one uses Kimmel’s method—i.e. 
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inductively interpreting from gathered data rather than deduce from what one 
presupposes—one may come to a very different conclusion. The socio-biological 
evidence, then, requires more careful examination and more scholarly responsible 
interpretations.21 
Brain Research 
 Brain research can also provide “evidence” for gender differences. Interpretation 
of the data on brain research is complex. However, advocates for the existence of 
decisive differences between the sexes share some common views. First, while these 
advocates could not decide about which hemisphere is superior, they “assign[ed] that 
superior one to men.”22 That is, when it was considered superior, men were identified 
with the right hemisphere, which is associated with visual, spatial, artistic, musical, and 
mathematical talents, which dominates the left hemisphere.23 Yet, when the left side was 
considered to control reason and intellect, men were considered overwhelmingly more 
left-brained.24 Since men were associated with whatever was considered superior at a 
given time, they were linked to different sides of the brain depending on the norm of the 
time. Thus, despite inconsistencies, the one constant is that men are associated with, and 
believed to have, advanced development in whatever side of the brain that was 
considered superior. 
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 A second common belief within the same group is that the differentiation between 
hemispheres (called lateralization) demonstrates that men’s brains are much more 
focused and concentrated on one side (lateralized) than women’s, enabling men to be 
more capable of spatial tasks. Interestingly, however, studies that found women’s brains 
more lateralized than men’s also found men to be more capable at spatial tasks.25 When 
one researcher found the female brain to be more lateralized, the conclusion was that 
such lateralization of the female brain interfered with special tasks. However, when 
another researcher found the female brain less lateralized, the conclusion was that less 
lateralization interfered with spatial tasks.26 Again, despite the inconsistencies, the 
constant is that these scholars suggested that lateralization, regardless of the extent, 
interfered with spatial functioning in women but enhanced spatial functioning in men. 
Thus, the importance lies not in what researchers found, but in how they interpreted the 
findings. Whoever has interpretive power holds the power to instill his or her norms, 
consciously or not. 
 Similarly, when scholars suggested that the determinant for sex difference lies not 
in the side of the brain one uses more often, but in how the brain is used, the proponents 
for definitive differences between the sexes argued that male brains are always better 
equipped than female ones for visual–spatial tasks. Accordingly, they claimed that 
women, even when using the right side of the brain, tend to use communication skills, 
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including nonverbal ones, ignoring the fact that men do too.27 Hence, researchers found 
that although men and women use all parts of the brain, they use them differently. 
 An important theorist for my argument is Joan Roughgarden. She argues that 
there are differences, albeit small, in the brains of men and women. Most of these 
differences have to do with brain size, muscles, symmetry/asymmetry, neurons, tissues, 
and clusters of cells and nerve cells.28 Apart from these small differences in the brain, 
however, “male and female human brain anatomy is very similar—the big story here is 
the overlap between the sexes, not their difference.”29 Roughgarden concludes that the 
differences “follow the familiar script: small statistically valid differences in the average, 
with a large overlap.”30 
 Apart from neural categories, one must also consider cognitive aspects of the 
brain. Whereas overall intelligence does not differ between men and women, there seems 
to be a clear difference in cognitive abilities and aptitudes. Women test better than men in 
verbal fluency, articulation, and memory, and men in general test better at visualizing 
how to rotate a shape or object in two- or three-dimensional space, which has been 
especially noted in reviews of SAT test scores.31  
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 Men and women also seem to use their brains differently, using different parts of 
the brain for the same task.32 Although it is important to note this difference, researchers 
have often overlooked the fact that it pales in comparison with the differences among 
men as a group and among women as a group. According to Janet S. Hyde, her 
colleagues, and “virtually every single study ever undertaken,” the most significant 
differences exist among men and among women, even though the differences between 
men and women are more heavily stressed.33 As Doreen Kimura, a neuropsychologist 
stated, “The similarities between human males and females far outweigh the 
differences.”34 Nevertheless, the notion that men and women are definitively, physically, 
and essentially different, despite scientific evidence to the contrary, is omnipresent. The 
persistence of this idea is often used as the foundation for claims about essential 
differences between men and women. 
Research on Sex Hormones 
 Hormonal research is another area where dominant masculine interpretations are 
hotly debated. When men demonstrate any form of aggression, inextricable links to 
testosterone are often drawn. In a certain sense, the decisive difference between sexes is 
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the hormonal system. That is, the male sex hormone (testosterone) is responsible for 
masculinity in men, and the female sex hormone (estrogen) is responsible for femininity 
in women. According to Steven Goldberg, “Every society demonstrates patriarchy, male 
dominance and male attainment”; thus, it is logical to conclude “the hormonal renders the 
social inevitable.”35 There seems to be some scientific evidence to support Goldberg’s 
claim. Men, in general, have higher levels of testosterone and aggressive behavior than 
women. Also, when the level of testosterone is increased in a “normal” male, his level of 
aggression also increases.36 
 Before making the leap to inevitability, however, one should be mindful of 
several facts.37 First, both men and women have testosterone and estrogen. Men have a 
higher level of testosterone than women, generally speaking, but at least some women 
have higher levels of testosterone than some men and some men have more estrogen than 
some women. Second, the level of testosterone varies greatly among men; the same goes 
for estrogen levels among women. Third, testosterone has a permissive effect on 
aggression; that is, it does not cause aggression but exaggerates aggression that is already 
present.38 Studies have shown that aggression produces testosterone, not vice versa.39 
One study even showed that men with low testosterone were more likely to be angry, 
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irritable, and aggressive than men with normal or high levels of testosterone.40 Also, 
because violent men with high levels of testosterone may previously have been diagnosed 
with an antisocial personality disorder (which produces more testosterone), evidence 
points to the permissive effect of testosterone on aggression.41 
Finally, from the beginnings of hormonal research, researchers located their 
hormonal interpretations only in preconceived binary terms. When female hormones 
were found in men’s urine, for example, scientific communities reacted by calling the 
finding “disconcerting,” “anomalous,” “somewhat disquieting,” “surprising,” “curious,” 
“unexpected,” and “paradoxical.”42 Preconditioned deductive thinking, instead of 
evidentiary inductive thinking, is evident in these reactions. 
 The two camps of thought on the issue agree on a few points. They agree that men, 
in general, have higher levels of testosterone and aggressive behavior than women. They 
also agree that testosterone and estrogen are both present in males and females, albeit in 
different levels. However, the explanation for the effects of the hormones differs. The 
fact is that men’s and women’s testosterone and estrogen levels vary greatly among 
members of each group. Also, many scholars have shown that aggressive behavior 
explains increased levels of testosterone. Then, the focus for both positions must be of the 
effects on how human beings behave. Hence, instead of assigning testosterone as the 
cause of male aggressions—perpetuating the unjust accentuation of sex difference—one 
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should start thinking about why men became aggressive, causing their testosterone to 
increase. 
Research on Genetics 
 As mentioned in chapter 2, Christine E. Gudorf has claimed that the traditional 
dimorphic structure for sex is not clear-cut. Part of the reason for her argument is that the 
genetic make-up of humans is much more diverse than many accept or expect. Gudorf 
claims that in terms of sex chromosomes, there are more than two primary human 
patterns, XX and XY—for example, there are XXX, XXY, XYY, XO, and occasional 
XXXX.43 The most common of these uncommon patterns, namely Klinefelter’s 
syndrome (XXY) and Turner’s Syndrome (XO), occur in significant numbers.44 In 
addition, there are ambiguities in external organs, internal reproductive organs, gonad 
patterns, and the aforementioned hormonal patterns and brain-related realities.45 
 Many scientists agree that genetic research does not provide data that assure a 
clear dimorphic model for sex. Scientists have discovered that each human has about 
30,000 genes and differs from other humans, on average, by only sixty (0.2 percent) 
(exclusive of genes on the sex chromosomes).46 In terms of genes on the sex 
chromosomes, there are also differences. Three of the genes on the X chromosome, 
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which has 1,500 genes, differ from person to person.47 One of the genes on the Y 
chromosome, which potentially has 500 genes (twenty-four of which have been identified 
thus far), differs from person to person.48 After considering all the variations, a person 
with an XX —typically a woman—differs from one with an XY— typically a man—by 
about 250 genes from the sex chromosomes and sixty genes from the nonsex 
chromosomes. This difference is much greater (about four times) than the difference 
found among men or among women.49  
 The genetic differences between men and women seem to be the one place where 
the data show greater diversity between women and men than among men or women 
independently. In terms of the whole body, genetic comparison brings about a significant 
amount of overlap, while allowing for a sharp gender binary between XX and XY bodies. 
That is, in mammalian species, the bodies of males and females can sometimes be nearly 
identical overall in some (though different in gamete size) or strikingly different in 
others.50 Feminine males who have an XY may easily be considered, and socially 
“counted,” as women, and masculine females who have an XX may be considered men in 
the same sense. Thus, genetics does not necessarily dictate a gender binary. 
Although the mammalian system of sex chromosomes produces a binary 
based on gamete size, the gender bodies that make those eggs and sperm are 
not constrained by the genetics of sex determination; they are free to adapt 
evolutionarily to local context. Indeed, research on the human genome is 
revealing that all people are genetically different. Individuality is not skin-
deep, but extends deep into our DNA. … “Normal” people are not a sea of 
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homogenous genotypes, bodies, and brains. “Normal” people are as 
genetically diverse as snowflakes.51 
 
 Despite the great diversity and individuality among humans, however, I do not 
deny some commonalities among men and among women. I do not believe that the 
concept of sex is so relative and subjective as to suppose that sex is purely fiction. Rather, 
men and women are useful categories and should be kept as such.52 Nevertheless, the 
difference between the two is amplified by social conventions and is not purely natural or 
inherent. Conversely, the similarities between the two are downplayed, moving farther 
away from the reality, which shows much similarity between men and women. 
Researchers must study the process of the augmentation of sex difference to 
determine the extent to which social influences play a role in this process. Here, I 
consider psychological, historical–anthropological, and sociological perspectives. 
Social Construction 
Freudian Influences 
 Researchers agree that gender identity and sexuality formation start at an early 
age, although researchers vary slightly as to when the starting point occurs. According to 
Freud, gender identity and sexuality formation are not biological achievements but 
psychological accomplishments.53 Freud generally thought that the human body is not 
hardwired to become an adult man or woman and different experiences affect the psyche, 
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resulting in observable differences between women and men.54 That is, until we reach the 
genital stage of development, when our desires (id) for food (consumption and excretion), 
shelter, and pleasure are still being gratified at the instant of our need, both boys and girls 
experience roughly the same things.55 When humans reach the genital stage, however, 
they (ego) learn to repress and discipline the id and find a way toward socially approved 
goals (superego). This marks the beginning of becoming masculine or feminine.56 
 Freud’s literature, and its interpretations, is very complex. However, forming his 
arguments in a nutshell is as follows: as weaning and toilet training begins, we begin the 
process of identification and differentiation. A boy, unlike a girl, unlearns his attachment 
with his mother and his ego transfers the identification to his father because although he 
has the biological capability to act on his desires for sexual relations with his mother, he 
knows that his father may punish him if he were to compete for sexual access to his 
mother with his father (Oedipus complex). The boy will be satisfied with mother-like 
substitutes and become a dad himself, whereby he develops a masculine active sexuality. 
A girl, who also wants sexual relations with her mother but does not have the biological 
equipment necessary, experiences penis envy. She retains her identification with her 
mother and transfers her focus from the clitoris (her equivalent for penis) to the vagina, 
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so that she finds her satisfaction in having a baby, whereby she develops a feminine, 
passive sexuality.57 
 The proponents of Freud’s theories belong to diverse groups. One of these locates 
gender identity formation somewhat later than Freud placed it. Only when children are 
more aware of themselves, the world around them, and their gender do they begin to 
identify and label themselves as boys or girls.58 According to this theory of cognitive 
development, children see the world around them, develop their identity through 
cognitive filters, and interpret the world according to the categories that they see as 
socially acceptable.59 Of course, this process of gender identity, self-identity, and social 
acceptability is an ongoing process.60 
 There are others who, by the time that they enter grade school, have experienced 
confusion because the social categories of boys and girls simply do not correspond with 
who they are. Hence, if one does not cognitively move according to socially acceptable 
categories, then the people around him or her help to direct them. For example, the 
mother of a girl who does not walk like a girl might say, “For heaven’s sake, Lisa. You 
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walk like John Wayne,” or a boy who does not act boyish may be called a “wimp, fairy, 
or Little Lord Fauntleroy.”61 
 Therefore, unlike proponents of the arguments for biological inevitability, Freud 
and his followers described—instead of prescribed—sex differences in terms of how they 
are produced or learned. According to these theories, nurture, not nature, plays a greater 
role in how gender identity is achieved. However, there are fundamental problems with 
this position. That is, even if Freud is correct about the social construction of gender 
identity and sex differences, this does not necessarily mean that the notion at the heart of 
his work is not deeply flawed. One may turn to psychoanalytic feminism to locate these 
flaws stemming from male-centered analyses. 
 Doing his study from a man’s vantage point, Freud’s model always places women 
at an inferior level to men. Women are lacking, envious of what they do not have (a 
penis), and are the objects of devaluation by both men and women. According to Nancy 
Chodorow, however, one must move away from the traditional psychoanalysis that puts 
the son and father relationship at the center and towards one that puts the relationship of 
the mother and children of both sexes at the center. The effect of this method is that men 
do not have to worry about the social expectations of demonstrating their successful 
achievement of masculinity by necessarily distancing themselves from their mother. Then, 
men, along with women, are able to value intimacy, connection, and community as 
healthy adult experiences alongside more impersonal and cognitive learning.62 In such a 
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model, the boy’s shift from connection and intimacy with his mother and to his father 
does not have to be impersonal or traumatic. Also, his attitudes toward and capacity for 
intimacy with women do not have to take a violent form.63 
 In a similar trajectory, Carol Gilligan noted something in human psychology that 
extends beyond the impersonal, cognitive, abstract, and universal paradigm. Gilligan 
explained that there are different voices that result from different experiences and that 
these are closely tied to the “feelings of empathy and compassion and are concerned more 
with the resolution of ‘real life’ as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas.”64  In her book, In 
a Different Voice, Gilligan proposed a new model, the ethic of care, which set her apart 
from Freud and his followers like Jean Piaget and from her own teacher Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s notion of the ethic of justice.65 Gilligan’s rendering of this different voice 
called for psychology to avoid being male-centered and using approaches traditionally 
associated with men (which women should envy or to which women should aspire). 
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 Her reason was that the outdated model for psychology is “an unfair paradox that 
the very traits that have traditionally defined the ‘goodness’ of women are those that 
mark them as deficient in moral development.”66 Hence, her theory challenges her 
predecessors who claimed that “women show less sense of justice than men … that they 
are often more influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility”67 and 
that “the most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main, the legal 
sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys.”68 
 Contrary to the interpretations of her work by many scholars, Gilligan does not 
support the notion that women and men are fundamentally different and, thus, people 
should listen to women more closely.69 Instead, her psychological findings are based on 
the different nature of people’s experiences within their social structures, not on inherent 
or essential differences between the sexes. 
The title of my book was deliberate; it reads, “In a different voice,” not “in 
a woman’s voice.” … Thus, the care perspective in my rendition is neither 
biologically determined nor unique to women. It is, however, a moral 
perspective different from that currently embedded in psychological 
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theories and measures, and it is a perspective that was defined by listening 
to both women and men describe their own experience.70 
 
Thus, notwithstanding Freud and his followers’ shortcomings and male-centered research, 
the vast majority of the scholars agree that the environment and experiences resulting 
from that environment play a crucial role in determining who we are as human beings, 
especially concerning gender. 
Socio–Anthropological History 
 Margaret Mead, an anthropologist, is among many scholars who have taken 
seriously the “primitive” [sic] world. In her pioneering book Sex and Temperament in 
Three Primitive Societies, Mead found that people think about gender difference 
differently depending on their social norms and experiences in their environments.71 
However, she did not always find egalitarian results for sex in the groups she observed. 
Of the three tribes she studied, she found two in which women and men were seen as 
similar. In the other community, the sexes were seen as opposites, but in the reverse way 
that women and men are typically seen in the United States.72 Also, studies of North 
American tribes demonstrate more diversity in the construction of gender than is found in 
the collective consciousness of the West.73 These studies paved a way for some scholars 
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to find communities where diverse sexual expressions are not only more accepted, but 
also admired, honored, and thought of as special.74 
 In fact, research on Native American and other cultures revealed that there are 
groups in which gender expression is not simply bipolar or dimorphic, but fluid.75 
Furthermore, studies of gender diversity must be read in the context of research on sexual 
diversity. The diversity to which I refer can include homosexuality and bisexuality, as 
well as intersexuality and ambiguous sexuality. 
 Anthropologists have discovered that homosexuality and bisexuality, far from 
being “abnormal,” are omnipresent in the animal and human world.76 Evidence of sexual 
diversity in the animal world is not only overwhelming, but “downright bizarre by even 
the most liberal human standards.”77 Thus, “What varies is not the presence or absence of 
homosexuality—that’s pretty much a constant—but the ways in which homosexuals are 
treated in those cultures.”78 In other words, if one wants to make an argument from the 
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standpoint of nature, the kinds of sexuality in nature that do not fit in the traditional 
bipolar model are so common, they may just as easily be taken as normal or natural. 
 Scholars have also discovered that physical diversity, including intersexuals and 
what Anne Fausto-Sterling called “herms, merms and ferms” also exists among us in a 
number that is no longer esoteric or insignificant.79 Depending on whom one asks and 
how one defines these “diverse” groups, the actual number varies greatly—ranging from 
0.07 percent to 4 percent.80 Some scholars have found a more significant number.81 
Fausto-Sterling and her colleagues provided an overview of estimates (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Occurrence of Physical Diversity Chart 
Sexual characteristic Rate of occurrence 
Not XX and not XY 1 in 1,666 births 
Klinefelter’s syndrome (XXY) 1 in 1,000 births 
Androgen insensitivity syndrome 1 in 13,000 births 
Partial androgen insensitivity syndrome 1 in 130,000 births 
Classical congenital adrenal hyperplasia 1 in 13,000 births 
Late onset adrenal hyperplasia  1 in 66 individuals 
Vaginal agenesis  1 in 6,000 births 
Ovotestes 1 in 83,000 births 
Idiopathic (no discernable medical cause) 1 in 110,000 births 
Iatrogenic (caused by medical treatment) No estimate 
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5 alpha reductase deficiency No estimate 
Mixed gonadal dysgenesis No estimate 
Complete gonadal dysgenesis 1 in 150,000 births 
Hypospadias (urethral opening in 
perineum or along penile shaft) 1 in 2,000 births 
Hypospadias (urethral opening between 
corona and tip of glans penis) 1 in 770 births 
Total number of people whose bodies 
differ from standard male or female 1 in 100 births 
Total number of people receiving surgery 
to “normalize” genital appearance 1 or 2 in 1,000 births82 
 
 
Consistent with these results, some postmodern views claim that not only gender, 
but sex also, is socially constructed.83 According to Monique Wittig, women are 
identified with sex, needing descriptions (i.e. wo-men). This identification alters the 
category of women such that in some ways they lose their freedom and autonomy insofar 
as they are known only in relation to men. Men, on the other hand, are simply people and 
do not need further description. In this sense, Wittig claimed, there is no gender but the 
feminine gender, as men are just men.84 
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Gender is the linguistic index of the political opposition between the sexes. 
Gender is used here in the singular because indeed there are not two 
genders. There is only one: the feminine, the “masculine” not being a 
gender. For the masculine is not the masculine, but the general.85 
 
 There is, then, no reason to divide human bodies into male and female “except 
that such a division suits the economic needs of heterosexuality,” creating a semblance of 
order.86 Such process of differentiation via compulsory heterosexualization “restricts the 
production of identities along the axis of heterosexual desires” and maintains male 
domination.87 Similarly, Wittig considers sex a gendered category, stating that there is no 
distinction between sex and gender; both are constructed because of compulsory 
heterosexuality and are “naturalized but not natural.”88 Sex is not simply a given, a prima 
facie from which gender characteristics flow, nor an a priori reality. Sex is “a political 
and cultural interpretation of the body,” and it has been “gender from the start.”89 
After realizing such a social construction, my next step is deconstruction of sex, 
gender, and identity so as to see their density. This process calls for destabilization and 
subverting of sex, gender, desire, pleasure, and identity. However, it is not a process that 
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leads to nothingness, a hypothetical “third gender,” or a transcendence of the binary.90 
The task is not to celebrate every possibility but to redescribe those possibilities that 
already exist and are hindered and made unintelligible by the construction. That is, what 
is considered “natural” must be denaturalized in order to see the actual complexity and 
diversity of gender, sex, desire, and identity.91 
No matter how remarkable the number, the current acknowledgments of sexual 
diversity are not enough to necessarily abandon the dual-sex model that is commonly 
accepted. Rather, there is a great variety in the sexual spectrum that renders one-size-fits-
all claims, rules, or roles about each of the sexes, at least, inelegant and, probably, unjust. 
Based on the evidence thus far, it could be claimed that male and female as categories are 
quite diverse; thus, in order to embrace the dimorphic model for sex and gender as a 
general category, one must be aware and accommodate the reality of diversity. 
Sociological History 
 Neither the postmodern social constructionist approach nor the essentialist 
naturalist approach ought to be taken wholly and without scrutiny by a responsible 
scholar. Sociology is no different. Hence, to discuss sociology with regard to gender, one 
must acknowledge both the constructed and non-constructed self.92 Humans are not born 
as tabulae rasae, but are actively and interactively affected by influences from without. 
Thus, for its part, sociology must contribute to the study of sex and gender where issues 
concerning gender difference, power, relationality, and environment (including 
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situational, cultural, experiential, and institutional influence) affect, or even exaggerate, 
some innate biological realities. 
 The first place where the seeds of gender difference are planted and humans learn 
to define and redefine gender is the family. In the early years of childhood, children are 
exposed to the system or structure of their families, which has a lasting effect on their 
lives. Nancy Chodorow observes that most childcare in the early years is provided by 
women.93 Thus, daughters identify with and imitate motherly intimacy, while sons, in the 
absence of their father, disassociate from mother-related intimacy and rely on the 
impersonal and the cognitive.94 Children also begin to associate non-motherly, 
impersonal cognitive learning, breadwinning, and earning a paycheck with power; 
consequently devaluing mothers and motherhood.95 
In her book Intimate Strangers, Lillian B. Rubin writes of the inaccessibility of 
men’s inner thoughts and feelings: 
Partly, that’s a result of the ways in which boys are trained to camouflage 
their feelings under cover of an exterior of calm, strength, and rationality. 
Fears are not manly. Fantasies are not rational. Emotions, above all, are not 
for the strong, the sane, the adult. Women suffer them, not men—women, 
who are more like children with what seems like their never-ending 
preoccupation with their emotional life. But the training takes so well because 
of their early childhood experience when, as very young boy, they had to shift 
their identification from mother to father and sever themselves from their 
earliest emotional connection. Put the two together and it does seem like 
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suffering to men to have to experience that emotional side of themselves, to 
have to give it a voice.96 
 
Also, as children grow older, parents, teachers, and classmates continue to reinforce 
proper roles by choosing, labeling, and encouraging children in terms of how and what to 
play and accept.97 As pressure mounts to keep these roles intact, the exaggerated 
expression of femininity and masculinity begins to surface.98  
 Such a phenomenon pervades human surroundings and permeates social 
institutions.99 When individuals marry, and perhaps have children, the sequence makes a 
full circle and returns to the family, where the appropriation of roles is reinforced.100 
However, the “traditional family” is not inevitable, traditional, or natural.101 Take the 
American family, for example. One can imagine the days when the traditional family 
restricted women to the home and sent men to the workplace. However, such a 
phenomenon is associated with postindustrialization, when “paid work shifted from home 
and farm to mill and factory, shop and office” and much of what men used to do around 
the house—such as making furniture, clothing, and beddings—became obsolete as heavy 
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machines did the job.102 Preindustrial America was quite different. Much of the work 
around the house was germane to providing for the family. Hence, both women and men 
participated in the work of the family, either by producing and making goods or by 
farming. Similarly, both men and women participated in domestic duties (including 
childrearing) because the family revolved around the home.103 The family continued to 
demarcate separate spheres for men and women as a form of strategic adaptation to the 
industrialized environment. When this kind of industrialized life became the normal way 
of life, the separation of the two spheres began to be exaggerated. 
 American family history is but a single example. There are other places in history 
where a sequence of events resulted in the production of social norms.104 For example, I 
explore how such a phenomenon occurred in at least one other country in the next chapter: 
South Korea. 
Masculinity 
If gender is exaggerated from biological givens via social construction and 
upbringing, then the pertinent question to this project is, how are men brought up, 
affected, and constructed? Lillian Rubin stated that many men at a young age learn to 
                                                 
102
 Kimmel, Gendered Society, 120. See also Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American 
Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 1992 new edition 2000) especially Chapter 3, 
42-67. 
 
103
 A telling example that John Demos gives is of childrearing manuals being written for fathers. See John 
Demos, “The Changing Faces of Fatherhood: A New Exploration in American Family History,” in Stanley 
H. Cath, Alan R. Gurwitt, and John Munder Ross, Father and Child: Developmental and Clinical 
Perspectives (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 429 in Ibid. 119-120. 
 
104
 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered 
Marriage (New York: Viking, 2005) especially 145-176; Cf. Colin Creighton, “The Rise of the Male 
Breadwinner Family,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 38, (1996). 
194 
 
  
camouflage their feelings and define themselves in opposition to women, 105 often 
resulting in hypermasculinity.106 As the discovery of the connection between destructive 
behavior and hypermasculinity has taken place, the dimorphic sexual model has been 
challenged. Socio-biological findings are beginning to acknowledge that a traditional 
model for gender may be harmful not only for women, but also for men.107  
The reason is at least twofold. Many men do not find the traditional male model to 
be something with which they can identify. Also, many men do not have a model from 
which they can work because certain models—such as the Catholic idea of gender 
complementarity108—do not spell out what masculinity means. When masculinity is not 
acknowledged in name, individuals cannot deal with it. When men find themselves not 
being able to identify, define, or meet the expectations of success, power, and restricted 
emotionality, some feel anxious about their masculine identity and develop psychological 
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strain (i.e., gender role conflict) and feel less prepared for being strong and capable men 
and/or fathers.109  
Adding to these constraints, “men often have a difficult time relating to children 
because of the inflexible nature of their masculine personalities … assuming superior, 
reasoned male logic, a child’s emotional needs seem frustrating and annoying.”110 Unable 
to show a loving and gentle side to their sons or daughters, men often end up handing 
down one instruction: to be aggressive.111 While many fathers claim that aggressiveness 
and competitiveness in sports build character, some empirical data show, in fact, that 
activity such as athletic competition “obstructed maturity and growth in some 
situations.”112 Sons, like their fathers, often develop “depression, anxiety, anger, 
substance abuse, loneliness, and other interpersonal problems” as a result.113 The reason 
is that they see themselves as failures (known as “masculine deprivation”), where men, 
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not living up to the masculine (essentialist) expectations become as a result “engrossed in 
a state of perpetual male sexual anxiety with clinical or non-clinical consequences.”114 
Because of repressed emotions to fit the masculine norm or of not living up to the 
masculine expectations, many men deal with their depression with alcohol and/or 
violence.115 Such a cycle can lead to a number of social problems. 
In his groundbreaking work The Myth of Masculinity, Joseph Pleck challenged 
notions of masculinity in a completely different way.116 Before Pleck, many scholars saw 
the fact that men were having trouble fitting into the norms of masculine roles as the 
problem. Pleck, however, claimed that the role itself was problematic. That is, Pleck 
concluded, the claim that men ought to play a certain role is based on the Male Sex Role 
Identity (MSRI),117 which is virtually empirically false because it is contradictory and 
inconsistent.118 Not only is MSRI false, but the male sex role stemming from such an 
identity “was also the source of strain, anxiety, and male problems” for men.119 Pleck 
proposed a new model, the Sex-Role Strain (SRS), which makes the shift from locating 
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the problem in men who cannot fit the role, to suggesting that the roles that they are 
forced to play as the problem.120 In other words, men are not the problem; their role 
expectations are. 
Many other scholars followed Pleck by further investigating the problems of the 
role assigned to men and the problem of lack of male involvement in the family 
stemming from that role.121 In The Gendered Society, Kimmel provides a postmodern 
criticism of Pleck’s new male SRS model. Kimmel finds that Pleck’s work was restricted 
to roles, which did not account for the diversity among men and among women as 
separate groups.122 Furthermore, Kimmel argues that Pleck’s sex role theory treats men 
and women in a roughly similar way so that men are seen as having not more power in 
society, but a different power and role in society. Kimmel’s criticism will become 
important for later discussions of the Roman Catholic family’s complementary model.123  
Finally, Kimmel criticizes the inability of outdated sex-role models to treat 
institutions as gendered, not just as individuals. That is, he thinks that these sex-role 
models made criticisms on an individual, instead of on an institutional, basis.124 Kimmel 
does not dismiss many cases as isolated or idiosyncratic problems; rather, he says that a 
discussion about sex roles is a social (structural) issue. 
 
                                                 
120
 For an in depth discussion on “SRS,” see Pleck, The Myth of Masculinity, 133-153. 
 
121
 Clyde W. Franklin II, Men and Society (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1988); Kenneth Clatterbaugh, 
Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity: Men, Women and Politics in Modern Society (San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1990). 
 
122
 Kimmel, Gendered Society, 91. 
 
123
 Ibid. 91. 
 
124
 Ibid. 91-92. 
198 
 
  
Gendered Institutions 
 Kimmel first attempts to account for the diversity, admits unbalanced power 
among men and women, and then claims that these problems must be addressed on an 
institutional and social level. Humans are not only hardwired in some sense at birth, but 
also born into a world that is conditioned, influenced, and gendered. The first place where 
this occurs is the family. Beyond the family are other gendered institutions, including, but 
not limited to, classrooms, workplaces, media, and religion. These gendered institutions 
have profound effects on society. For the purpose of this project, I focus mostly on the 
effects this has on men. 
Schools 
 Historical experiences play a major role in determining social norms. Those 
norms linger and become so prevalent that individuals start to see what they believe, 
instead of believing what they see. One example of this phenomenon is an experiment in 
which half of the observers were told that a 9-month-old child they were watching was a 
boy and the other half were told the child was a girl. The observers, depending on their 
preconceived notions, interpreted the child’s behavior differently. When the child 
expressed agitation and cried, the observers either thought that “he” was angry or that 
“she” was afraid.125 If humans are susceptible to these kinds of conditioning, indentifying 
other places of influence becomes very important. Many sociologists have investigated 
these influences, so I will briefly highlight the results of these studies. 
 From nursery school and kindergarten classes to college and university 
classrooms, gender-specific assumptions and inequalities, whether implicit or explicit, are 
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prevalent. Teachers at all levels encourage or discourage certain behaviors among boys 
and girls due to gender assumptions or expectations. Some examples are: assuming girls 
love reading and hate math and science, paying closer attention to boys because they 
cannot focus when studying math, reading, or writing, and allowing boys to shout out 
while instructing girls to raise hands.126 These assumptions encourage students to yell out 
or draw back from class proceedings, because of the established atmosphere and not 
necessarily because students are hardwired to do so.127 However, institutional 
assumptions have infiltrated so deeply into society that even the most observant often do 
not realize the influence of such conditioning. 
T.V. Shows 
Not long ago, former Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers stated 
that gender roles are innate and significant and that one of the reasons women lag behind 
men in science and math careers is due to inborn differences. This sparked scholarly, and 
nonscholarly, outrage, which contributed to his resignation. Summers failed to 
acknowledge the role that social constructions play in producing such results.128 The 
media, for example, play a significant role in reinforcing what children learn in school. 
At a young and impressionable age, children are exposed to many forms of media, 
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including TV shows, movies, and commercials. Often in these avenues of communication, 
boys play a central and valued role and girls “serve as backdrop.”129 While presenting a 
more diverse depiction of women (single, divorced, or widowed), the female characters 
are continually portrayed as domestic, superficial, and overly-emotional.130 
Many changes have occurred over the years to counter sex typing.131 In children’s 
books, for example, female characters are much more visible now. However, their 
portrayal is still reminiscent of the past. Often they are portrayed as passive and 
submissive; one depicts a female Nobel Prize winner, Marie Curie, as a great helpmate to 
her husband.132 As women are less often depicted as passive, submissive, and helpless 
domestic helpmates, a comparable depiction of men (i.e., as nurturing and caring) does 
not occur.133 Kimmel describes this resistance: “As in real life, women in our storybooks 
have left home and gone off to work, but men still have enormous trouble coming back 
home.”134 
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Workplace 
 The way workplaces are structured adds to the perpetuation of what individuals 
learn in their families, schools, and the media. Gender discrimination and sex segregation 
at workplaces are no longer as obvious or prevalent as they once were. For example, 
more women are in the labor force, more men and women are starting to work in fields 
not formerly assigned to them, and dual-earning couples have become the norm in the 
postmodern world.135 However, many of the old norms still linger, although they are less 
apparent and better disguised. 
In today’s society, “womanly” characteristics are somehow perceived as the cause 
of the wage gap between the sexes. That is, women are not seen as needing money or 
work or as having the same aptitudes or capabilities as men to do a certain job.136 As such, 
“Of the nearly 60 million women in the labor force in the United States,” about “30 
percent worked in just ten of the 503 occupations listed by the U.S. Census.137 Whereas 
occupations dominated by women generally pay much less, the lower pay does not 
appear to correspond to the nature of the jobs. In reality, women are not paid less because 
the nature of their jobs requires less work.  
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For example, when clerical work was considered to be a man’s job, clerks were 
paid reasonably well. 138 However, when the gender composition of the work changed in 
the United States and Great Britain, and women were doing most of the clerical work, 
clerks’ wages fell. According to Cohn, “This is a result, not a cause, of the changing 
gender composition of the work force.”139 In fact, it is often the case that organizations do 
not pay different amounts for different jobs but pay differently for different genders.140 
Even when women enter high-paying fields, they are prevented from moving “up the 
ladder” by the” glass ceiling.”141 One recent study showed that a male-dominated 
environment makes women who break through the glass ceiling more likely to give 
mentoring and support and promotional assistance to male subordinates than female ones 
(reaffirming the Queen Bee syndrome).142 
The reality of the gendered workplace, however, is not necessarily all good news 
for men. One of the negative outcomes for men is that they occupy the worst and most 
dangerous jobs: what the South Koreans call 3-D jobs: dirty, dangerous, and difficult. 
According to Warren Farrell, men are also victims in the current structure: while women 
suffer from the glass ceiling, men suffer from the “glass cellar.” Of the 250 occupations 
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ranked by the Job Related Almanac, “All the hazardous occupations are virtually all-
male,” and “the twenty-five jobs often conceived as dangerous or ‘worst’ jobs (such as 
truck driver, roofer, boilermaker, construction workers, welder, and football player) are 
almost all men…” and “More than “90 percent of all occupational deaths happen to 
men.”143 Men’s insistence on the traditional notion of masculinity allowed them to create 
this link between the worst jobs and men but “men are not very happy with the world 
they have created.”144 
Despite these statistics and the obvious dissatisfaction that comes with these jobs, 
men fiercely fight to prevent women from entering these fields. There are at least two 
reasons for this resistance: Notwithstanding these dangers—or because of these 
dangers—men’s jobs pay better than those almost exclusively occupied by women. Thus, 
it is hardly reasonable to claim that men are the real victims.145 Also, deeply rooted 
gender ideology plays a significant role. Men often relate to each other through obsessive 
competitiveness, for example, because they identify competition as part of the masculine 
domain.146 Thus, men may want to keep the male “club,” or realm, exclusive.147 
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Whatever the reason, and no matter how dangerous, difficult, dirty, and harmful the job, 
men continue to fiercely protect their territory. 
Persistent Masculinity 
The way humans think about maleness is socially constructed within certain 
parameters of biological givens. In that sense, even if men have the dominant social 
power, most do not feel that they have this power. Men, only insofar as the social power 
is socially maintained and controlled by men, indirectly reap benefits of it. Hence, men 
struggle to maintain a self-image that is powerful because most do not have much power. 
In the process of maintaining a powerful image—whether it be restricting emotionality, 
trying to be successful, being physically and financially powerful—men tend to hurt 
themselves by 
blocking their access to vital social support networks, withholding their 
nurturing and giving support to others, and limiting and perverting the various 
forms of their sexual expression, through, primarily, the inducement of sexual 
anxiety and the perpetration of sexual abuse.148 
 
 This process, often inherited from one’s father, begins at an early age. Fathers do 
not want their children to have problems. Well-intentioned fathers and mothers 
“admonish their sons for feminine behavior because they … believe they are assisting 
their sons … to go it alone … without realizing some of the emotional costs such as 
‘relational dread’ … or feeling emotionally adrift. In the same vein many well-intended 
sons trust their parents’ guidance.”149 The aim of allowing or encouraging men to succeed, 
to be powerful, to do it alone, and to restrict their emotions, though well-intended, is to 
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make men tough. However, “in reality it may actually leave them with a sense of psychic 
fragileness due to relational disconnection and the prescription of overly restricted gender 
roles.”150  
 The consequences for men are persistent worries about success, power, and 
competition, restrictive emotionality, restricted affectionate behavior among men, and 
conflict between work and family relations, all of which yield a number of damaging 
results. These can include “maladaptive behavior, beliefs, and attitudes, … anxiety, 
depression, difficulty with intimate relationships, stress, negative attitudes toward help 
seeking, well-being, substance use, self-esteem, and poor attachment with parents.”151 
Philaretou and Allen also noted some harmful results, such as  
relative inability to experience intimacy, closeness, and emotional 
connectedness with their significant others, … general inclination to resort to 
anger and violence when faced with frustrating situations, … consistent and 
persistent refraining from house-care and childcare work and … tendency to 
consider sexuality and emotionality as two separate and distinct entities to be 
pursued for their own sake.152 
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Thus, attaining the masculine image is, on the one hand, a place where men feel like men, 
prove their manhood, and reinforce their identity. On the other hand, it is also where men 
ultimately feel unsuccessful and unable to live up to the masculine image and where they 
are left to deal with damaging effects as a consequence of the resulting anxiety.153 
Refutation: Mythopoetic Men’s Movement 
Some have responded negatively to these scientific responses. One example of a 
movement that opposes these findings is the Mythopoetic Men’s Movement (MMM 
hereafter).154 Due to his work Iron John, Robert Bly is often credited with launching or 
leading the movement.155 Generally speaking, MMM engages in healing for damaged 
men. Proponents for the movement often see themselves as victims and consider such a 
situation a “crisis.”156 They became victims due to challenges in traditional and 
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fundamental beliefs about men and men’s place in society.157 The challenge, in part, 
comes from changes in their economic situation, as economic autonomy has been the 
hallmark of traditional definitions of masculinity (e.g., control over one’s labor, the 
product of that labor, manly self-reliance in the workplace, etc.).158 Perhaps, however, no 
group is more responsible, according to MMM, than the perpetrators: women (and the 
women’s movement) and homosexuals (and their movements). Because MMM centers 
on the belief of that men and women are essentially different, groups that feminize, or 
make “wimps,” out of men must be contested and the solution lies in retrieving a deep, 
essential manhood called “Deep Masculine”.159 
Harvey C. Mansfield, a Harvard University political philosopher, has stated that 
active and assertive manliness is widespread, and people still find it attractive today.160 In 
his initial effort to define manliness, Mansfield identifies two elements of the term 
manliness that society finds attractive: confidence and the ability to command 
competently. Both of these characteristics are exemplified by characters like John 
Wayne161 and lead men to be assertive.162 Mansfield acknowledges that not everyone 
finds manliness and assertiveness attractive, and certain characteristics of manliness can 
be negative.163 Notwithstanding these possible flaws, manliness, with its confidence in 
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the face of risk, leadership in governing, admiration for heroes, and aggressiveness in 
wars, is seen to be ultimately what leads to a successful and stable society.164 This is why 
men have always been in power and women have not.165 What hinders the progress of 
societies, then, is that which makes society lack manliness: feminism, the example par 
excellence. 
Mansfield concluded, “Feminism is the culmination of rational control yet at the 
same time radically opposed to it. It culminates [sic] rational control by abolishing the 
sex difference, facilitating the management of human beings by removing the grand 
source of irrational insistence, manliness.”166 Sex difference, however, is a clearly 
observable fact, according to Mansfield, “of plain biology showing that nature seems to 
put the equipment of aggression in the hands of males rather than females. Men have 
more strength, size, and agility than females.”167 
 Bly and his followers, however, do not believe that men inherit this masculinity 
through a biological process. While maintaining that masculinity is an “inner essence,” 
Bly and others hold that it must be earned or achieved, the success of which depends 
solely on validation by other men.168 The consequence of such a view is the persistence 
                                                 
164
 Ibid., 23, 211, 233 and passim. 
 
165
 Mansfield thinks that Margaret Thatcher and Elizabeth I are “manly women” but these are rare. For the 
most part women are “less active politically, less interested in politics, less well informed about politics 
than men. Just as women are less likely to know the names of players in the National Football League (or 
even the names of the teams!), so too in politics they know less because they care less than men do.” Ibid., 
79-80, 151-152; Cf. Kierski and Blazina, “The Male Fear of the Feminine and Its Effects on Counseling 
and Psychotherapy,” 155-72. 
 
166
 Ibid., 238. 
 
167
 Ibid., 42; For a critical review of this book, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Man Overboard,” The New 
Republic (June 22, 2006). http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/man-overboard 
 
168
 Kimmel and Kaufman, “Weekend Warrior,” 21.  
209 
 
  
of such images of masculinity in today’s society.169 What is puzzling is why so much 
effort is needed to activate and maintain this form of masculinity, especially if men are 
supposed to have already obtained it. The answer, as MMM proponents would probably 
say, is that much energy is required to achieve manhood because the larger society has 
feminized and made wimps out of men. If left alone, the Deep Masculine would work 
itself out—although MMM proponents would continue to insist that it takes the work of a 
man to achieve masculinity and obtain validation from fellow men. 
The highlights of MMM are as follows: 
the loss of true manliness, in modern culture; the need for men to be 
‘initiated’ into manliness by other men, their symbolic or actual fathers; the 
need to separate from women, and revive ancient masculine rituals; the 
need to reclaim and celebrate the lost elements of masculinity such as the 
Warrior, the King, the Magician, and of course the Wild Man.170 
 
 According to Kimmel and Kaufman, the men who inherited a prescription for 
manhood “that included economic autonomy, public patriarchy, and the frontier safety 
valve” are the ones affected most psychologically: “middle-class, straight, white men 
from their late twenties through their early forties.”171 That is, men are continually told 
that they are entitled to partake in manly virtue and power (and most privileged groups 
are, in fact, from that group), yet individually, they feel powerless. In other words, many 
men simply do not feel that they reap the benefits of male, or white, privilege. They feel 
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defensive and stand accused. Much of that, MMM advocates often feel, is the result of 
the infiltration of women in to their privileged space.172 However, Kimmel and Kaufman 
concludes that MMM is “the cry of anguish of privileged American men” and that it is 
not surprising that the “overwhelming majority of the men who are currently involved in 
the new men’s movement are precisely middle class, middle-aged, white and 
heterosexual.”173 
Notwithstanding the simplistic thinking and anxiety over losing the homo-social 
milieu that men once enjoyed, there may be some helpful insights to be drawn from 
MMM. I acknowledge that there are some general biological differences between men 
and women, although not to the extent that MMM presents. Also, as an Asian man, I 
empathize with socially marginalized men who feel powerless and who do not feel the 
overwhelming male advantage. Finally, I acknowledge that it is generally true that much 
of history highlights the fact that men have been in charge of leading much of the world. 
However, I would remind the proponents of MMM that this phenomenon does not prove 
men’s natural ability to lead or women’s instinct to follow. Rather, such a result stems 
from the differentiation that society constructed. 
Explaining the Omnipresence of Sexual Differentiation 
 According to Barbara F. Reskin, no matter the group or society, dominant groups 
have a tendency to remain privileged because they write the rules.174 The maintenance of 
the status quo happens by a process called differentiation, or separating one’s self from 
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one’s subordinates.175 The differentiation “assumes, amplifies, and even creates 
psychological and behavioral differences in order to ensure that the subordinate group 
differs from the dominant group.”176 This phenomenon is not specific to issues of gender, 
but is true of any dominant or subdominant relationships (e.g., white/black, Western/Far 
Eastern, upper class/lower class, clergy/lay, etc.). 
 Moreover, the difference is often hierarchal. That is, not only are differences 
presented as limited and specific to a certain sex, but male characteristics are viewed as 
superior.177 Table 3 shows a highly generalized list of conspicuous descriptors that 
generally follow common attributions. 
Male    Female 
Rational   Emotional 
Strong    Weak 
Independent   Dependent 
Vigorous   Frail 
Hard    Soft 
Aggressive   Passive 
Adventurous   Domestic 
Abstract   Concrete 
Public    Private 
Doing    Being 
Mechanical   Organic 
Conquering   Nurturing 
 
Table 3. Conspicuous Descriptors of Gender Attributions178 
 
                                                 
175
 Ibid., 62. 
 
176
 Ibid., 62; Cf. Cynthia F. Epstein, “Ideal Roles and Real Roles or the Fallacy of the Misplaced 
Dichotomy,” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility (1985):4, 36; Allison M. Jagger, Feminist 
Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 109-110; Catherine MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 38; Candace West and Don H. 
Zimmerman, “Doing Gender” Gender and Society 1.2 (June 1987), 137. 
 
177
 Welch, Macho Isn’t Enough, 16. 
 
178
 Ibid., 16. 
212 
 
  
Society usually favors “hegemonic masculinity” according to the admittedly biased list in 
Table 3.179 Sometimes definitions for each sex vary depending on history, geography, 
time, race, ethnicity, and culture.180 However different the definitions are the dominant 
group often exaggeratedly differentiates itself to maintain the status quo by attributing 
itself with favorable characteristics.  
Such a phenomenon is less visible in modern society—either because the 
dominant groups claim that they value subordinates’ work181 or because they allow 
subordinates into the dominant realm, using other forms of differentiation within that 
realm (i.e., physical and behavioral or social differentiation).182 Of course, there is 
nothing wrong with valuing others’ work, but the valuing becomes suspect if it is used to 
justify the inevitability of differentiation as the sine qua non of dominance.183 
Such an invisible hand of extreme differentiation is sometimes made visible by 
scholars who look at high-paying jobs, less popular jobs, how workers are evaluated, and 
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who is in charge of performance evaluations.184 When differentiation is made visible, it 
often looms large.185 Hence, the notion of sex difference is perpetuated by the dominant 
group (e.g., Whites, Westerns, upper classes, clergy, managers, etc.) using the same 
method, i.e. extreme differentiation, to maintain power. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that sex difference exists but pales in comparison to 
differences among men and women as separate groups. The dissimilarities are 
exaggerated in an effort to keep the status quo via gendered institutions. This practice 
becomes embedded in ideologies, causing the problem that I am addressing here. Some, 
including Mansfield and Bly, find men’s disempowerment (by feminism) the source of 
what is damaging to men, which is seeing this problem according to what sociologists 
call a “causal model.”186 To see the bigger picture and go beyond superficial causes, one 
must locate the foundational cause, or what sociologists call the “basic cause.”187 The 
basic cause of the norm of exaggerated sex difference is not men as such, or Whites or 
the upper class. The basic cause of such social constructions is any dominant group’s 
attempt to maintain its power by using differentiation. Barbara Reskin calls for the 
structure of dominance, from which other causes flow, to be changed.188 The dominant 
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group, she suggests, must pay for keeping the status quo and there must be incentives to 
divide resources equitably.189 
The most basic cause of the problem mentioned above is in the ideology and its 
complex interaction with other ideas, rewards, social structures, and cultures. 
Fundamentally, the ideology and the social structure flowing from it are at the root of 
many problems, and until this base can be uprooted, the most basic cause will linger. If 
the only way to a true solution is to improve upon the basic cause, then the ideological 
structure must change alongside, or perhaps prior to, socio-structural change. Gender 
hierarchy and differentiation, like racial hierarchy and differentiation, must be rethought 
and reconstructed as a small step in the right direction. Minimally, then, false difference 
must be made visible, and the notion of gender must be reconstructed. 
It would make sense, then, that the dominant masculine groups try to maintain the 
status quo by exaggeratedly differentiating themselves from their feminine counterparts. 
Not surprisingly, when such a polarized and differentiated masculine image is threatened, 
men often overreact.190 Such was the case in the United States during the period after the 
military defeat in Vietnam, when a hypermasculine paramilitary culture emerged.191 
However, the result of attempting to maintain dominance by such differentiation is either 
the emergence of the notion that masculinity is in crisis (as in MMM) or a 
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hypermasculinity.192 In order to avoid such reactionary results, one must explore what 
true masculinity means, not how to maintain the status quo. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with being active, desiring to succeed, and 
working hard to climb the ladder. Nevertheless, these characteristics are neither 
something specific to men, nor are they necessarily healthy or helpful for all men. 
According to Joe L. Dubbert, 
There was nothing wrong with physical activity, or being aggressive, or 
winning, but problems arose when men discovered that these qualities did 
not make them more manly. Such behavior did not enhance their value to a 
company, alleviate marriage tensions, turn them into adequate lovers, or 
raise their status in any substantial way. So called masculine activity simply 
did not create an attitude or style that could make any man successful.193 
 
Hence, not only is the traditional hegemonic masculine mystique false, unjust, and 
unhealthy, it also is not practical or effective.194 
Although this reality is largely true in Western culture, it is not limited to the 
West. The concepts and trends developed in this chapter are applicable in non-Western 
countries and cultures as well. As a demonstration of this, I explore their applicability to 
non-Western examples. Thus, before reconstructing masculinity, I examine another 
culture as an illustration: that of South Korea. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MASCULINITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
 Like the Roman Catholic tradition, Korean culture is multifaceted and a product 
of myriad influences. Hence, it would be impossible—and misleading—to point out a 
single cause for Koreans’ attitudes toward masculinity. The current norms of Korean 
masculinity are the result of a longstanding tradition of customs, ideology, and 
inculcation. While it is impossible to find one cause for these assumptions, it is possible 
to point out the major factors that influence them. 
 In this chapter, I aim to show that the Korean notion of gender is deeply rooted, 
starting in the mythic stories about the genesis of the nation. While some matrilocal 
practices existed between 1392–1910 CE, patricentric Neo-Confucian ideologies were 
received in an unequivocal and ubiquitous manner by the late 19th Century. However, as 
the nation went through a kind of a militarization resulting from being attacked and 
colonized (1895-1945), and forced to accept the US military policies (1945-1948), the 
military culture would have a greater influence on constructions of Korea, including 
gender constructions. I would argue that the example par excellence of such a 
phenomenon occurring today is the training process for the mandatory military service in 
Korea. I will show the correlation of this kind of gendering institution to another male-
dominated institution, the Roman Catholic Church in Korea, since seminarians must also 
serve in the military. By the end of the chapter, I will make visible the nearly linear
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relationship between the two institutions and suggest further implications and 
possibilities for improvement. 
Gender Roles in Korea 
When Koreans refer to the “old ways” (gusik) or to something “traditional” 
(jeontongjeokin),1 they often use the terms that allude to the ways of the Chosŏn (Yi) 
Dynasty (1392–1910). The founder of the dynasty adopted neo-Confucianism as an 
official political ideology, which eventually found its way to the core of Korean culture. 
The lasting impact of this ideology is very much present today. However, because there 
are many assumptions about and misunderstandings of the Chosŏn period and 
Confucianism, an overview of these subjects is necessary.2 
Korea’s history goes back nearly 4,000 years3 before the Chosŏn period. Attitudes 
about gender fluctuated during this time, and women sometimes ruled. The mythology 
surrounding early Korean history, namely the Tan’gun myth, also reveals Koreans’ 
attitudes about men and women.4 According to the Tan’gun myth, 
illegitimate Hwanung [literally “heavenly male”] was interested in ruling 
the human world, and his father [Hwanin] allowed him to descend to earth 
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with his entourage and magical power. One day, a bear and a tiger anxious 
to become humans asked Hwanung to fulfill their wish. He ordered them 
to stay in a cave without sunlight and to eat garlic for one hundred days. 
While the tiger failed to observe this command, the bear patiently 
followed it and became a woman. Then Hwanung married the bear-
woman and begot Tan’gun.5 
 
In this story, “The woman is merely depicted as the bearer of the heir, thereby suggesting 
that woman’s only contribution to the creation of the Korean nation was the provision of 
a proto-nationalist womb.”6 
There are many stories like this one, as well as different stories. There are so 
many different influences on gender roles prior to the Chosŏn period that I cannot explore 
them all here. Thus, I will give a brief overview of the period with which Koreans are 
very familiar; that is, the period to which many refer when talking about the gender 
attitudes Korean have today and which had a powerful impact on modern Korean 
attitudes toward gender: the Chosŏn Dynasty. 
 It is difficult to make an accurate overarching claim about the Chosŏn Period 
(1392-1910) or Confucianism because such a claim could take on different meanings 
depending on which aspect is being discussed. Much can change during a period of over 
500 years. The early stages of the dynasty have clear historical differences from the late 
Chosŏn period. In the early Chosŏn period, for example, women enjoyed some benefits, 
many of which were lost in the later period. According to books of genealogy from the 
early Chosŏn Dynasty, offspring were recorded in the order of birth, instead of recording 
all male offspring first, and the details about women’s descendants were recorded in the 
same way as men’s. Sons were not adopted, even when women were unable to bear a son, 
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and women were allowed to remarry just as men were. Moreover, there is also evidence 
of newly married men, and newborn babies, living in the mother/wife’s side of the 
household.7 Although it is inaccurate to say that the early Chosŏn period was egalitarian, 
these policies were quite different from those of the late Chosŏn period. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the “traditional” American family (gender role) is 
highly misunderstood. Similarly, the notion of the traditional Korean family is often 
misconstrued. Later in the Chosŏn period, jus sanguinis,8 which was centered on men, 
became much stronger and absolute due to the emphasis on the family line stressed by 
neo-Confucian ideology. This philosophy became a statewide ideology in the late Chosŏn 
period. In his article, “Pre-Confucian Korean Society as the Role Model for Today’s 
Society,” Mark Peterson argued that the traditional Korean family, defined by the 
predominance of the eldest son (in ritual and primogeniture), absolute agnatic adoption, 
patri-local marriage, and single surname villages were inventions after the Confucianized 
system (i.e., after 1650).9 In pre-Confucianized Korea, “the true Korean family system 
was characterized by equal inheritance for sons and daughters, equal access to ritual by 
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according to the Neo-Confucian ideals: patient, obedient, passive, child-rearing, domestic, etc. However, 
recent researches show that that simply was not the case. See Cho, Korean Woman and Man, 71. 
 
8This is a rule by which a person’s citizenship and social class is determined by that of his or her parents 
(by “blood”). 
 
9
 Mark Peterson, “Pre-Confucian Korean Society as the Role Model for Today’s Society,” in Gender, 
Experience, and History: POSCO International Symposium on Korean History [Chentŏ, Kyŏnghŏm, Yŏksa] 
(Seoul: Sogang University Press, 2004), 91-105 especially 96. 
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men and women, no need for agnatic adoption if a daughter was born and various styles 
of adoption were possible for the childless, and marriage was ambilocal … and kinship 
was reckoned multilaterally.”10 
 Just as policies varied from the early to late Chosŏn period, the application of 
neo-Confucian ideology varied. Neo-Confucianism refers to the Confucian thought that 
thrived on the emphasis of the Four Books (Analects of Confucius, Mencius, the Great 
Learning, and Centrality and Commonality, commonly known as the Doctrine of the 
Mean) by Chu Hsi (1130–1200) from the Song Dynasty period of China.11 For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the difference between neo-Confucianism and ancient 
Confucianism is not significantly important. What are most relevant to this project is how 
neo-Confucianism was manifested in Chosŏn, what was emphasized, and what the focal 
points became for Koreans.12 
Sŏnglihak 
 The main ideas of neo-Confucianism in Korea (called sŏnglihak) are as follows. 
Neo-Confucianism has two main branches: a political ideology and a vast system of 
social norms and values. All involve cultivating oneself. Individuals involved in politics 
cultivate and accumulate virtues through moral self-mastery; thus, when they serve the 
people, they do so morally and rightly. The system of social norms and values, which 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 96. 
 
11
 For the following information see Yang Jong-Hoe’s “Changing Values Cause Ideological Confusion,” in 
Kim Kyong-Dong and the Korea Herald eds. Social Change in Korea vol 2 (Gyeonggi-do, Korea: 
Jimoondang, 2008), 86-98. 
 
12
 In fact, there were differences of opinion from the prominent Neo-Confucian scholars at the time. For 
more on this conflict, see YŏngDŏk Lee, The Great Encyclopedia of Korean National Culture 12 
[Hankookminjokmunhwa Daebaekwasajŏn] (Gyeonggi-do, Korea: WooingJin, 1991, 1996), 431-438. 
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directly relates to self-cultivation, should come before a discussion of political 
ideology.13 
 As a system of social norms and values, neo-Confucianism has six ethical 
principles: (a) cultivating oneself and making others comfortable; (b) sincerity and 
reverence; (c) three cardinal virtues and five moral imperatives (samkang o-ryun); (d) 
loyalty and filial piety; (e) forgiveness; and (f) faithfulness and righteousness. The three 
cardinal virtues state that there is an obligation between ruler and subject, parent and 
child (son), and husband and wife to which all must adhere. The five moral imperatives, 
or guides, for interpersonal relationships are “righteousness between sovereign and 
subject, proper rapport between father and son, separate functions between husband and 
wife, proper recognition of the sequence of birth between elder and younger brothers, and 
faithfulness [among] friends.” These five imperatives, along with loyalty and filial piety, 
are essential for individuals and social institutions.14 
 As these principles gained power and became accepted as the philosophy of ruling 
by “cultivated,” or educated, scholars, and as the practice eventually trickled beyond 
centralized administrative bureaucracy to the common folk, major social institutions 
began to be transformed. The family and kinship system began to change from that of the 
early Chosŏn period, which was greatly influenced by the previous Koryŏ (918-1392). 
The Koryŏ system, which was bilateral, somewhat egalitarian, and endogamous, began to 
                                                 
13
 Dong and the Korea Herald eds., Social Change, 88. 
 
14
 Ibid., 89. It is noteworthy that in any Confucian system, certainly including SŏngLiHak, the domestic 
sphere extends directly to the political/public realm. Hence, loyalty and filial piety was inseparable and 
should be observed strictly in both realms equally. 
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shift to a neo-Confucian patrilineal, patriarchal, and exogamous system.15 Furthermore, 
agnatic kinship and the patriarchal and patrilineal system were implemented through 
ancestral worship. The oldest legitimate son inherited ritual-related privileges, along with 
his parents’ land and slaves. Moreover, because individualism was overlooked for the 
sake of the collective, individuals often were evaluated not according to their individual 
characteristics, but according to their specific relationships within the social network. 
Remnants of hierarchal, patricentral, authoritarian, orthodoxical, and network-centered 
attitudes and privileges, which result in obsession about the social network and power 
and the silencing and submission of women for the sake of the collective, are alive today 
and have serious implications for gender relations in contemporary Korea.16 
 One aspect of neo-Confucianism in Korea is its claims about cosmology and 
human nature. At the foundation of these claims is the principle of ŭm-yang (commonly 
known as yin-yang). The cosmos is in harmonious ŭm-yang (or darkness and light, 
respectively), a principle that is clearly visible in women and men. Men (yang/light) 
represent the origins of the universe, the heavens, movement and activity, and strength. 
Women (ŭm/darkness) are created, the earthly preservers of the created, quiet, and soft.17 
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 Ibid., 90. 
 
16
 Ibid., 90-91. See also, Cho, Korean Woman and Man, 71-72. In this sense, I disagree with Professor 
Yang Jong-Hoe. He is quite positive about the possibility of the old Confucian value system disappearing. 
Also, he asserts that the family structure has changed “from consanguine to conjugal and from patriarchal 
to egalitarian.” Ibid., 92, 98. While I agree that Koreans have made great strides, the value system is far 
from disappearing and egalitarian families are rare. According to Professors Eun Ki-Soo, Lee On-Jook, and 
Lee Mi-Jeong, researches show that the value system are still quite “conservative,” women are still held 
back, and women suffer greatly from the double burden of the “second-shift.” Ibid., 146-156; 167-183. I 
will make this case more extensively, and the implications for men, later on in this chapter. 
 
17
 Note the consistency of man/heavenly, woman/earthly theme in the earlier mythical story of Tan’gun 
about the creation of the first Koreans. Also, the custom of referring to men in terms of yang and women 
ŭm, is still widely practiced without much criticisms or reflections from the general populace. 
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This cosmology became systematically predominant in Korean society and eventually 
became the ideology of namjonyŏbi (man is respected and woman is lowly) and 
samjongjido (“three subordinations” of women).  
 Thus, the cosmological and biological realities of sex are considered destiny, and 
women must be satisfied with playing a role as helpers. Such attitudes were so strong that 
even in the poorest of houses there was strict separation of inner rooms (naesil, the 
women’s realm) and outer rooms (sarang, the men’s realm).18 Thus, boundaries existed 
that Korean women could not cross, either ideologically or physically. 
 In sum, during the Chosŏn Dynasty, neo-Confucianism took on a form that the 
ruling elites preferred and that later manifested itself on a national scale, emphasizing 
certain ideals about orthodoxy and a network of androcentrically hierarchal and 
authoritative viewpoints. The ideology also incorporated a cosmology of active men and 
receptive women. Consequently, corresponding norms and expectations about men and 
women were set. 
 Even after drastic changes that occurred after the last years of the Chosŏn 
period—such as the fall of the Yi dynasty, the annexation and colonization by Japan 
(1910–45), and the Korean War (1950–53)—Confucian values and norms remained 
strong. Despite outside influences and national modernization, general attitudes toward 
masculinity and femininity remained intact. Men continued to be in the outer, valued 
realms (e.g., the public, the workplace, etc.) and women remained in the inner, less-
valued realms (e.g., private spaces, the home, etc.). 
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 Cho, Korean Woman and Man, 73-74; Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi, 233; Park YongOk, 
“Confucian View of Womanhood in a New Light” [Yukyojŏk Yŏsŏngkwanŭi Jaejojŏng], Korean Feminist 
Studies 1, (Society of Korean Feminist Studies, 1985). 
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Korean Masculinity—Taejangbu 
 The fact that general attitudes toward gender remained intact does not necessarily 
mean that there is a monolithic definition for each gender. Outside influences and 
modernization heavily influenced Korean gendered thinking, according to the realities of 
the period and class divisions. As in many societies, Korean sexual mores were 
continuously shifting. For example, Vladimir Tikhonov compared and found similarities 
between Chinese and Korean shifts in definitions of masculinity.19 A Chinese person may 
associate traditional, archetypical masculinity with a handsome man with a beard and 
muscles who practices boxing and fencing. However, during a different time, the Chinese 
favored scholarly men who were delicate, hypersensitive bookworms.20 Similarly, 
historical socio-political developments in Korea also caused great shifts in gender 
thinking, including the dominant masculine image. 
 Tikhonov found somewhat dichotomous images of masculinity in Korea, similar 
to the shift he found in China. On one hand, fighting prowess and respect for fierce, 
tough manliness, associated with the lower, common class (ch’ŏn or paeksŏng),21 was 
accepted as part of being masculine.22 On the other hand, having exemplary study skills 
                                                 
19
 Vladimir Tikhonov, “Masculinizing the Nation: Gender Ideologies in Traditional Korea and in the 
1890s-1900s Korean Enlightenment Discourse,” The Journal of Asian Studies vol. 66.4 (November, 2007): 
1037-1046. 
 
20
 Robert Van Gulik, Sexual Life in Ancient China (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 188 quoted in Ibid., 1037. 
 
21
 Paeksŏng usually denotes the “subjects” or the people in general. However, according to James B. Palais, 
it, along with ch’ŏn, is used to designate the lower class in apposition to the term designated for the higher 
class yangban. See his Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: YuHyŏngWŏn and the late Chŏsun 
Dynasty 27 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 1023; One may also bifurcate them in terms of 
“sangkŏt” and “sŏnbi,” respectively. 
 
22
 Ibid., 1029, 1037-1040; The limits of this chapter does not allow me to discuss many related stories from 
Samguk sagi (Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms) that exemplifies some of the Koreans notions of 
heroes (yŏngung) or good fellows (hohan), mirroring Chinese notions of yingxiong and haohan 
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and self-control, along with learning free from passion, balance, restraint, and, especially, 
adherence to moral and ritual norms, associated with the higher classes (yangban, or even 
wealthy chungin, “middle people”), meant a man was taejangbu (i.e., a manly person) or 
a true kunja (a lofty gentleman or a sage).23 Even in these dichotomous definitions of 
masculinity was the common patriarchal belief that men had the birthright to command 
the family.24 Filial piety toward parents was demanded from offspring, and was required 
of wives to their husbands. The state (which was the family writ large) had the same kind 
of absolute authority, demanding the same kind of obedience and loyalty from its 
subjects.25 
 Tikhonov stated that these different images merged to form a syncretistic 
archetypical male. The old kunja paradigm of masculinity was “being appropriated for 
the new aims,” whereby physical strength became a prerequisite for mental strength.26 
Because it resulted from a falling dynasty and the annexation and colonization of Korea 
by Japan, this new appropriation started to define not just masculinity, but also a new 
“patriotic masculinity.”27 That is, there was a kind of urgency that if a “regenerative 
masculinity” was not created, then “the race (injong) will gradually become weakened 
and degraded”; because of the “diminishing physical strength,” an “extinction of the race” 
                                                                                                                                                 
respectively. For more on this, see Ibid., 38-39 or more extensive and Korean version of Vladimir 
Tikhonov’s article above, see Park Noja, Making a Valiant Men [Ssikssikhan namja mandŭlki] (Seoul: 
Purŭnyŏksa, 2009). 
 
23
 For more examples and discussions, see Ibid., 1029, 1041-1046 and Park Noja, Making a Valiant Men. 
 
24
 Ibid., 1045. 
 
25
 Ibid., 1045-1046. 
 
26
 Ibid., 1056. 
 
27
 Ibid., 1058-1059. 
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was now imaginable.28 Thus, the masculinity that stemmed from this ideology was built 
on a “national emergency and the painful anticipation of the downfall of the state.”29 The 
character of such a man entailed not only being a kunja, with his “‘lofty aims,’ self-
discipline, and moral rectitude,” but also required the “heroic” masculine toughness “in 
which ‘patriotism and loyalty’ were upheld by bravery, self-sacrificial attitudes, and 
bodily and spiritual ‘vigor.’”30 One’s manly worth would be measured, then, both in 
“ideally disciplined, docile modern male body and souls … [and] in terms of regular 
training and precise execution of orders.”31 As I show later in this chapter, the corollary 
effects of the new masculine ethos on many aspects of later Korea are quite profound. 
Korean Femininity 
 While this dissertation is not about femininity per se, masculinity obviously is not 
exclusively about men. According to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Elaine H. Kim, 
“women as well as men are consumers, producers, and performers of masculinities”; thus, 
a few words about Korean femininity are necessary.32 
 Certain notions that were important to men have also been considered important 
for women. The notion of patriotism, for example, was so important that certain acts of 
patriotism, normally considered non-feminine, were deemed honorable. Whereas the 
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 Ibid., 1057-1059; Cf. Kim Kwang Jung, “The ‘National Salvation through New Education’ Ideas in the 
Period of Patriotic Enlightenment Movement in the Last Years of the Taehan Empire,” [Hanmal 
aegukyemong undonggi ŭi sinkyoyuk kuguknon] Sahak y yŏn’gu, (1992), 43-44, 193-213. 
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 Ibid., 1059. 
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 Ibid., 1058, 1060. 
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 Ibid., 1060. 
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 Kim and Choi, 68; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Gosh, Boy George, You must be Awfully Secure in Your 
Masculinity,” in Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis, and Simon Watson eds., Constructing Masculinity (New 
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passive Korean woman was often not justified in taking any active, let alone violent, 
actions, there are documented cases of Korean women’s violent responses, which were 
sometimes lethal, to defend their chastity or their nation against barbarians. Inasmuch as 
these acts were used for some honorable situations, they were considered acceptable.33 
However, these were exceptional cases and not commonly practiced customs. 
Because of the expectation that they remain in the inner realm, Korean women are 
considered mild, gentle, weak, tender, sensitive, and susceptible.34 Korean womanhood, 
then, is measured by fulfilling duties as a mother and wife (known as hyŏnmoyangchŏ, or 
wise mother and good wife). Korean women are judged not directly by their performance 
as such, but by the performance of their husbands and their sons.35 In fact, by the late 
Chosŏn period, a common Korean woman had to do everything she wanted to do through 
the success of her husband and/or sons.36 Autonomy was a foreign concept to women, as 
was justice.  
Women, ranked lowest in the family, also suffered the demands of their in-laws.37 
Only through the success of their husband or sons—usually measured by passing the civil 
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 Ibid., 1044-1045. 
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 Cho, 106. 
 
35
 Cho, 78-86; For a discussion on the Five Relations of Mencius (father-son, old-young, husband-wife, 
between friends, and ruler-subject), Sok K. Lee, MD, “East Asian Attitudes toward Death— A Search for 
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service examination—could women receive honor and be compensated for their suffering. 
However, even when women achieved a place of authority and power through the success 
of their husbands/sons, the vicious cycle repeated itself for her daughter-in-law, over 
whom she had control.38 
Korean Gender 
 If a good Korean woman is measured by her mildness, gentleness, weakness, 
tenderness, sensitivity, and susceptibility, as well as by the success of the men in her 
family, then Korean man are measured by controlling, ruling, and dominating, as well as 
being forcible, strong, smart, rational, cold, and selfish. Their worth is often measured 
through their ability to succeed, which was defined in the Chosŏn period as passing the 
civil service examinations and in modern Korea as earning money.39 These fundamental 
beliefs are consistent with those of any patriarchal group or society. Additional beliefs are 
as follows: 
• Women and men are intrinsically and unalterably different from one 
another. 
• These presumably natural differences explain why women and men 
(rightly) play distinctly different roles in society. 
• Men are natural—superior—income earners … public authorities, and 
heads of households because of their (allegedly) distinguished traits 
… 
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 This is true of many Confucian societies. Similarities can be drawn from China at the time. It is 
interesting to note that there is very high suicide rate among the women there. Margery Wolf, “Women and 
Suicide in China,” in Women in Chinese Society, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974). 
 
38
 Cho, 78-80. 
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 DaeHyun Jung “The Nature of Women Issues and Feminist Studies [yŏsŏng munjeŭi sŏngkyŏkwa 
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“Men’s Talk: A Korean American view of South Korean Constructions of women, Gender, and 
Masculinity,” in Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi eds., Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean 
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• Women’s allegedly natural inclinations … make them valuable in 
home life and in comforting men, who, it is patriarchally believed, 
shoulder the heavy burdens of public life. A woman gives this comfort 
willingly and gratefully … because women are so thankful for 
…men.40 
  
 The repercussions of such attitudes are vast. Showing vulnerability, for example, 
is a sign of weakness; hence, men cannot talk about difficulties and apprehensions and 
must choose an unhealthy path of silence about their privations. The pressure of being the 
one responsible for providing economically for the entire family adds to the stress. 
Confusion about one’s masculine identity due to lack of wealth, power, or success 
compounds the situation.41 Thus, what is meant to empower and privilege men—i.e. 
being the leader, the breadwinner, the provider, public, strong, rational, aggressive, 
conquering, independent, etc.—often has the opposite effect—i.e. feeling inadequate, 
stressed, vulnerable, defeated, lonely, etc.42 Other negative effects are investigated in 
detail later in this chapter.  
 However, it would be inaccurate to place the blame solely, or even mostly, on 
sŏnglihak, the Korean system of social norms and values, for the unjust, unfair, and 
uneven attitudes toward gender in modern Korean society. One must consider not only 
where such ideologies and practices originated, but also what or who is perpetuating them. 
Because families, companies, and many other institutions function under old ways of 
thinking about gender, the source of the ideology is not immediately clear. For example, 
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 Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
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only when I fulfilled my compulsory military duty did I realize that one of the major 
reasons for the maintenance of such norms is the relentless encouragement of gender 
ideology of young Korean men in the military. To understand this phenomenon, 
providing a background of the hegemonic construction of compulsory military service in 
Korea and its culture and effects is in order. 
Militarization of a Nation 
There are multiple ways in which the militarization of the nation has developed. 
First, the Japanese colonization (1895-1045) had a profound effect on lifting the status of 
martial warriors. Second, the admittance of Western (weapons) technology fed into such 
an admiration. Third, the policies of the U.S. interim government (1945-1948) after the 
Korea’s independence and the turmoil leading to and following the Korean War 
compelled the nation to long for a militarily strong country. Fourth, the dictator’s rule of 
the nation and the militaristic control of the populace contributed to the militarism of the 
nation. Finally, and most importantly, the ongoing compulsory military service of all men 
in Korea has had the greatest impact on the military mindset of the nation and its 
subsequent thinking about gender. It will become evident that one can easily invoke neo-
Confucian notions to achieve a military agenda, and vice versa. Indeed, one will see that 
favoring either militarism or neo-Confucianism may ultimately be about relying on and 
maintaining power, including interpretive power. 
Korean Military Culture 
 Military culture has a profound influence on many facets of Korean life as a 
whole. The enormity of the military influence that upholds the traditional neo-Confucian 
attitude toward men is a curious reality. The reason is that neo-Confucianism, which was 
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a philosophy of ruling by cultivated scholars, claimed “men of the pen enjoyed political 
dominance over men of the sword,” and “it was a gentleman scholar (sŏnbi), not a martial 
warrior, who represented ‘hegemonic masculinity’ under the Confucian order.”43 
However, after years of colonization by Japan, the model of the patriotic man eventually 
combined with these ideas. How, then, did military culture infiltrate so deeply into 
Korean culture and also become the dominant influence on gender? 
 In the late Chosŏn period, around the late nineteenth century, there were a series 
of challenges from foreign powers and native peasants that forced the ruling elite to adopt 
ideas by kaehwap’a or the reformist Confucian group. One of the factions from this 
group thought that whereas the East had the superior mentality, the West was much more 
materially advanced. Eventually, they adopted the notion of tongdosŏgi (Eastern way, 
Western technology). The legacy of this adoption was that Koreans remained critical of, 
or downright opposed to, the notion of democracy and its institutions while adopting the 
materials of democracy, namely technology, arsenals, and weapons manufacturing, to 
combat the challenges from neighboring countries and uprisings within the country.44 The 
acceptance of Western technology gave more weight to the military prowess. Pre- and 
post-colonial Korea continued to adopt and embrace tongdosŏgi, blaming colonization on 
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effeminate Koreans and praising and glorifying the military tradition of honor and 
patriotism.45 
 Another contributing factor to the militarization of the nation was Japanese 
disciplinary control during the colonial period. The Japanese colonial state campaigned 
for short hair for men, colored clothes (as opposed to traditional white clothes), saving 
money, and the prohibition of organized movements for public meetings and associations. 
The Japanese controlled not only the actions but also the minds of their subjects.46 This 
systemization of surveillance, monitoring, and use of physical force resulted in a fierce 
and violent rule, which added to the strong militaristic framework of postcolonial Korea. 
Although colonial rule left an extensive infrastructure for industrialization during the 
postcolonial era, it also left many who were deeply affected by, and willing to accept as a 
norm, its repressive and brutal militarism.47 Moreover, the interim US military 
government in Korea (1945–8) utilized the same people who served in the Japanese 
colonial government.48 Hence, the militaristic culture was prolonged. 
 Hegemonic sentiments may grow after times of national turmoil. When a country 
is attacked or controlled, its citizens long for a stronger nation. Thus, the Korean War 
also had a profound impact on the populace for “the paramountcy of militarized national 
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security and therefore the need for a strong military for decades to come.”49 Such a 
demand was met, starting with the junta led by Park Chung Hee, who ruled from 1961 to 
1979. Park formerly served in the Japanese military and was aware of the effects of 
dominant militarism. He enacted into law the current system of resident registration 
(chumindŭngnokchedo). That registration enabled him to control the populace by 
assigning each citizen an unchallengeable number at birth and using it to store records 
about individuals regarding military service, taxation, and criminal investigations. In the 
meantime, Park continued to galvanize the nation with anticommunist posters, mottoes, 
and sentiments to fortify his military rule and to put down any detractors as suspicious 
communists.50 He and his successor, Chun Doo Hwan, who ruled 1980–7, continued 
militaristic rule and monitoring with the use of residential meetings by regions 
(pansanghoe), propaganda and anticommunist education and contests in schools, and in 
the mass media.51 
 Well before the Korean War, however, the dominant vehicle for instilling military 
ideals in the nation was and remains men’s compulsory military service. At the end of 
WWII and the Japanese occupation of Korea, the US military government inaugurated a 
new military system in Korea. However, because this newly US-established military 
consisted of elite officers who were trained by, and had served in, the Japanese Imperial 
Army, the final product was a curious mixture of US military structures and Japanese 
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Imperial Army culture and routines.52 Members of the military endured daily subjection 
to harsh bodily discipline that was justified by the collective ethos of “sacrifice of the 
individual for the sake of a larger goal, that is, the military security of a nation.”53  
 With national security as a justification, the military exploited its soldiers into 
complete obedience and required them to carry out orders without critical thinking. 
Although disobedience can be fatal during war, using wartime scenarios to instill a 
culture of complete obedience in non-combat-related situations, without opportunity for 
reflection, resulted in much abuse within the military. A number of books written by 
former officers, as well as countless articles that have been published in recent years and 
my own experience in the military, testify to the fact that much mental and physical abuse 
is still going on in the military.54 Such a culture continues to reinforce “macho” mores, 
justifying the abuse and forcing soldiers to endure like “real” men.  
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These general features of military culture were accentuated in the South 
Korean military as shaped, to a great extent, by the fascistic culture of the 
Japanese Imperial Army. Before the recent gradual change in the military 
subculture began, strenuous discipline often took the form of repeated 
physical assault and psychological abuse to break down an individual 
conscript’s will and subject him to the orders of his superiors. For instance, 
habitual practices of abuse ranged from verbal humiliation and severe beating 
to depriving subordinate soldiers of meals and sleep. Absolute obedience and 
the performance of personal services such as washing and ironing clothes or 
running errands governed the relationship between subordinates and superiors. 
These routine aspects of the military subculture indicate that popular 
acceptance of military services as men’s national duty was not grounded in 
any genetic inclination of males to violence but stemmed rather from a 
“cultural inclination to obedience that would permit integration into the 
highly hierarchical military system.”55  
This process of bodily subjection, though it is designed to promote obedience, 
is likely to generate resistance toward military service, instead, if it is not 
accompanied by substantial rewards, a sense of entitlement, or a sense of 
fairness in bearing this burden.56 
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 Nevertheless, such a proliferation of abuse, and consequent male gender identity 
formation, continue to burgeon within and beyond the military—notwithstanding the 
“few good men” who exemplify a “good” soldier and commander who rules without 
absoluteness and ruthlessness and does not expect unexamined acceptance. The result of 
these practices is a culture that defines masculinity in a very peculiar and specific way. 
By studying numerous documents, Cho Sŏng-suk observed three common aspects of the 
ideal military man: The real man (chinjja sanai), (a) via common expressions and 
indoctrination of male supremacy, endures everything with superhuman toughness and 
fortitude; (b) via the rationalization of power, he accepts authoritarianism and strives for 
that power for himself; and (c) via sex as amusement or entertainment, he relieves stress 
by belittling women or by using demeaning sexual words, gestures, and actions.57 There 
are efforts from high up in the military to eliminate these practices, but they are so 
prevalent and ingrained that they remain common in the ROK Army. 
 Soldiers who do not fit neatly into, and/or do not adhere to these expectations, are 
often treated abusively. The English equivalents of commonly used phrases in the 
military are, “At least a real man should …” “Why don’t you act like a man?” and “If you 
were born with something between your legs, act like it!” The greatest insult of all is, 
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“Are you a girl?”58 Another pressure tactic used in the military to maintain these 
expectations is guilt. Superiors constantly remind subordinates, “Your parents believe in 
you,” “Do it for your parents,” and “Think of your parents and endure!” These statements 
put tremendous pressure on soldiers to obey without question.59 Moreover, what is not 
said is just as powerful as what is. That is, without actually saying that men are superior, 
these comments reinforce the notion that men “at least” are not like lowly women.60 
 Those who do bear the painful experiences are eventually rewarded when they are 
promoted to positions of power. Officers, mostly men in their early twenties, get to 
experience power, enabling them to move a great number of men with a flick of a finger 
or a phrase. Wielding great power at such an early age leaves a lasting impression, and 
many continue to seek that power post-service in the workplace and in their households.61 
 Non-officers are also rewarded the freedom and power, which is frequently 
manifested in vulgar forms, by the time they become sergeants (the final rank before 
being discharged as compulsory soldiers). Sergeants freely share often-fabricated stories 
of their sexual life and make subordinates share their stories. Through this process, 
manhood is measured by how many women a man has slept with, and the stories 
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encourage other soldiers to imagine engaging in similar exploitive sexual situations. As a 
result, women are often seen and talked about as objects of sex to be dominated and used 
at will.62 
 These experiences do not end as soldiers leave the guardhouse of their unit and 
are discharged. Most are discharged while they are in their early twenties and bring what 
they learned in the military into society. Because all able Korean men serve in the 
military and are conscripted at a still impressionable age, most bring the gender ideology 
they acquired during their military service to their schools, families, and workplaces.63 
Further, given that most power positions are occupied by men, their gender ideology 
permeates all parts of Korean society. 
Masculinity in Contemporary Korean Society 
 Practices in Korean workplaces are prime examples of a hegemonic masculinity 
that centers on resilient toughness, hierarchy, obedience, and “brotherhood.”64 Despite 
recent efforts by a few conglomerates and small companies to jettison some harmful old 
practices, the need to have a performance-centered attitude to reach a position of power 
has remained intact. In order to earn their rightful place of power as a man, men in the 
workforce do what it takes to improve their performance. A 2009 study by UBS, a Swiss 
bank, is a telling example. The study concluded that the workforce in Seoul has the 
second highest number of working hours per year in the world, approaching 2,312 hours 
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per year, which is 61 hours short of Cairo’s workforce who has the highest number of 
working hours per year.65  
 In order to reduce disorder and complaints about pressure to increase production, 
companies often apply the Confucian ideology of family to the workplace. For example, 
the Confucian notion of filial piety (hyo) may be applied in the workplace to encourage 
subordinates to show their absolute loyalty (chung) toward their superiors—an important 
Confucian idea and one of the most important in the Korean military.66 This absolute 
obedience may lead to subordinates engaging in activities (often involving alcohol and 
women) that they do not desire. 
 By applying the Confucian virtue of loyalty between male friends, males bond 
through sul munhwa, or a drinking-culture. Sul munhwa is “an essential element for 
men’s work and role in the public sphere” and is, hence, part of brotherhood “in critical 
business dealings or in stress-relieving pleasure.”67 The following quote exemplifies what 
sul munhwa entails: 
There’s a saying, work plus liquor plus women equals business. To do well, 
you have to go along with this. It’s not like you say, “Hey! Let’s have sex 
with hostesses tonight.” That just happens, depending on the atmosphere and 
how you feel.68 
 
 Thus, by participating in activities in “room salons,” bars, and cafés, sul munhwa 
is not simply a drinking culture, but a culture of men that perpetuates military culture by 
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seeing and using women as objects of sex and by bonding through expression of disdain 
for women. Men often refer to women in terms of “food, sport, toys, flowers, decorations, 
atmosphere, or a temporarily invigorating bath.”69 Two implications of such a culture are 
that men who reject these norms and criticize such a culture are not seen as macho, tough, 
and manly—or may be ineligible for promotions70—and women, who cannot partake in 
these activities even if they wanted to, have additional barriers to being promoted. By 
being excluded from the army, sul munhwa, and other male bonding activities for the 
most part, women, because of their nature, complementary biology, and “inabilities,” 
cannot meet the prerequisites for promotions and economic success.71 
 Even when women were given opportunities to overcome these barriers in the 
past, institutions kept them in their “proper” place. According to Seung-Kyung Kim,72 
President Park allowed women to work outside the home (sewing in a Nike factory, for 
example) and linked their work with national security, necessity, respectability, and 
patriotism, even presenting them as “marriageable.” However, this calculated move was 
not to claim their autonomy or rightful citizenship but—seeing that their cheap labor 
availability was economically advantageous—to exploit their abilities and to keep them 
in check. Hence, women may still be deemed to have a respectable femininity if, instead 
of being under their parents’ careful supervision, they are under the supervision of a 
foreman in a factory.  
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 Also, female laborers are seen as doing the work that women are supposed to be 
good at (e.g., sewing) and, hence, do not lose their femininity by working in the public 
sphere.73 Finally, women were seen more as respectable (i.e., as obedient, dutiful 
daughters, not as citizens), thinking first about the needs of their family and second about 
saving money for a future husband. This respectability was predicated upon continuing to 
be silent about the institutional justification of their low wages.74 Thus, relentless 
patriarchal inculcation limited woman’s advancement and pressured men to participate in 
unjust social structures and ideologies in order to climb the socio-economic ladder. 
  In a sense, military modernity seems to be a stronger influence than neo-
Confucianism as far as systematic dissemination of ideas of gender, sex, race, class, etc. 
Similarly, the influence of the military at the time of the military coup in 1961 
demonstrated its power over Confucian ideologies. For example, immediately after the 
1961 coup d’état, the military junta employed a new way of living by simplifying family 
rituals and slowly doing away with the Confucian notion of many children as good luck. 
To alter this deeply rooted Confucian understanding and practice, the state “made 
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extensive use of hierarchical organizations in administering the family planning 
policies.”75   
 Simultaneously, however, the state used the deeply rooted neo-Confucian gender 
ideology to its advantage when implementing the practice of contraception. This 
implementation was done by highlighting women’s domesticity, putting them in charge 
of childbirth and controlling of it, and by portraying them as being “dutiful” and willing 
nationals in practicing family planning.76 It is fair to say, then, that it was not neo-
Confucian ideology per se that controlled the populace but the institutions that had the 
interpretive power of that ideology. The military is one such institution, the state is 
another. With this power, the militaristic approach has infiltrated all corners of the 
society from which “the military mindset can translate into non-warring forms of 
aggression” in the family, marriage, workplaces, government, and other social 
institutions.77 When a man enters a social institution, for example, it becomes a war zone, 
the circumstances become war situations, and competitors become enemies. “When the 
warrior male goes into business, business becomes war… The market place is a heartless 
zone.”78 
Just as the culprit of this masculinity cannot simply be Korean neo-Confucianism, 
the indictment for an unhealthy notion of gender in Korea cannot lie solely with military 
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culture. The military is not the only institution of power and influence. Hence, although 
military modernity is a stronger influence than neo-Confucianism in indoctrinating 
specific notions of gender, there are other influential institutions that perpetuate gender 
norms, including the workplace, media, family, politics, church, schools, and textbooks.79  
The Roman Catholic Church in Korea 
 I do not cover all of these institutions in Korea here. Rather, I consider the Korean 
Roman Catholic Church. Catholic missions had positive influences on the Korean 
peninsula. The missionaries’ transmission of Catholic teachings brought the nation new 
ideas and opportunities. Missions proclaimed radical ideas of equality before God, which 
was unimaginable in the neo-Confucian Chosŏn society. Korean Catholic women learned 
the Korean alphabet for the purpose of reading Catechism and prayer books, they became 
active in the early stages of the Catholic Church in Korea (starting in the late 18th 
century), and benefited from the Catholic marriage/divorce system; some were even 
considered “companions and partners rather than submissive wives.”80 
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 Notwithstanding these positive influences, I cannot overlook the kinds of 
repression brought about by the Catholic Church. Many setbacks from positive influences 
of Catholic missions were in the form of gender ideologies, especially those that appealed 
to Confucian concepts of chastity and womanly virtues. For example, instead of focusing 
on Mary as the mother of Jesus, the focus was on Mary as a silent and submissive virgin. 
The consequence of this approach was repetition of the old ways, whereby women’s 
obedience was more important than justice.81  
 Consider the Korean women who often were beaten by their anti-Catholic 
husbands and who ran away. The missionaries told them to go back home and respect the 
Catholic way by submitting to and obeying their husbands. The French missionary priests, 
who were men, did not help the situation by demanding strict obedience from the faithful; 
instead, they reinforced neo-Confucian notions that made Korean women more willing to 
be silent and to obey men.82 Thus, what was an active group in the church at its 
foundation in Korea became a passive group and becoming more restricted upon 
returning home. Conversely, men became compassionate partners with their counterparts 
in the early church in Korea, only to return to their authoritative and commanding 
masculinity at home.83 
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 Since then, a hegemonic and authoritarian approach has been the overarching 
method chosen by many priests in Korea.84 Because Koreans were accustomed to ideas of 
hierarchal cosmology and obedience to superiors, priests (former conscripts themselves) 
had no problems implementing a traditional approach.85 In an emblematic representation 
of such reality, Korea remains one of the very few parts of the world that still requires the 
practice of head covering (using misabo or Mass veils) by its women. 
 Nevertheless, small but powerful voices of discontent have begun to emerge. 
Some Catholic scholars, women for the most part, have published their dissatisfaction 
with the authoritarianism of Korean Catholic priests and called for a less authoritative 
and more loving approach.86 Books have also been published, calling for reforms that did 
away with authoritarianism and gave more opportunities to the laity, especially women.87 
Many articles called for more lay and women’s participation to eradicate the 
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subserviently obedient and passive images of women and Mary and to replace such 
models with more inquisitive, conversational, and active images.88 
 Although never directly acknowledging the Church’s gender ideology as 
problematic, the Roman Catholic Church in Korea has taken steps to respond to a 
growing number of dissenting voices concerning women’s issues. In a letter 
commemorating 200 years of Catholicism in Korea (1984), the Pastoral Council in Korea 
included a “separate issue” section in which it admitted that the role of women in the 
church had been diminished from what it was when the Church was just beginning to 
take shape in Korea. The council also stated that it is problematic for the Church’s future 
that women could only participate as helpers and that more education is needed for and 
about women and more opportunities must be given to them.89 
 Unfortunately, few improvements have been made in practice. 90 Continuing with 
an authoritarian methodology and refusing to listen to the voices of the oppressed within 
the Church will be detrimental for the future of the Church in Korea. Though not 
identical, the Roman Catholic Church in Korea, I argue, is using an authoritarian 
approach dangerously similar to that used in the military. Many priests demand complete 
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loyalty from their parishioners and do so in a hegemonic fashion.91 There is an 
expectation of sacrifice on the part of the parishioners while very little theological 
explanation is given for this demand. Priests are comfortable demanding material gifts, 
and many followers follow and bow to them in the same way they do to the altar. 
 While priests’ attitudes toward women are and gendered cosmology is not always 
visible, enforcing the wearing of the misabo and the insistence on women’s role as 
helpers for the church, their family, and their husbands are indicative of where they stand. 
Consequently, men are on the receiving end of women’s help, and the priests benefit 
most of all.92 It is difficult not to think of the alarming similarities with militaristic 
ordering: obedience to absolute authority, expectations of sacrifice for the whole, and 
differentiated gender expectations. 
 Unlike the U.S. seminarians and clerics who are exempt from military service, all 
able priests in Korea have fulfilled compulsory military duties, and they return to the 
male-dominated hierarchal society of the seminaries. It is almost inevitable that they 
continue to practice what they became familiar with and were taught to think in the 
military. There are already countless studies of the negative effects these norms have on 
women.93 In what follows, I explore the dangers of these Korean (neo-Confucian and 
militaristic) ideologies for men. 
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The Dangers 
 When the economic crisis hit Korea (known as the “IMF crisis” because of the 
Korean government’s acceptance of an International Monetary Fund bailout) in 1997, and 
again in recent years, many lost their jobs. Living in a country where masculinity is 
defined by one’s performance, the ability to have ordering power over inferiors according 
to that performance, and status as the breadwinner, many men found themselves in a dire 
situation. Suddenly, they were not “man enough,” and their identities were in jeopardy. 
For many, it was better to live in the streets (or even to commit suicide) rather than return 
to their families to live as powerless men.94 Many are stressed from the pressure to keep 
their productivity and performance high, the prospect of losing their jobs, the demands of 
superiors, and their not fulfilling familial duties. As a result, many rely on alcohol, 
cigarettes, and even sexual services to relieve these stresses. Not being able to talk about 
their feelings (for that would not be “manly”) only adds to their anxiety.95 
 The ramifications of the hegemonic masculine ideology go beyond men’s reaction 
to it. Korean women, like other members of the society, also respond in a pejorative 
fashion when these expectations are not met. Often, when men are not fulfilling their role 
as breadwinner, it is acceptable for women to leave the home. One of the lawful reasons 
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for divorce in Korea is a husband’s economic incompetence.96 Faced with possible 
divorce, men often choose to accommodate their wives in any way they can, sometimes 
even to the point of allowing their wives to commit adultery.97 And, at times, incidence of 
domestic violence and battered husbands reach news and media outlets.98   
 Also, as more Korean women find employment outside the home, more power is 
allocated to them in the family. Used properly, their economic power brings opportunities 
for shared power in the family. Used improperly, however, it serves as a tool of revenge 
for years of being ordered and controlled and even as a way to win money in divorce 
suits.99 Men sometimes react by tolerating abuse or even by committing suicide (Koreans 
are ranked number one in the world for suicide among men in their forties).100 However, 
men also react violently. Struggling with abandonment by society and neglect from the 
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family, men resort to verbal abuse and domestic violence to reclaim their throne as the ruler 
in the family.101 This way, they can recover the power and control they lost.  
 When all corners of society—whether the workplace, media, family, political 
arena, military, church, school, or textbooks—tell men they must embrace authority and 
power in order to be accepted, men find it difficult to think otherwise. When men cannot 
find a way to fulfill these expectations, the negative effects on all levels of society are 
almost inevitable. These “manly” expectations are unhealthy for Koreans, Catholics, and 
men or women, no matter where they live. The need for new models and expectations 
regarding men and masculinity is urgent and cannot wait another generation. 
Signs of Hope: Changes in Korea 
 Despite overwhelming institutional indoctrination, voices of concern have begun 
to emerge among men, taking cues from earlier feminist movements and calling attention 
to the existence and enforcing of machismo culture in Korea. In May 1992, a group 
called the Good Fathers’ Gathering (my translation) set out to nurture a happy, safe, and 
healthy family by respecting all family members, instead of enforcing the paterfamilias 
approach.102 In April 1995, Men’s Group for Cultivating a Culture of Equality, a 
subgroup of the all-female group Seoul Women’s Transformation, surfaced as well. This 
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men’s group set out to cultivate a fair society, especially concerning gender equality, via 
profeminist approaches.103   
 In the same year, a hotline for men was established to provide counseling for 
those needing to resolve their emotional and psychological problems.104 Eventually, these 
groups would unite to form a comprehensive male movement called the National 
Association of Korean Fathers.105 Prior to the formulation of these male groups, the 
men’s studies programs in Korea focused only on Western scholarship. After these 
movements arose the men’s studies programs take on a Korean shape.106 Unfortunately, 
the voice of these movements remains small. Nevertheless, this pioneering has the 
possibility for growth. 
 Aside from these men’s movements, there have been social changes in Korea. 
Increasingly fewer Koreans have a negative view of women in the workforce (8 in 10 
Koreans approve of women working).107 More Koreans now place women who are 
housewives on equal ground as those who work for wages (9 out of 10). Fewer hold 
employment preferences for men over women.108 In a recent survey, only 1 in 10 Korean 
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women aged 15 to 44 felt they must have a son, compared to 4 in 10 in 1991.109 Women’s 
economic participation rate hit 50.3 percent in 2006.110 
 More policy decisions and legislative actions have been geared towards gender 
equality and human rights. These actions include the 1987 Equal Employment Law, the 
1989 New Family Law, the 1991 Infant Protection and Care Law, the 1993 Special Law 
Against Sexual Violence, the 1997 Law Prohibiting Family Violence, and the 1999 Law 
To Prohibit and Regulate Gender Discrimination.111 At a glance, Korea seems to be on its 
way to greater gender fairness; however, this is not true in reality. 
 I do not intend to detract from or belittle the fruits of the efforts of the men and 
women who fight for justice in Korea. However, it must be noted that the psyche and 
structures of Korean society have not changed greatly, and much work is yet needed to 
achieve gender justice for women. For instance, it is true that Koreans view women in the 
workforce much more positively than before, but only insofar as they also fulfill their 
duties as housewives and mothers. That is, a better social status combined with the same 
traditional gender role expectations in the family yields worse situations for women. 
These “improvements” often are setbacks for women because mothers are expected to be 
full-time career women and full-time housewives and care-givers.112 Progress did not 
redefine gender roles for women and men; it simply added to previous expectations. 
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 More women have opportunities to work than ever before. However, the 
economic participation rate of women in the workplace in Korea (50.3 percent) is lower 
than the average for men (74.8 percent) in Korea and lower than women in nations 
studied by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
2004 (60.4 percent). Also, women’s wages are about 60 percent of what men earn, and 
women work in service, blue-collar, clerical, and part-time jobs more often than men.113 
 These data mean that perspectives on male roles have stayed essentially the same 
as well, which is not necessarily good news for men. The more lasting and rigid the 
gender role expectations are, the more men feel pressured to perform, deliver, and 
achieve power as an authority and as a breadwinner.114 The increase of women in the 
workforce may be seen as a threat to men’s objective to gain control in the workplace. 
When women earn more money than men, or when wives are forced to work, husbands and 
fathers may perceive this outside employment by their womenfolk as their failure as 
men.115 
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 Increasingly, younger men are recognizing the harmful nature of these gender 
expectations and changes are taking place. Men can observe that their fathers, after being 
in the workforce for years, are feeling resentment for not being treated with respect for 
their years of sacrifice. As fathers retire, and/or their economic ability decreases, they 
may become powerless and their resentment and loneliness may grow. Mothers, in turn, 
may finally feel that they have some power and try to get what is owed to them for years 
of sacrifice as their husband’s helper, children’s assistant, and the family’s powerless 
passive member. Women indeed may have something owed to them and have the right to 
seek what they feel their labors deserve. 
However, a new generation of Korean men is starting to see these relationships as 
unhealthy. They realize that Korean gender and gender role expectations are often 
harmful. Many are now requesting the jobs they want despite those jobs being considered 
unmanly. For example, men are choosing to become nurses, telephone customer service 
representatives, and weather forecasters—occupations traditionally associated with 
women in Korea. One TV news magazine program seated a male broadcaster on the left 
side of the desk and a female broadcaster on the right, positioning that was unthinkable in 
the past.116 Individually, these are not drastic changes, but they are, nonetheless, 
significant for the visible nature of these occupations.  
 The consciousness of Korean men is also changing. According to a 2006 survey 
of 700 Korean men, 68.7 percent approved of the so-called women’s quota system 
(yŏsung haldangje) in private and public workplaces. This quota system requires and 
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encourages women’s participations in the workplaces. According to the Director of 
Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute, for example, the 
quota system in 2000 required that women “account for over 50% of proportional 
representation candidates for municipal and provincial councils, and political parties must 
make efforts to ensure that women make up at least 30% of nominated candidates for 
local constituencies in the general and local level elections.” As a result of the effort, 
women make up 13.7% in the 18th National Assembly of Korea in 2012, contrast to just 
one representative in the 1st Assembly from 1948 to 1950.117 
Moreover, 56.9 percent of the men surveyed stated the sex of their only born child 
did not matter, and only 10.2 percent thought that men must buy the house and women 
provide the dowry (wedding and household expenses) at the beginning of a marriage, 
which is traditionally the case in Korea.118 In a different 2006 survey, which was 
compared to a 1995 survey in which 37 percent of Korean respondents (male and female) 
stated a university education is more important for a man than for a woman, there was a 
significant drop, to 23 percent.119 
 Unfortunately, the mindset seems somewhat inconsistent. For example, of the 700 
surveyed men, only 3.2 percent preferred having a woman as their superior at work, and 
70.2 percent said women could work insofar as their jobs do not interfere with their 
domestic duties. In other words, men permit more women in the workplace but restrict 
them from being their superiors and require them to do their jobs at home, too. The 
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conclusions of the survey were that men, overall, wanted to escape the pressure and the 
responsibility of a paterfamilias model but did not want to let go of their authority and 
power especially over women.120 
 Thus, while Koreans are on the path to improvement, there is still a long way to 
go. The more institutions become aware of these realities, the better the Korean social 
situation of justice will be. Policies, organizations, and participation for equality and 
mutuality are on the rise but must do more. High schools universities must include 
awareness programs on their orientation agenda to educate students about the dangers of 
rigid gender norms. Other Korean institutions, including the Roman Catholic Church, 
must also follow suit. However, for the Korea Roman Catholic Church to improve, it 
needs help from the Vatican. 
Veritatis splendor 
 The militaristic hegemonic approach employed by Korean Catholic priests—
which, as I have stated earlier, stems from the neo-Confucian-influenced and militarily 
galvanized gender ideology of Korea—is not a problem specific to Korean Catholics. 
Such an approach is justified not only within Korean culture, but also within the Roman 
Catholic tradition as a whole. To show this, I turn to Veritatis splendor (Vs). Through it, I 
demonstrate that the Church takes a hegemonic and authoritative approach to theology 
and its implementation, and is, therefore, perpetuating an unhealthy relationship between 
the clergy and the laity. Hence, I claim that Catholics, laity and/or theologians alike, must 
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continue to call for the discontinuation of this approach and ask for a better model from 
and with which they can work. My task has been to uncover, reveal, and spell out 
implications so that others may also see the need for such a call. 
Pope John Paul II (JPII hereafter) takes up many issues in Vs. The main theme of 
the encyclical is a concern about methods in moral theology stemming from the crisis of 
truth, or disappearance of truth—which is not defined in the document—due to the 
individualistic, relativistic, and nihilistic tendencies of modern society.121 The proper 
method for moral theologians is to “instruct the faithful… about all those commandments 
and practical norms authoritatively declared by the Church.”122 As a result of not obeying 
the proper methodology, however, JPII sees that there is a “lack of harmony between the 
traditional response of the Church and certain theological positions, encountered even in 
Seminaries and in Faculties of Theology…”123 More specifically, JPII says, “Dissent, in 
the form of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on in the media, is 
opposed to ecclesial communion and to a correct understanding of the hierarchical 
constitution of the People of God.”124 
Vs begins with a hopeful acknowledgement of “the splendor of the truth which 
shines forth deep within the human spirit.”125 JPII also acknowledges the individual 
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conscience as “the law of God written in the heart.”126 Later in Vs, there is more 
recognition of human moral sense, that Christians are “supported by the moral sense 
present in peoples and by the great religious and sapiential traditions of the East and West, 
from which the interior and mysterious workings of God’s Spirit are not absent.”127 
Ultimately, however, because of human limitations, the authority of truth claims 
seems to lie in the Church, which “contains the voice of Jesus Christ, the voice of truth 
about good and evil. In the words spoken by the Church there resounds, in people’s 
inmost being, the voice of God who ‘alone is good,’ who alone ‘is love.’”128 JPII 
acknowledges, following the Second Vatican Council, freedom of individual conscience. 
Yet, it is difficult to see in Vs the point of welcoming freedom in theory when it states 
that putting the authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law into practice 
 “…can only confirm the permanent validity of Revelation and follow in 
the line of the interpretation given to it by the great Tradition of the 
Church's teaching and life, as witnessed by the teaching of the Fathers, the 
lives of the Saints, the Church's Liturgy and the teaching of the 
Magisterium.”129 
 
 The document also shows a certain apprehension toward exaggerated versions of 
autonomy, human reason, and freedom. Such a concern about exaggerated versions may 
be at the root of the reservations about theologians expressed in the encyclical. In Vs, JPII 
points out that there is a great danger in exalting human capacity to the point of 
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disregarding dependence on Divine Wisdom.130 It would be detrimental to the faithful to 
present human freedom in a way that God, revelation, and the Church do not matter 
anymore. While I agree and recognize the danger of idolizing human autonomy, it is 
unclear which theologians the encyclical is criticizing. It seems that this extreme form of 
autonomy, human reason, creative conscience, fundamental option, and freedom of which 
Vs is speaking are hardly identifiable among the moral theologians of today. The 
criticism is more valuable, then, as a general guide and warning to Catholics not to veer 
in the direction of extreme relativism, individualism, and nihilism. Instead, the criticism 
generalizes all moral theologians and gives them one method of operation, namely that of 
transmission of the Magisterium. 
 Save for the extreme forms that I discuss here, many moral theologians contribute 
greatly to the discussion. Truth can emerge through these discussions. However, if the 
faithful are told they are “obliged to acknowledge and respect the specific moral precepts 
declared and taught by the Church in the name of God, the Creator and Lord,”131 then 
truth must belong solely to the Roman Catholic Magisterium and the faithful must simply 
take orders and obey. In fact, the encyclical calls all moral theologians “to set forth the 
Church’s teaching and to give, in the exercise of their ministry, the example of a loyal 
assent, both internal and external, to the Magisterium’s teaching in the areas of both 
dogma and morality.”132 In many ways, then, moral theologians’ duty resembles those of 
catechists. 
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 There are alarming similarities between these beliefs and those espoused by the 
Korean military. As the recipients of orders from an absolute authority,133 the Catholic 
faithful and Korean soldiers simply obey. This casuistic/legalistic approach poses 
morality primarily in terms of obedience. Such an approach 
…sees morality primarily in terms of obedience…. No one can doubt that 
Veritatis Splendor employs such a model. The very first paragraph 
emphasizes the need for obedience to the truth, but recognizes that such 
obedience is not always easy.134 
 
It is easy for Korean priests, who are immersed in Roman Catholic, neo-Confucian, and 
militaristic mores, to demand complete loyalty from their parishioners in a commanding 
and hegemonic fashion. These attitudes often result in the unjust use of power, as in the 
Korean military and Korean workplaces, families, and other institutions.  
It would be more helpful to guide the faithful and warn them of dangers in extreme 
individualistic thinking, instead of condemning a whole group of people, like moral 
theologians, based on misrepresentation. Similarly, like any other authorities, it would be 
helpful also to present the danger in extreme versions of the Church’s authority. In this 
light, John Paul II’s criticism of totalitarianism may prove to be a good tool for the 
Church’s own reflection: 
to construct the renewed society and to solve the complex and weighty 
problems affecting it, above all the problem of overcoming the various 
totalitarianism, so as to make way for the authentic freedom of the person.135 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
133
 John Paul II’s magisterial documents want to affirm that they have this kind of sole and absolute 
authority in the Church as derived from the Holy Spirit. Ibid.116. Some may argue that this is to tone down 
and alter some teachings found in Guadium et spes. See Mary Elsbernd, “The Reinterpretation of Guadium 
et spes in Veritatis splendor,” Horizons 29.2 (Fall 2002): 225-239 especially 226, 238. 
 
134
 VS is certainly employing such a model. See Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. eds., 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 11: The Historical Development of Fundamental Moral Theology in the 
United States (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 250. 
 
261 
 
 
 
Such an attempt would point out to Korean priests, and all of the Catholic faithful, the 
dangers of hegemonic attitudes and the causes of such attitudes, including unjust gender 
norms. 
Octogesima adveniens 
 It would be unfair to say that top-down, absolute, militaristic, and authoritative 
approaches are the only Roman Catholic approaches.136 One can certainly find a method 
employed by the Church that uses a different model. I wish to point to one such example, 
namely Octogesima adveniens. Mary Elsbernd locates the impetus for Octogesima 
adveniens in a much earlier method developed in the 1920s by Joseph Cardijn, namely 
Observe (or See), Judge, Act. The method was designed to facilitate dialogue among the 
gospel, social teaching, and local situation in bringing about action.137   
 Elsbernd found the concept applied in Pope John XXIII’s earlier encyclical Mater 
et magistra. In it, John XXIII “defends human dignity in the midst of the ever-increasing 
social relationships and interdependencies that characterize our modern world,”138 and 
mentions Cardijn’s method139 as a way of applying social principles to specific situations. 
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In other words, the principles were the starting point; then the local situations were 
reviewed and judged accordingly.140 
 In a slight, yet dramatic, shift, Paul VI in Octogesima adveniens also uses 
Cardijn’s method but focuses on the local (subjective) situations first, and then asks to 
take part in a dialogue among the (objective) Gospel, tradition, and principles. 
In the face of such widely varying situations it is difficult for us to utter a 
unified message and to put forward a solution which has universal validity. 
Such is not our ambition, nor is it our mission. It is up to the Christian 
communities to analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to 
their own country, to shed on it the light of the Gospel's unalterable words 
and to draw upon principles of reflection (principia cogitandi), norms of 
judgment (iudicandi normas) and directive for action (regulas operandi) 
from the social teaching (e sociali doctrina) of the Church. This social 
teaching has been worked out (est confecta) in the course of history … . It 
is up to these Christian communities, with the help of the Holy Spirit, in 
communion with the bishops who hold responsibility and in dialogue with 
other Christian brethren and all men of goodwill, to discern the options 
and commitments which are called for in order to bring about the social, 
political and economic changes seen in many cases to be urgently needed. 
In this search for the changes which should be promoted, Christians must 
first of all renew their confidence in the forcefulness and special character 
of the demands made by the Gospel. 141 
 
 This shift in focus, from objective principles as the starting point to the specific 
local situations, is a result of an anthropology that stresses freedom, equality, and 
participation,142 which in turn stems from the anthropology of Gaudium et spes, which 
accentuates the dignity of the human with a conscience and human freedom at its core.143 
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This transfer of focus, from the objective norm of the law to the subjective norm of 
conscience is of great methodological significance. Historically conscious Christian 
individuals are to examine their consciences about what to do in the midst of specific 
situations because “truth is found in the innermost depth of one’s existence.”144 
 In the context of the subject matter at hand, then, the paradigm exemplified by 
Gaudium et spes and Octogesima adveniens would best serve as the guiding model for 
masculinity. Rather than deductively enforcing certain potentially great criteria—such as 
strength, high performance, activity, orthodoxy, and commanding and authoritative 
power—this method calls for using these criteria in conjunction with the local situation 
and “the ever-increasing social relationships and interdependencies that characterize our 
modern world.”145 
 This procedure is dynamic rather than static, inductive rather than deductive, and 
respects individual dignity while a “careful and objective scrutiny of the present reality in 
the light of the gospel and of the teaching of the church” is at its core.146 In such a model, 
no longer can an institution uncritically follow a socially constructed and destructive 
notion of masculinity and remain blameless for the continuation of injustice. Similarly, 
the laity and scholars can no longer idly function as recipients/ transmitter of the official 
teaching or condone the hegemonic, authoritative, and sometimes militaristic approach by 
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passively obeying the clergy. Rather, all must work mutually with the Magisterium to 
bring about a dialogue among the gospel, social teachings, and the local situation. 
Conclusion 
Gender role expectations in Korea stem largely from neo-Confucian ideology. 
The perpetuation and dissemination of this ideology stems most strongly from the 
militaristic hegemonic approach learned through compulsory military service. Because all 
able (“normal”) male citizens in Korea must fulfill this requirement, society often mirrors 
the ROK Army milieu. The Korean Roman Catholic clergy also is subjected to military 
culture and is not immune. The clergy is doubly affected because the same messages 
about gender role expectations are conveyed through superiors via encyclicals and the 
Magisterium. 
The results of these detrimental gender requirements are an unsettled and anxious 
society, confused citizens and religious persons, and an unhealthy mental state for women 
and men. The solution, however, lies not solely in blaming men as such, for that approach 
may impinge upon the dignity of those not directly involved in the perpetuation of 
injustice. A new model for masculinity, then, must go beyond complementarity and 
inflexible canonical gender norms. It must be a model that fosters the flourishing of both 
sexes by way of mutuality, is fluid in its understanding of gender, and seriously considers 
historical consciousness and its present location. 
For such a solution to come to fruition, an effort must be made at both ends: in 
Korea and in the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. If it is a necessary strategic 
requirement of the military to have a system of absolute obedience, then Korea must 
implement an educational system whereby compulsorily enlisted men learn that military 
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mores should not be confused with those of society. As for the Roman Catholic Church, 
it must make a counter-cultural effort to ameliorate the situation for both faithful men and 
women, and the laity must be able to work to create a better dialogical and mutual setting 
in their locality. Only then can they feel that they are not bound by traditional norms and 
feel healthy enough to contribute positively and lovingly to others, society, and the rest of 
God’s creation. To help the church in this process, I dedicate the remainder of this 
dissertation to parsing a more just form of masculinities. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONSTRUCTING A MORE JUST MODEL: MASCULINITIES 
At the outset of this study, I set out to articulate the acceptable form of 
masculinity for Christian Theology. As I explained in earlier chapters, however, there is 
no one form of masculinity. For this reconstruction to function effectively, one must seek 
to articulate forms of masculinities that, in accordance with the nature of this project, are 
set within the framework of the Roman Catholic tradition and are based on Jesus of 
Nazareth as the model. 
In this chapter, I first present models that will aid in moving beyond the unilateral 
power structure of the Catholic notion of gender complementarity by using the notion of 
mutuality and the life of Jesus Christ as standards. Next, I present what is minimally 
required in constructing a new model for masculinities—by drawing on the principles of 
medical ethics—and what may be helpful specifically for Roman Catholic men in 
constructing this new model—by using the notion of sacramentality, or the sacramental 
principle. Through these models, I aim to develop a framework for masculinities that not 
only avoids hierarchal or complementary notions of gender but also develops just and 
loving model that guides men toward seeing the imprint of God through their 
distinctively (Catholic) male experiences.
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Mutuality 
Scholars within the Roman Catholic tradition have made attempts to uncover 
alternative visions of the relationship—whether hierarchal or complementary—between 
God and human beings and among human beings. One such scholar has been Dawn M. 
Nothwehr. She has expanded Hugh of St. Victor’s notion of incarnation in terms of the 
mutual relationality of all parties involved to claim an active role for women in the 
birth—the virgin birth more specifically—of a child. 1 Nothwehr has also argued that St. 
Thomas Aquinas, while upholding Aristotelian hierarchical biology, provides a notion of 
charity that serves as the root of friendship with God.2 Ultimately, there remains a certain 
distance between God and human beings, but with faith and love, the relationship 
between them becomes much more mutual.3 Such authors provide a framework to 
consider that despite the differences between men and women, a mutual relationship is 
possible with love.4 
Nothwehr has also asserted that the work of John Duns Scotus provides an even 
stronger framework to seek the positive value of the mutual relationality of the Trinity: 
First, Scotus’s affirmation of both the individual personhood of each 
member of the Trinity as a suppositum of divine relations makes it possible 
for the Trinity to also stand as a paradigm for human relations. Second, the 
individuality Scotus claims for each person of the Trinity provides the 
metaphysical basis for mutuality; the persons of the Trinity are constituted 
as persons through the relationship (ad intra) of mutuality. Insofar as the 
                                                 
1Dawn M. Nothwehr, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Ethics (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock 
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Trinity as a communion of persons models the goal for human community, 
the Trinity models the relationship of mutuality as the goal of all human 
activity.5 
 
In these Roman Catholic examples, Nothwehr finds a new guiding norm for relationships, 
namely mutuality, and a proper understanding of power within it. For her, it is not only 
that one practices justice and love but how one does so that allows for the thriving of 
humankind6; it requires the relinquishing of power by the powerful and the taking up of 
power by the poor and the marginalized.7 Hence, the notion of mutuality, while distinct, 
is closely related to ideas of equality, reciprocity, and solidarity. 
Equality is distinguished by definite boundaries, and a marked one-to-one 
correspondence in the relationship or the exchange between the parties of 
an affiliation; an exchange of like for like. In a relationship characterized by 
reciprocity, there are clearly defined boundaries between parties involved, 
and any action, influence, giving/receiving is conditioned by the 
expectation by the other party(ies) that what is received is of equal value to 
what is given. In the case of solidarity, boundary lines are distinct. Yet, 
there is a desire to be with the other that strains boundary lines between 
persons toward one another. Each person’s desire exceeds his/her ability to 
fully participate in the act or experience to be undergone by others. The 
straining toward the other, however, does not break individual boundaries. 
In the case of mutuality, boundaries are distinct, but the critical difference is 
that they are determined with the other(s) and thus, they are more flexible 
and fluid. The mean and the end of exchange must be geared to the 
common flourishing of all parties involved.8 
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 Nothwehr, Mutuality, 145-146. Here, suppositum is defined as a metaphysical entity of which a 
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Nothwehr explains that as mutuality is “an animate process and not a static 
situation,”9 sustaining a mutual relationship requires praxis, a perspectival, an interpretive, 
and a dialogical view of truth in a dynamic sense.10 This notion expands the idea of the 
moral subject from one simply viewing the subject as a monolithic reality to “one who 
develops, experiences, and transforms values, and who is, in turn, developed and 
transformed in valuing.”11 Recognizing such a view of mutuality does not, however, 
mean that one lapses into relativism. Rather, while recognizing its animate nature, one 
must avoid relativistic nihilism by acknowledging one’s own presuppositions, listening 
attentively to views different from one’s own, and always depending on 
“scripture/tradition, church teachings and the sensus fidelium [to] provide additional 
safeguards.”12 This notion of mutuality also modifies our understanding of “good” as not 
based on individualism, exploitation, authoritarianism, or paternalism but rather a form of 
mutuality that “fits” the other goods in the cosmos.13 
In terms of sex and gender, then, mutuality means that both women and men are 
bearers of the imago Dei. It means biogenetic and sociocultural evidence of gender must 
challenge traditional dualism and physicalism. It means the “sharing of ‘power-with’ by 
and among women and men in a way that recognizes the full participation of each in the 
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imago Dei, embodied in daily life and through egalitarian relationships.”14 In this 
understanding of relationship and the power within it, the Roman Catholic notion of 
gender complementarity is insufficient. The traditional notion of complementarity would 
only be acceptable, then, if (1) the couple to which it refers complements each other in 
accordance not with strict and designated roles according to gender but rather with their 
natural or learned talents so to maximize their potential as human beings and (2) if it did 
not refer strictly to a couple but could also refer to a community such that an uncoupled 
person’s life could be considered full and complete, allowing the condition for the 
possibility of “sharing of power-with” to be properly established. 
Nothwehr is not alone in her quest for a better (Christian) understanding of 
relationship and power. James B. Nelson, as mentioned in Chapter Three, also finds fault 
with the unchecked, “unilateral,” self-centered, one-way, exhaustible worldly power that 
our institutions have traditionally bestowed upon men. Nelson claims that unlike 
unilateral power, relational (shared) power generates more power as one absorbs the 
influence of another without losing one’s own center. Unlike one-directional power, 
which, in accordance with the principle of conservation of energy concerning physical 
power, is lost when transferred to another entity, relationally shared power only grows as 
it is transferred and shared. The experience of non-mutual power, then, is unilateral 
power, the power that is conferred on the “phallus.”15 The experience of mutual power is 
relational power, the power that is conferred on the full reality of both the penis and 
phallus. Whereas the false (phallic) notion of power is alive and well only until it is spent 
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(and “dies”), the true (shared) notion of power, measured by the size of the stature of 
one’s soul, is inexhaustible and does not die but rather transforms its life. That is, true 
power is mutuality. 
Jesus Christ as the Model 
Christine E. Gudorf claims that one can take cues not only from not only some 
thinkers within the tradition, as does Nothwehr, and from ideological and philosophical 
exercises, as does Nelson, but also formulate norms of masculinities from the very stories 
of Jesus of Nazareth. She notes that Jesus, as a life-nurturing man, may be seen as a 
“wimp”16 by today’s societal standards and/or too feminine by current Church 
standards.17 Yet the Jesus of the Gospels is a male figure who ministered “in tears, in pity 
and tenderness, in eschewing the privileges of authority, and especially in serving others 
in subordinate roles as when he washed his disciples' feet.”18 I believe it particularly 
noteworthy that a short phrase like “Jesus wept” is given a verse of its own, as it signifies 
awareness of the importance of this act by Jesus.19 Hence, in a sense, our gender 
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 In fact, there is a movement in the United States known as “Macho Jesus for Men” headed by Mark 
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272 
 
socialization not only “victimizes men in many, many ways,” but is also not true to Jesus’ 
way.20 Gudorf argues that we, men and women alike, must be like Jesus; that is, more 
than partially and peripherally involved in the basic nurturing activities of human life.21 
The call, then, is not to jettison Jesus or the tradition, but to formulate a better 
definition of masculinities for Catholics and genuinely to remain within and sincerely to 
become closer and more authentically faithful to Jesus and the Roman Catholic tradition. 
To that end, one must make valiant efforts to understand all that one can about Jesus of 
Nazareth. As I discussed in Chapter Three, if one wants to emulate Jesus, borrowing from 
Nelson, the central issue is not Jesus’ maleness but Jesus’ humanity! His human sexuality 
is a testimony to his maleness; just as divinity and humanity are not to be understood as 
utterly different and essentially opposite, neither are maleness and femaleness. The 
divinity understood as dominating Jesus’ humanity is a “phallic” definition of the divine. 
Men, therefore, are not to embrace something foreign.22 Rather, men are to embrace the 
fullness of the revelation that comes through their male bodies, the characteristics already 
contained within them, and, indeed, the earthly phallus—as deep, moist, sensuous, 
primitive, and powerful as it may be. Equally important and equally male are good penile 
energy in men: a soft, vulnerable, and receptive form of peaceful power. In this model, 
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mutuality is a norm, and the integral (full) acceptance of the tradition and Jesus’ 
humanity and divinity is an adequate analogy. Like the Christian notion of the Trinity, 
such a model calls for the unity of men as a group while also recognizing the great 
diversity within that group. The acceptance of mutuality and diversity is the goal of 
male–female relationships and reflective of the very character of God.23 
The discussion thus far has been a mere first step. One must not forget that just as 
other (non-theological) sources have been helpful in our understanding of gender, they 
may also be useful in formulating a new paradigm for Catholic masculinities. Hence, 
moving beyond normative categories for formulating a just and loving model for 
masculinities for the Catholic family, one may find categories developed by Tom L. 
Beauchamp and James F. Childress in the contemporary medical ethics literature to be 
appropriate.24 While not having a direct connection to medical ethics as such, the 
categories are helpful insofar as their normative claims can also function for the notions 
of masculinities. That is, the adequate theological criteria for masculinities must adhere to 
their principles, namely 1) respect for autonomy, 2) prohibition of maleficence, 3) 
valuing of beneficence, and 4) justice.25 
Autonomy 
 As the root of the word itself indicates, auto/nomy concerns the self and its own 
governance. Determining what this actually means is a complex task. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
23
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many theories of autonomy all agree that two common conditions are intrinsic to the 
concept: 1) liberty (independence from controlling influence) and 2) agency (capacity for 
intentional action).26 Beauchamp and Childress expand these two conditions to 
encompass the action of “with understanding,” so that consent of a patient, for example, 
is an “informed” consent.27 Cumulatively, then, an autonomous action entails that one 
intentionally chooses to act on something with understanding and without an outside 
controlling influence on the agent. 
 In this context, it is critical to recognize that intentionality is not a matter of 
degree; that is, one either acts intentionally or non-intentionally. Conversely, how much 
one understands and is influenced is a matter of degree. One can understand only to a 
certain degree, and one can be influenced to a greater or lesser extent. An autonomous 
action must entail, at the very least, “a substantial degree of understanding and freedom 
from constraint.”28 As is often the case in ethics, however, determining what is 
considered “substantial” is a difficult task. In clarification, Beauchamp and Childress 
maintain that a substantially autonomous decision can be carefully taken in light of 
specific objectives.29  
In relation to the objective at hand—to specify the principle of autonomy for 
constructing a better model of masculinities—one must articulate what is (at least 
minimally) required for men to be autonomous. Whatever one deems appropriate for a 
notion of masculinities, it must entail that a man intentionally chooses to judge, decide, 
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and act freely (i.e., without substantial constraint) with substantial knowledge. In 
previous chapters, I discussed how socially constructed ideologies (i.e., controlling 
influences) have presented men with certain obstacles to the ways that they wish to act 
and think. Such hindrances, however, do not necessitate that men have no freedom 
whatsoever to act and think with liberty, or that they are simply a product of 
outside/external influences. Nevertheless, as I previously explained, the process of 
socialization is sufficiently strong to be considered a substantial controlling influence that 
does not allow men to gain a clear understanding of their own manhood. 
 For men to acquire better self-governance, then, they are required to gain a better 
understanding of the kind of socialization to which (often unknowingly and 
unintentionally) they have been subjected and gain authentic knowledge of their selfhood. 
This dissertation is meant partially to serve as a tool on a journey toward fulfilling that 
requirement. Only by gaining such understanding can men begin to move toward 
relieving their lives of anxiety, stress, and depression. Only then can men throughout the 
world create more loving and just homes for their families and fulfill the conditions 
necessary for reconstructing truer, freer, and more autonomous and authentic “manly” 
selves. 
Nonmaleficence and Beneficence 
 The principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence are so closely related that it is 
difficult to discuss one without simultaneously discussing the other. Closely associated 
with the maxim Primum non nocere (Above all, do no harm),30 nonmaleficence requires 
that one not intentionally inflict harm. However, one can immediately see at least two 
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problems with this conception: ambiguity concerning what constitutes harm and the 
passive nature of the principle. Not only must one define “harm” but also determine 
whether a harmful action is justifiable in a particular situation. This discernment requires 
differentiating trivial from serious harm as well as physical from emotional/mental harm, 
which is a very difficult but important process. Sometimes one must take a harmful yet 
necessary and justifiable action, as does a surgeon in performing invasive surgery, or 
faces a situation in which “a harmful invasion by one party of another’s interests may not 
be wrong or unjustified, although it is prima facie wrong.”31 Adding to these difficult 
concerns is the fact that the principle is passive in nature; “do no intentional harm” has 
more to do with inaction than action. 
 Because of these difficulties, the principle of nonmaleficence must be discussed in 
conjunction with the principle of beneficence. Along with passively avoiding evil and not 
inflicting harm, this methodology forces one actively to prevent and remove evil and 
harm and to promote good.32 This principle requires that one promotes not only what 
contributes to human flourishing but also remove conditions that cause harm to others.33 
In a sense, beneficence is a more difficult appeal than nonmaleficence because it requires 
more effort. This is because it is not enough that one not be part of the problem; one 
should be part of the solution. One may find it more difficult to act beneficently since 
inactions are often not considered immoral whereas nonmaleficent inaction is immoral.34 
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Nevertheless, Beauchamp and Childress claim that “even though nonmaleficence requires 
impartial treatment, it does not necessarily override or take priority over beneficence.”35 
 The implications of the two principles for the task at hand are vast. I have hitherto 
discussed the harm that the modern (Roman Catholic) norms of masculinity have caused. 
Because it is difficult to define what is harmful in a universally normative sense, I have 
attempted to parse out only what is harmful in regards to this project. My purpose has 
been to identify what harms one ought to avoid. I have suggested that we avoid one-sided 
(polar-opposite) as well as complementary notions of sex and gender. However, as the 
principle of beneficence teaches, one must move further to pronounce what good one can 
do to contribute to the flourishing of all men, and indeed all persons. I have suggested 
that accepting a more integral version of masculinities may be a great first step toward 
achieving beneficence. 
One ought actively to deconstruct and construct, respectively, surrounding 
conditions that continue to obstruct and enable men in order to allow them to become 
more true to the wholeness of their being. If that means that one should actively 
undertake steps to promote the wholeness of the person vis-à-vis the institutions that 
develop norms concerning sex and gender based on misunderstandings, then one should 
do so. My objective, then, is to endorse and advance the kind of knowledge that awakens 
societies and institutions to grasp the totality of the reality of men and manhood. 
However ambiguous the meanings of masculinities are, these notions must avoid 
promoting the infliction of intentional and unnecessary harm and promote the 
performance of good works. This, I suggest, requires one to move beyond 
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complementary and one-sidedness to promote a more diverse and comprehensive 
definition of masculinities. 
Attention to principles from medical ethics may help one to build better categories 
and to describe the conditions that enable such acceptance. Taking cues from the more 
developed norms stemming from medical ethics, Margaret A. Farley adds the notions of 
fruitfulness and social justice.36 By fruitfulness, Farley does not simply refer to the form 
of biological (procreative) fruitfulness that results in the production of offspring—
although this form is immensely important and powerful—but rather all forms of 
interpersonal love.37 This kind of fruitfulness extends beyond biological children created 
between “just the two” to a wider community of persons because “love brings new life to 
those who love.”38 The new life may take different forms, including “nourishing other 
relationships; providing goods, services, and beauty for others; informing the fruitful 
work lives of the partners in relation; helping to raise other people’s children; and on and 
on.”39 
Justice 
Intimately related to fruitfulness, Farley expands the notion of relationality to the 
wider community in her discussion of social justice as a norm. She explains that as her 
notion “points to the kind of justice that everyone in a community or society is obligated 
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to affirm for its members,”40 it requires consideration of all persons “for incorporation 
into the wider community, for physical safety, psychic and economic security, and basic 
well-being.”41 Within this sense of social justice, Farley identifies other issues of utmost 
importance, including racial, sexual, and domestic violence, as well as development, 
globalization, and gender bias, most of which stem from the reinforcement of “unjust 
construction of gender roles” and false stereotypes of religious and cultural traditions.42 
In light of this fruitfulness and social justice can enhance the traditional notion of 
masculinity in a number of ways. First, any attempts at defining masculinity ought to 
bring a new kind of life and energy into the realities of being a man. Unlike a notion that 
significantly limits men’s potential to become more fully (hu)man, and thereby restricts 
their process of being born again into a new life, a more informed definition of 
masculinities accepts multifaceted aspects of the male realities which hitherto have been 
deemed unacceptable. Such unacceptability stems partly from the idea that accepting all 
forms of masculinities may lead to the point where one can claim that there is no such 
reality categorized as “man” or even “sex.” 
However, a man who can simultaneously accept his uniqueness and his 
commonality with other men is able more fully to accept his multifaceted nature without 
claiming that the notion of masculinity is meaningless. Doing so is important because it 
acknowledges that this fullness of being opens up limitless possibilities for men to 
                                                 
40
 Ibid.,228. 
 
41
 Ibid.,291, 228. 
 
42
 Ibid.,229-230. 
280 
 
continue to find new ways to grow, to give themselves to God, to be born again in their 
own unique way, and, indeed, to be more fruitful. 
Second, the new notions of masculinities include the norm of social justice, which 
contains the notions of psychic security and basic well-being. To ensure men’s well-
being, then, one must jettison aspects of traditional notions of masculinity that cause 
unnecessary anxiety and superfluous stress. The first step in doing so is to “alleviate the 
social attitudinal consequences of maintaining a strong negative evaluation” of men who 
do not fit neatly into the socially constructed notion of masculinity,43 so that men do not 
feel the need to “live up” to the unrealistic expectation of being either a sole breadwinner 
or an emotionless stoic leader without any emotive needs. Achieving this goal requires a 
kind of education that “will help to demythologize popular beliefs that create false fear” 
regarding traditionally non-manly behavior.44 In accordance with the theme of social 
justice, such an education must be provided at the institutional level, and would therefore 
require institutional support.45 
Putting these norms together, a reconstruction of masculinities for Roman 
Catholic families begins to surface. Using a modified notion of masculinities, one is able 
to apply it to the appropriate role that men can play within the (Catholic) household. Thus 
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far, the notions that this dissertation have set forth are applicable to not only Catholics but 
all Christians, and indeed all people. The universal nature of this study is thus quite 
catholic in its approach, which is a positive outcome. Nevertheless, as this project is 
intended to develop a specifically Roman Catholic vision/understanding of masculinities, 
there remains a need to construct and explain the notions of masculinities in a 
distinctively Catholic language. To that end, one may find the Roman Catholic vision of 
sacramentality as it relates to the notions of masculinities particularly helpful. 
Men, Body, and Sacramentality 
Practicing Catholic theology or being a Catholic requires continuous participation 
in sacramental life, which includes ritual participation in the sacraments of the Church. 
However, understanding the meaning of the Catholic notion of sacramentality requires 
exploring it beyond the seven clearly defined sacraments. The basis for considering an 
action a sacrament is the sacramental principle that “sees” the invisible grace, that makes 
visible the divine presence, and that finds the spiritual in the material reality, all because 
the imprint of God is in all of God’s creation.46 According to this principle, all reality is 
sacred and all of creation is potentially sacramental because “everything is, in principle, 
capable of embodying and communicating the divine.”47 All of us, in fact, “have personal 
sacraments: people, things, places or events which speak to us deeply and richly of the 
love of God which we know surrounds us always but of which we are not always 
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aware.”48 Of all these moments, there are seven during which we commonly recognize 
and become aware of the creation that is grounded in grace. As such, the Catholic Church 
has designated these seven sacraments as special sacraments, defining them as  
moments of reflection, shared with one another in celebration, that bring 
together and deepen all our other reflections about life. They are key 
experiences that provide new insight into our other experiences and so 
deepen them.49 
 
However, just as we call Sunday “the Lord’s day” although God is available every 
day, sacramental experience is not limited to receiving the seven communal sacraments 
in the Church but is also possible individually in everyday life.50 Indeed, the seven 
sacraments draw on key experiences from the most basic of human experiences—birth, a 
shared meal, sin and reconciliation, maturity, spousal union, vocation, sickness and 
death—to inspire one “to look to others and to the wider world for more signs of God” by 
reference to one’s own personal key experiences.51 Hence, one is able to make visible 
what is normally invisible through sacramental moments.52 These moments, usually 
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involving key experiences in one’s life, are instances of epiphany that enable one to see 
the sacramental reality beyond that experience and in creation itself, and even in the 
mundane experiences of everyday human life. 
 One may experience many of these key moments in life, depending on one’s 
openness and willingness. One example of these moments that is not part of the seven 
sacraments is the experience of the process of procreation: childbearing, gestation, and 
giving birth. These miraculous and momentous moments give not only the mother but 
also the father an opportunity to see life in a new light and invite them to see the rest of 
creation in a new light. The important moments in the process of procreation can point 
one toward God and make God more visible, providing moments of realization that help 
one to apprehend that the more one knows about all of God’s creation, the more one can 
know about God.53 
Of the many possible experiences, those involving human sexuality and the body 
are often vehicles to know reality immediately and directly. The human body and the 
sexual experience through it can be manifestations of the sacred, “revealing to us what is 
beyond our conscious rational apprehension.”54 In other words, being more aware of our 
bodies and sexual experiences can potentially be a truly sacramental experience. The call, 
then, is “not to project the ‘value of phallus … onto our experienced worlds,’ but to make 
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the ‘fully physical, sweating, lubricating, menstruating, ejaculating, urinating, defecating 
bodies… the central vehicle of God’s embodiment in our experience.’”55 Men, it follows, 
can reflect on their own bodies and sexual experiences to gain insight into sacramentality 
as men. While both men and women can experience momentous changes in their lives 
that point them toward God, there are changes experienced by men, such as certain bodily 
changes, that reveal them to be sacred and sacramental. 
Men can experience sacramental moments of reflection early in their lives with 
the natural changes that occur in their bodies, which can be quite natural, uncontrollable, 
and unintentional but also manageable and intentional. In the developmental adolescent 
years, boys first notice physiological changes, including the appearance of chest and 
facial hair and the development of a deeper voice. Initially, these changes serve only as 
signs of their entry into manhood, as boys are rarely given an opportunity to discuss the 
changes in hindsight or to learn about the changes prior to their occurrence in preparation 
for them. Such lack of opportunity can be attributed to the fact that boys are encouraged 
to camouflage their feelings and discouraged from discussing physiologically and 
psychologically changing moments and experiences. Fathers also miss this opportunity to 
discuss the changes in their sons’ bodies because they do not know how to give voice to 
their sons’ experiences. Rather than addressing the situation, men often avoid it 
altogether, performing what Lillian B. Rubin calls the “approach–avoidance dance.”56 
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More mature reflection reveals that several of these changes in the male body can 
be recognized as sacramental. However, such recognition is possible only if men break 
their silence about and reflect on their experiences through their bodies. To that end, men 
must become aware of the vulnerabilities of their changing bodies, and “rather than 
building up a muscular, athletic, erect, brave, wise, protective, competitive, iron body … 
try to stay closer to real bodies, itching, aging, flowing, hurting, loving, dying, smelling, 
praying, masturbating, spilling, adorning, fathering, nurturing, growing fat, getting 
sick.”57 Thus, a better awareness and understanding of the symbolic value of changes in 
the male genitalia, male circumcision, semenarche (first ejaculation, including nocturnal 
emissions and masturbation), deepening of the voice, growth of bodily hair (especially 
chest and facial), and puberty in general through open expression and conversation is 
essential in evoking their sacramental potential. One prominent Catholic thinker has 
already embarked on this process. Before calling upon his helpful work, however, a few 
words of caution are necessary. 
Richard Rohr, O.F.M. 
 Richard Rohr is a Catholic priest in the Franciscan tradition and the founding 
director of the Center for Action and Contemplation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
Along with Patrick Arnold and Joseph Martos, his works can be categorized within the 
field of (Catholic) mythopoeticism (see chapter 4).58 Catholic mythopoeticism shares a 
common theme with its Christian and secular mythopoetic counterparts: a concern over 
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maintaining an archetypal model of masculinity. Accordingly, Catholic mythopoeticism 
is concerned with the themes of “fatherlessness, initiation, wildness/wilderness, male 
bonding and the feminization of society and the Church.”59 While the latest edition of his 
work (From Wild Man to Wise Man: Reflections on Male Spirituality) omits several 
harsh sections contained in his previous edition (Wildmen, Warriors and Kings: 
Masculine Spirituality and the Bible) and does not directly attack women and 
feminization, as do Arnold and secular mythopoetic authors in their works, his basic 
mythopoetic beliefs remain intact.60 
 One section that Rohr omitted was the very first page of the book, which had 
stated 
WARNING. This book is not for women. Nor is it for softies, wimps or 
nerds who intend to stay that way for the rest of their lives… if you are 
open to being changed, strengthened and deepened, read-on—even if you 
are a woman, but especially if you want to be a man.61 
 
Such a warning comes from his belief that there are decisive masculine and feminine 
dimensions. Hence, his Center for Action and Contemplation is “geared toward action, 
which is on the masculine side of spirituality, but it is also a place for contemplation, 
which is on the feminine side.”62 Unlike other mythopoetic counterparts, however, his 
Catholic mythopoeticism encourages men to develop their feminine side and vice versa 
based on his belief that 
                                                 
59
 Joseph Gelfer, “Identifying the Catholic Men’s Movement,” The Journal of Men’s Studies 16.1 (Winter, 
2008), 43, 53. 
 
60
 For example, the newest edition (2005), omits many definitive sounding claims contained in the 1992 
edition of The Wild Man’s Journey. 
 
61
 Richard Rohr, OFM, The Wild Man’s Journey (1992), i. 
 
62
 Ibid.,5. 
287 
 
the spiritually whole person integrates within himself or herself both the 
masculine and the feminine dimensions of the human spirit. She or he is 
androgynous…[having] the ability to be masculine in an womanly way and 
to be feminine in a manly way. The androgynous person distinguishes the 
masculine from the feminine, which is a male gift, but also unites the 
masculine and the feminine, which is the female gift.63 
 
Like the “New Catholic Feminism” discussed in chapter 2, in this (male) quasi-version of 
a (misguided) pro-feminism, he recognizes the negative consequences of gender 
stereotypes (i.e., a supposed “natural” male tendency toward violence and dominance) 
and the good that came out of liberal ideas (i.e., individual worth, freedom, rights, and 
equality). However, by relentlessly invoking polarity in femaleness and maleness, he is, 
as another critic says, “perpetuating simplistic gender roles.”64 Although he never makes 
outright statements of masculine superiority or feminine inferiority, he claims that the 
“feminine” virtues, such as “humility, obedience, openness, receptivity, trust, forgiveness, 
patience and long-suffering… [i]n and of themselves… have no power to move in any 
outward direction,”65 but if a woman develops her masculine side, she “will have these 
strengths and they will make her a more dynamic and integrated person.”66  
Moreover, despite speaking out against patriarchy and claiming that some 
characterizations of masculinity and femininity are false, Rohr simultaneously polarizes 
the two conceptions, as he does in the following passages: 
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We know instinctively that masculinity cannot be the same as patriarchy… 
it is the other side of feminine energy. It is the other pole, the complement, 
the balance, the counterpoise…. I am not saying that males are 
characterized by exclusively masculine energy and that females hold only 
feminine…. 
For starters, a masculine spirituality would emphasize movement over 
stillness, action over theory, service to the world over religious discussions, 
speaking the truth over social niceties and doing justice instead of any self-
serving “charity.” Without a complementary masculine, spirituality 
becomes overly feminine (which is really false feminine) and is 
characterized by too much inwardness, preoccupation with relationships, a 
morass of unclarified feeling and religion itself as a security blanket. 
Some believe, as I do too, that biology is also destiny. Our meaning 
is partly encoded in our body, our genes, our shape and physicality… [F]or 
men, it has something to do with both carrying and planting seeds. For 
women, it means receiving protecting and nurturing what is planted. I know 
some will not agree with me here, particularly some braches of feminism, 
but I ask you to indulge me.67 
 
Hence, Rohr encourages men to move away from the cultural stereotypes while 
paradoxically reifying the very gender stereotypes that he encourages them to relinquish. 
I am aware that as Rohr wrote this work at a particular time period and in a 
popular/spiritual writing style. Thus, it is inappropriate to present his conclusions as 
“scientific” findings. Nevertheless, I believe that application of some of his imagery can 
be very helpful in constructing masculinities, and thus apply his section on male sexuality 
(especially that contained in the newest edition). 
The Knights of Columbus and Fathers for Good 
It is important to briefly discuss first the historical precedents from which authors 
like Rohr draw their ideas: the Knights of Columbus in general and their group Fathers 
for Good in particular. Founded in 1882, the Knights of Columbus has sought to mutually 
“benefit society for Catholic men and their families and was intended to encourage pride 
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in American Catholicism.”68 The group recognizes that one “way to illustrate the virtues 
of a real man of God is by reference to a good soldier,” such as by referring to the need to 
be “a special-ops dad” and describing “good husbands and fathers” as “true knights for 
God and country.”69 As part of its efforts to encourage men to become true fathers, the 
Knights of Columbus began an initiative in 2008 called Fathers for Good, whose goal “is 
to equip and inspire men to face the challenges of daily life at work and at home, and to 
bring them closer to their faith and their families.”70 Drawing on the existing Knights of 
Columbus literature, this initiative led to the compilation of the St. Joseph Series Booklets, 
whose topics “cover prayer, manly virtues, saintly models and practical advice and 
guidance for today’s fathers.”71 
Just as Rohr tries to strike a balance between secular mythopoeticism and 
feminism, Fathers for Good is less concerned with emphasizing certain common themes, 
such as male dominance, militarism, and sports, than its evangelical Protestant Christian 
counterpart, Dad the Family Shepherd.72 Fathers for Good strives to “encourage a 
masculinity founded on the sacraments, such as adoration of the saints and Mary and 
confession, which leads to a slightly less patriarchal masculinity.”73 Thus, we find in 
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Catholic mythopoeticism and Catholic men’s ministry several common threads, 
particularly an antipathy to sexism and its derivatives, such as sexist language and 
patriarchy. Nevertheless, both continue to perpetuate a deeply rooted notion of an 
ontological gender complementarity from which a “soft” conception of masculinity 
emerges.74 Despite their progress, made in part by keeping their literature free from 
militant, chauvinistic, male-headship language, and their honest intentions, they thus 
continue to polarize gender. I keep this reality in mind as I proceed to apply several 
useful forms of imagery derived from the very source of my criticism. 
Sacramental Moments for Men 
The Catholic Church mediates the rituals of the seven sacraments in ways that 
allows its followers to realize that these sacraments reflect the journey of human life, 
which leads to understanding that sacramental moments are contained not only in ritual 
but all of life. Similarly, an antecedent to the sacramental moment of changes in a boy’s 
body is openness in conversation about these changes to allow the boy to understand that 
he has somehow experienced God through these changes. We can thus “help our own 
sons by sharing our inner lives with them, our thoughts, our feelings, dreams, and hurts” 
only after we first recognize our male bodies and the momentous changes that came 
along with them.75 The opportunities for this conversation can occur whenever there are 
changes in one’s body, which are sometimes intermittent, sometimes regular, often 
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unintended but certainly intended at times, and frequently dramatic yet occasionally 
unconscious and mundane. 
After a boy first becomes conscious that his penis changes in size, for example, he 
quickly notices that such change is often uncontrollable. He can then realize that there are 
two realities of the male penis: hard and soft. While the harder reality outweighs the 
softer realities in rigidity, the soft outweighs the hard in actuality (as far as the actual 
presence is concerned). Thus, a conversation about this moment can shed light on both 
the ultimate control of God and the freedom that we are given by God. It can help us 
realize that there is “a proper place for both in our lives, vulnerability and strength, letting 
go and firmness. Wisdom is to know when, where, and how.”76 Through this integrity 
(i.e., fullness) of one’s experience, then, one can start to make visible the fact that, “The 
male penis… is a means of making contact, literally ‘reaching out’ for the other, not to 
hurt or invade, but to pleasure and delight—mutuality!”77 A more authentic knowledge of 
his body leads a man finally to understand the true function of his inviting body as it 
reaches out to the self and others and, indeed, directs him to appreciate his body as a 
symbol of self-gift that is God. Sometimes we do not realize such a reality of one’s penis. 
Yet, in the unconscious and the mundane, God is still with us, despite our unawareness of 
the abundant opportunities to notice that God is all around us and already in our bodies. 
Perhaps because men are socialized not to exhibit weakness and vulnerability, 
they often neglect to reflect on their scrotum, more so than their penis, which at least has 
the “strong” side. The male scrotum is a delicate organ, one that many consider the most 
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vulnerable part of the male anatomy; it is sensitive, weak, and defenseless. Ironically, 
however, Western society has derived some of the strongest sounding expressions from it, 
with such slang terms as “grow some balls” and “grow a pair” used as a means of 
commanding one to “toughen up.” The assumption in these phrases, of course, is that the 
scrotum somehow serves as a symbol for becoming strong(er). Male scrotal energy can 
certainly represent power and enormous possibilities; after all, male testicles literally 
carry billions of potential seeds of creation.  
Simultaneously, however, the male scrotum also represents a receptacle for and a 
form of protection for these billions of seeds, “a place of patient ripening, a place of dark, 
wet mystery, that must be protected and kept warm.”78 Gaining a clearer understanding of 
the male body that includes the testicles directs us toward a heuristic moment. That is, 
even at the most physical level, even when using a methodology that claims that biology 
is our destiny, a more authentic recognition of one’s body serves as a personal sacrament 
that evokes divine visibility of the reality of God and God’s creation. When a man 
realizes the power of his scrotal energy, he accepts his masculinity as powerful yet tender, 
defeated yet victorious, and confined yet open to creation. Indeed, one can similarly get a 
glimpse of the wholeness of God, albeit never sufficiently. Billions of opportunities for 
gaining this awareness have already been planted in the male body. Man only needs to be 
aware of and attend to his own body to realize this scrotal energy. 
Not all circumstances for male sacramentality come unintentionally. In many 
cultures, men are initiated into their society via male circumcision. Rohr argues that 
because the male scrotum, or the “male birth canal,” is largely associated with pleasure, 
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“many deemed it necessary for the man to bleed and suffer pain in his penis during 
initiation…[so that he is] taught the inherent connection between pain and new life.”79 
Male circumcision, which often occurs in the early stages of his life, can be a traumatic 
experience, yet it is through such trauma that a man is able, later in his life, to make a 
symbolic connection with the paradox of life. A man understands that the very intentional 
act of male circumcision is “a sacred wounding, leading to wisdom and even ‘covenant’ 
with God!”80 Despite the dangers of abusing the symbolism by associating all forms of 
new life with the necessity of pain, it reflects the fundamentally Christian view that life 
cannot be conceived without somehow giving it away. The moment of pain and all the 
resulting effects serve as reminders that we not only see God in the pleasures of life but 
also in pain and hardship. 
The male body is subjected to many physical changes during puberty, including 
the deepening of the voice and the growth of bodily hair, that all have the potential to 
provide insight into the reality of God, i.e., provide a sacramental experience. Perhaps no 
physical experience of men opens them to the sacramental potential as dramatically and 
directly as their initial experience of ejaculation (called, “Semenarche”).81 Boys’ 
semenarche, which occurs where the scrotal energy meets the phallic reaching out and 
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coming forth, is a memorable, highly charged event.82 Semenarche often occurs 
unintentionally in the form of a nocturnal emission (commonly known as a “wet dream”) 
but sometimes intentionally via masturbation. When semenarche occurs during a 
nocturnal emission, boys often confuse semen with urine, and show surprise rather than 
reporting pleasure or happiness.83 Most boys, even those exposed to sex education, feel 
unprepared and are secretive about the experience84 for one of many reasons, the most 
obvious of which, as I have repeatedly pointed out, is that they are socialized to 
camouflage certain experiences. However, some of the secretiveness and unpreparedness 
come from the fact that most of their education is neither adequate nor sufficiently early, 
with most education provided after many boys’ experience of semenarche, for it to have a 
significantly positive effect.85 Moreover, as semenarche is a socially invisible event, 
exemplified by the fact that we do not use the name for the first ejaculation in our 
vocabulary,86 boys deny attaching much significance to the event despite the fact that it is 
indeed significant in their lives.87 
On the other hand, when boys’ semenarche results from masturbation, they are 
conscious of the experience of the orgasm that accompanies masturbation, and thus 
remember it with more pleasure and happiness than those whose semenarche occurred via 
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a nocturnal emission.88 Moreover, “semenarche is less anxiety producing” and a more 
positive experience for boys who had received education prior to the event,89 as well as 
for boys with high cognitive capacity, as “a boy’s ability to understand the physical 
changes of puberty is limited by his cognitive abilities.”90 Such limitations grow 
exponentially when one discusses a boy’s ability to understand sacramental significance 
and the symbolism inherent in his physical changes. Since it helps boys consciously to 
experience an orgasm but most have not yet developed the cognitive skill to understand 
the changes occurring in the bodies, it behooves parents and religious leaders—for 
psychological as well as theological reasons—to discuss the experience of semenarche 
both prior to and after the event.91 
All leaders, including the leaders of a household, can help guide boys in making a 
scared connection to semenarche. In contrast to viewing all forms of masturbation as the 
same act, making a connection between the sacred and semenarche may help boys to treat 
this experience as a moment of reflection. Such an approach may lead boys to see that the 
experience of orgasm is considered “out of this world” for a reason. This moment of 
realization may serve all of us in realizing our insignificance in relation to the cosmic 
creation and its Creator, and simultaneously point to the billions of possibilities that we 
have to be connected to that very Infinity we cannot normally conceive. A boy may 
                                                 
88
 Ibid.,377. 
 
89
 Ibid.,379, 383. 
 
90
 Jean Piaget, The Child’s Conception of the World (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams, 1972) quoted in Ibid., 
383. 
 
91
 It is difficult to imagine religious leaders and parents voluntarily having this discussion. Perhaps 
institutions of education, as part of the sex education for example, can include this discussion in their lesson 
plans. I believe this kind of education must simultaneously involve the education of the parents, too. 
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slowly realize that “I’m not always in control, all this is mysterious, but the change is 
wonderful, and my views on life and my life will never be the same.” Such a realization 
reflects the “seeds” planted in the boy’s mind on which he can reflect later and see that 
the Invisible is truly visible after all.  
The experience of semenarche is but a single example of how our human 
experiences are meant to guide us toward God. However, such guidance cannot occur if 
gender-specific obstacles continue to hinder our conversations regarding our attempts to 
make ourselves wholly and holier Catholic Christians and citizens. Hence, the leaders of 
religious institutions and families must help boys to overcome these obstacles, i.e. their 
labeling of emotions, conversation, and cooperation as not masculine. At the same time, 
however, we must encourage boys to lead from what we have labeled as masculine 
values: rationality, intelligence, and ambition. All these characteristics can be, and often 
are, masculine qualities. Jesus led us from all of these qualities and Christians must 
follow him as our example par excellence. 
 Shining a new light on a truer reality of men and Catholic men more 
specifically—that of the sacramental experience—enables one to evaluate and call for 
reform of the current Catholic notions of sex and gender complementarity. While the 
large strides that have been made over the years concerning gender roles in the Catholic 
Church must be praised and acknowledged, Catholic men and women must continue to 
find new possibilities for a more just and loving definition of masculinities. I believe this 
dissertation may serve as a small step toward such a goal. 
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Conclusion 
Ancient and Christian conceptions of sex and gender resulted in part from a long 
tradition of biblical and dualistic thinking that ultimately gave birth to the notion that 
there exists essential and irreconcilable differences between men and women. From this 
development came the Roman Catholic teaching of a complementary model for gender, 
claiming that all men and women possess qualities and characteristics specific to their 
sex which yields two sets of appropriate roles for each sex. When subjected to theological, 
scientific, and cross-cultural examination, however, it has been revealed to have major 
problems. These problems yield an inadequate theology of a Christian notion of God. 
This is because a complementary model highlights only certain aspects of God, namely 
the masculine qualities, and ignores the passive, vulnerable, soft, and gentle 
characteristics. However, Jesus of Nazareth not only embodied both of these dualistic 
components but also personified qualities beyond them, including mutual components. 
Indeed, “His uniqueness lay not in having two natures, one divine and one human, 
miraculously combined. Rather, he possessed the same human nature we all have, but 
remarkable and fully open in mutuality with God’s loving power.”92 Hence, a Christian 
notion of God must comprehensively include a diversity of these characteristics. 
Particularly troubling is that, whether directly or indirectly, such complementary 
imagery continuously associates men with the image of God and women with any image 
but God. At the social/human level, such a model continues to be the cause of unhealthy, 
unchangeable, and unjust relationships in which men experience difficulty finding 
solutions to relationship problems, as the very model in which they live is problematic. 
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 Nelson, “Embracing Masculinity,” 213. 
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That is, the Catholic model places men outside of the family—the private sphere—into 
the public sphere when the solution requires that they return to the family. Maintaining 
such a clear-cut dualistic division between the public and private conceals a significant 
link between them.93 Moreover, the appropriate norms described above are neither 
comprehensive nor adequate because one must move beyond them to better understand 
the reality that is men. To that end, I will conclude by sharing how experience can 
contribute to an ongoing religious conversation about sex, gender, and masculinities. 
                                                 
93
 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books Inc, 1989), 132-133. Also 
Cf. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Woman in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) 
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EPILOGUE 
 
I wanted what all little boys wanted. To be a hero. To ride horses and hit 
home runs and kill the enemy and never die. 
 
… the readers of history identify with the victors, the tellers of the tale who 
make themselves the heroes. ‘That means… there are other tales to tell. 
History is a construct and is created by an interested party, and the interested 
party is always the powerful and the rich.’ 
 
— David Mura, Where the Body Meets Memory: 
An Odyssey of Race, Sexuality, and Identity 
 
A Case for Men’s Experience, Men’s Narrative 
 
 Men’s lived experiences appear to be unspeakable, as they are constantly told that 
they do not have memories other than that of traditional male heroes. There is thus a 
vacuum in the minds of men, of the past, of the body. The only memories that men are 
allowed to have, to speak about, to express, is of winning, of being in control, of being 
invincible, of being active. This is not reality. This is not genuine. This is not what is. 
Men must be given the opportunity to claim their narratives. Being penetrated through 
these narratives, men can finally start to discover a truer self, a self that is filled with 
more melancholy, grief, and loss as they grow older and wiser. Institutions, including the 
religious and academic, vigorously and adamantly resist such truth-seeking. The façade 
that relentlessly reminds men that sharing their experience is less important, less valued, 
less credible, less academic, and less manly must be removed to unveil the truth. Men’s
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stories must be told to make space for recognizing the loss that unyielding gender norms 
have caused. Men’s (expressed) experience must count. It must guide and encourage 
other men to reconstruct a more fair, just, loving, and true vision of themselves, one that 
allows them to pursue good and avoid evil. 
 My story cannot be fully presented in this limited space. I can, however, provide a 
vignette of my personal experience as a soldier, forced to play the role for two years. This 
revealing experience is an illumination of institutional inculcation, its ripple effects, and 
the kind of collateral harm that an attitude can cause to the greater society. I want to be 
clear, however, that I experienced several wonderful moments, encounters, and memories 
during my compulsory military service in Korea. My intention in telling this story is not 
to make an overarching claim about all persons in the military, nor is it to present the 
institutional problems as inherent so to conclude that they are inevitable. I do intend, 
however, to claim that my story is not unique, as many men share similar, if not worse, 
experiences, and that problems stemming from it reflect the general crisis that such an 
institutional milieu can and does create in our societies. 
Men Become Real Men after the Service! 
 In the midst of my Ph.D. studies in the United States, I received a letter from the 
Republic of Korea ordering me to return for compulsory military service or face jail time, 
fines, and investigation of my family. As a student of theology and of an authentic form 
of “just war” theory, I debated whether I should disregard this order. Since practicing 
conscientious objection was illegal at that time,1 I decided to submit to the order in order 
to avoid jail time and to appease my family. When I made this decision, I was assured by 
                                                 
1There were some signs of hope for conscientious objection becoming legal for a time, but it remains illegal 
at the time of this writing. 
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my friends, who fulfilled the obligation years earlier, that the military would use me in 
different capacities, given my linguistic abilities and level of education, and that a “desk 
job” would be waiting for me. Unfortunately, I was assigned to an infantry division 
notorious for its physically rigorous training. Thus began my 2 years of participant-
observation. 
 While the drill instructors taught me much regarding the military during basic 
troop orientation and training, I cannot explicitly describe their teachings here due to 
national security concerns. What I can share is their methodology of persuasion and 
several of the highlights of my education: 
• Be proud to be in uniform and serving the country. 
• You become an honorable and legitimate member of society only after serving 
your country. 
• If you evade service, you are forgoing your normal life in Korean society. 
• If you drop out during training, you become a dropout (loser) of life. 
• Becoming the best soldier possible is the way to fulfill your filial obligations. 
• North Korea is our main enemy but other neighboring countries may also be 
enemies. 
• Undertaking and executing your given assignments at all cost is the first priority. 
• Keeping the order of ranks is the foundation of the military. 
• As such, absolute obedience to the command and commanders is indisputable. 
• You live by the command and die by the command.2 
 
Evoking guilt (often by referring to one’s parents) and shame (telling one that he is a 
loser if he has any doubts or trouble meeting expectations) and repeating oft-said phrases 
regarding male supremacy3 are all part and parcel of a presupposed military culture that 
                                                 
2
 These principles were not only repeatedly expressed during training and throughout the military career, 
but also written as “official” teachings. Military of National Defense, The Field Manual for Basic Troop 
Orientation/Training (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 2004) especially numbers 2, 5, 7, 17, 19, 
20. 
 
3
 Sometimes the phrases are implicitly expressed by saying that only those who serve in the military are 
normal and legitimate. Since only physically able Korean men serve, the implication is that women and the 
302 
 
all recruits must simply accept. Throughout one’s life as a compulsory solider, these 
notions are reiterated sometimes via “Wednesday mental trainings” or by repeatedly 
singing military songs inculcating these principles. The names of these songs reflect the 
belief that (only) men are “high and mighty”: “Fabulous Men We Are”; “True Men”; 
“We (men) Are the Best,” etc. Other times, these notions are simply restated in everyday 
conversations. During my service, a day rarely passed in which I heard neither a sentence 
beginning with “At least, we men…” or a derogatory reference to women or female body 
parts. During one educational session, I remember an officer stating that men talk all the 
time about their lives in the military even after they have discharged their duties because 
men, as a species, find combat situations to be “natural.” For this reason, women, who 
cannot handle being soldiers, or men who fulfill their requirements in a non-combatant 
capacity, are not honorable like us. 
What I heard and learned was very different from my experience. I did not feel 
that military life was very “natural” for me. It was difficult for me to view my 
neighboring country as enemies. I did not consider several of the officers and superiors 
sufficiently competent to deserve my undivided obedience. I did not think of women as 
objects of desire that belonged in the home. However, as upsetting as such training tactics 
were, I could do nothing about them. Nevertheless, I do think that these training tactics 
“worked” on me, as I believed that I would feel ashamed to face my parents and my 
nation if I ever spoke up against any my superiors in any way.  
One recruit, however, did speak up. During orientation training, one of the 
highest-rated trainees among the recruits told a drill sergeant that as a Seventh Day 
                                                                                                                                                 
disabled are not. However, some commonly used phrases are quite blunt, graphic, and explicit, such as “If 
you are born with a dick, then don’t act like a pussy” or, if you show a sign of weakness, “Are you a girl?” 
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Adventist, he could not participate in training on Sundays, but offered to do extra hours 
of training on other days of the week in compensation. This form of speaking up was 
considered a form of “disobedience” that warranted sending him to the military prison. 
When he was given another opportunity to disavow his religious practice, he again 
refused, and offered to do any kind of rigorous training as an alternative. His offer was 
again rejected, and he was later sentenced to serve time in a civil jail. His example 
showed us all what would happen to us if we displayed the slightest form of resistance. 
Indeed, after witnessing this example, I was afraid to voice any opinion other than to yell 
out, “Yes, sir!” 
I entered the service with critical eyes, a mind filled with the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, and a disapproving attitude regarding the military’s language of gender. 
Moreover, I entered the service as the oldest (30 years old) of nearly 2000 trainees, and 
thus likely much less impressionable than many of the young soldiers in their early 
twenties who entered with me. Despite these qualities, I found myself saying, doing, and 
thinking the very things that I had criticized before I had entered, especially as I neared 
the end of my service, a time at which I enjoyed a tremendous amount of power as a 
sergeant. Even with my preparation before entering, I required quite a long period to 
adjust to the world outside the fences of the military after my discharge. Even at my age, 
I had unknowingly lived in the physical and mental constructions of this military culture. 
I can imagine the dire consequences for many soldiers who are younger, less prepared, 
less informed, and less aware. For these young men, not doing anything is not an option. 
On those Sundays when we were not on an assignment or in combat-situation 
training, we were free to attend religious services. There I met a group of young Catholic 
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seminarians from different parts of the regiment and division. They too had participated 
in the same training and practices and had lived in the same culture as the other soldiers 
in their division, and, before they had known it, had become “true men.” As the military 
provides no “adjustment education” at the end of service to prepare us for a non-military 
society—which I think that all men desperately need before discharge—these 
seminarians return to their seminaries, become priests, and function as leaders in their 
communities who employ the same authoritarian and commanding attitudes toward their 
subordinates and faithful followers that they had employed in the military. Because they 
had been too young for deep reflection when they had served in the military, they are 
often not conscious of this connection. More gravely, when they cannot regain the power 
that they had once enjoyed over their subordinates in the military, they often express their 
frustration in forms of aggression in their churches. Hence, it is extremely urgent that the 
Roman Catholic Church in Korea moves beyond constructed authoritarianism if it is to 
serve God and its neighbors in a just, loving, and Christian way.4 
To be certain, this phenomenon is not specific to Korean Roman Catholic 
seminarians or to the ROK military. Anyone who has been influenced by any institution 
to think hierarchically or complementarily regarding gender needs to move beyond this 
thinking. Anyone who seeks to regain power once enjoyed during military service, in his 
work, school, team, government, or family can turn violent. One must actively bring 
about change to avoid this potential harm. Providing readjustment education when 
nearing the end of the service may be one means of doing so. Providing education 
                                                 
4
 There is no religious exemption for seminarians. While there are many social movements for more 
exemptions in South Korea, I am not aware of any such efforts from the authorities of the Roman Catholic 
Church in South Korea. 
305 
 
regarding gender justice in our churches may be another. Regardless of the form that they 
use, we must preach the truth of gender reality to men and women and work to create a 
society that is pleasing to God’s eyes. To better serve God, to better serve God’s people, 
and to be better Christians, we must see such a one-sided, militaristic, hierarchal, 
authoritarian male construction as problematic, acknowledge the fullness of our beings, 
and accept the reality of diversity within our categories of gender. 
It is clear to me that acknowledging the current problems and reforming the 
Catholic Church and Korean society are difficult tasks. I cannot imagine that institutions 
would readily agree to tackle these problems at this time. However, many people from 
my parents’ generation never thought that they would live to see something similar to the 
Second Vatican Council in their lifetimes. Likewise, I despair that a sufficient number of 
the changes which I advocate, for the Korean Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic 
Church as a whole, will not occur in my lifetime. I do, however, sincerely hope and 
faithfully pray that I am wrong.
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